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This thesis argues that behind the façade of a “digital government” narrative, 
bureaucrats and corporations are building a new mode of public governance 
that restructures and redistributes work and institutions, thereby furthering the 
growth of the corporate state (Kapferer 2010). However, since the emergence 
of the Internet in the mid-1990s, Western governments and corporations have 
been presenting digital government simply as the path to convenient and 
accessible services. 
Critically deploying the concept of ideology to explore the interplay of 
discourse and practice, this thesis investigates how the new governance 
regime is being constructed. It explores the ways in which the narrative of 
digital government obscures its participants, its development and its effects, 
while comforting its authors and selling an imaginary of online retail 
government to the public. To understand emerging patterns of power and 
structures of governance, I adopt a governmentality perspective (Foucault 
1991). To analyse what is actually being produced, I explore a welfare 
payments “transformation” program under construction by an Australian 
Government department, Services Australia, and its corporate “partners”. 
Working from the ground up, the thesis examines the ways system builders 
understand what they are doing and why. Interviews with system builders and 
departmental documents demonstrate the way global software models shape 
organisations and lock-in relationships with software corporations, systems 
integrators and consultants to create a new coalition that exemplifies the 
dynamics of the corporate state.  
Analysing the broad socio-technical scope of the new mode of governance in 
turn reveals the ideological work performed by the digital government frame. 
Behind that vision is an infrastructure of surveillance and control that places 
considerable unsupervised power in the hands of generations of bureaucrats 
and politicians to come. Further, I argue that the public sector is absorbing 
and facilitating emerging techniques of capitalism, such as the modularisation 
of work and organisations, platforms and digital surveillance. To this end, I 
examine the process by which a hybrid public/private regime can exploit 
technological innovations, legal exemptions and exceptional circumstances to 
justify the expansion of that infrastructure. This new regime thrives within a 
space protected by bureaucratic and commercial secrecy, beyond the scrutiny 
of the public and legislatures. The unprecedented nature of this 
reconfiguration of power means that conventional mechanisms of governance 
are unable to see or understand it, and so standard accountability mechanisms 
never properly engage with these exemplary elements of the corporate state. 
Thus, as the emerging regime redraws relationships between bureaucrats, 
corporations, the public and the political spheres, it simultaneously extends its 
gaze and withdraws from public scrutiny and from direct engagement with the 
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PART 1  INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW 
1.1  The terrain and research question 
Scene 1: Perth, Western Australia, June 1998 
It was just after lunch on a regular weekday in a government office. Alan was 
heading out the door of our office with a large wheeled suitcase containing a 
computer, a projector, a screen and a stereo speaker system. At 45, he was the 
head of the IT division of a major state government department. Having once 
been the lead author of a state government information management policy, he 
had since been evangelising the great potential for information technology in 
government. He was on his way to give a presentation of his vision to a new 
audience. He did this regularly to groups of senior bureaucrats and business 
people and always got a positive reception. The presentation was a multimedia 
extravaganza, with video and sound segments drawn from sources around the 
world. It had cost thousands of dollars over some years to assemble and refine. 
In 1998, the world-wide web was expanding people’s access to more and more 
engaging online content. The liberating effects of the Internet were being widely 
extolled. In this vein, Alan’s presentation was visionary and exciting, rather 
than practical. 
That day, Alan was going to present to some senior partners in the local office 
of a global accounting firm. I was worried for Alan because I thought that this 
time these hard-headed bean counters would surely call him out for peddling a 
message that was all sound and fury and no substance. Throughout the 
afternoon I anticipated his return with a degree of trepidation. We had worked 
together for many years, and I was always a bit concerned that one day his 
enthusiasm for making multimedia and spending time evangelising technology 
was going to attract an adverse reaction. 
Alan returned to the office around four o’clock, beaming. The accountants 
loved the presentation. They had even scheduled Alan to deliver it again for 
their colleagues who were unable to attend that day. I immediately felt very 
relieved for Alan, but then I wondered why it was that such hard-nosed 
rationalists had lapped up Alan’s vision with such unquestioning enthusiasm. 
This seed of curiosity, later nurtured by several similar experiences, grew into a 
desire to understand what was happening. As it has transpired, what we now 
know as digital government delivers to rationalisers great opportunities that 





In the years after the Internet became commercially available in the mid 1990s, 
entrepreneurs saw the potential for extending electronic transactions to a 
broader range of enterprises and to the general public. This capability was 
called e-commerce. By the end of the decade, various interests could see the 
possibility of extending this concept to the public sector’s transactions with the 
public. Advocates of online government promoted the immediate benefits of 
24 x 7 availability from any location with a computer. Many advocates went 
further and foresaw the potential for making government more transparent 
and increasing public participation in government decision making. With less 
fanfare, advocates also identified opportunities for reducing the cost of 
delivering services and internal government operations. For many in 
government the arrival of networked computers promised to finally deliver the 
holy grail of “doing more with less”. 
All these benefits were combined into an agenda that became known as e-
government. This package of measures was promoted by central government 
policy units throughout the western world and beyond. Multinational 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) promoted it to member 
countries as a panacea for fighting all the challenges faced by government, 
from corruption to inefficiency and inequality. These policies and reports 
envisaged rapid transformation in a matter of a few years. The relationship 
between government, the public and business would be transformed; the 
emergence of a new mode of governance was predicted. The policies and 
reports were glowing; there would be no downside to e-government. The 
magic of online technology would deliver benefits for all. 
But progress was slow. There were some bright spots in many jurisdictions, 
but, after a decade, the expected overall transformation of government was 
not being realised. By 2010, as mobile technologies were being extolled as the 
next new wave of technological enablement, many advocates of computer- 
and network-enabled government rebranded the movement as digital 
government.1 The enthusiasm was undiminished, but the emphasis was 
changing, with a more singular focus on service delivery and less on 
democratic processes and public involvement in decision making. The 
transformational effects were still being promoted, but the visionary language 
was somewhat muted as the more practical aspects of the complexities of 
digitised transactions were addressed. 
 
1 The terms digital government and e-government are somewhat interchangeable. I use digital 
government as the generic term and e-government to refer to initiatives that use that term. E-
government was the term first used for this movement from the early 1990s, but in the early 
2010s, after a period of disappointment about e-government, there was an attempt to rebrand 
the movement as digital government (Di Maio 2013). However, the earlier tag has persisted for 
some academic authors (e.g. Fountain (2014) and Lips (2012)) and organisations (e.g. the 
United Nations (2016)). 
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However, the actual construction of systems that can provide the full online 
retail experience attracts several influential players with interests of their own. 
Delivering online services turned out to be a more complex problem than just 
creating a website. Personalised services, tight security, identity verification 
and data sharing all require sophisticated back-end systems. In many cases, 
making large antiquated internal systems accessible to the public involves a 
major redevelopment of systems designed originally to support skilled internal 
staff. The digital dream, rather than being a way to deliver services more 
cheaply, was going to cost a lot up-front and involve the transfer of public 
expenditure from employing public servants to buying private sector products 
and services. Moreover, large system developments have a high failure rate, 
especially in the public sector (Gauld, Goldfinch & Dale 2006, 10–13). 
Delivering digital government turns out to be expensive and risky. To embark 
on such a path, these projects require the whole-hearted support of 
departmental executives and their ministers to pitch these projects as high 
priorities. They then require strong backing from the “guardians of the public 
purse” (Wildavsky 1964)—the central agencies and the inner cabinet ministers 
who control government budgets. But the guardians demand a high price for 
their support. While the digital government discourse envisages government as 
an online retail experience, it ignores aspects of government that are of greater 
concern to these central stakeholders, such as holding down the bottom line 
through regulation, compliance and enforcement of the conditions of service. 
In the wings of government are other influential players: large global 
corporations who offer the ability to construct systems that would deliver the 
financial benefits required by the guardians, and the transformational dreams 
of system bureaucrats. The corporations develop similar capabilities mainly for 
private corporations around the globe. They also work with other 
governments with similar problems, and they develop the techniques and 
apparatus to handle such “transformative” changes. The “solutions” offered by 
these global firms and consultants have particular appeal to the bureaucratic 
desire for certainty. Bureaucracies and corporations jointly embark on projects 
that involve substantial organisational change to support the technology to 
streamline government operations, reduce costs—and incidentally make things 
more convenient for the public. 
In this thesis, I argue that the net result of satisfying these diverse interests is 
the creation of systems with a capacity to surveil and control the community, 
even as those efforts are promoted as convenience-enhancing. Governments 
are building this capacity without exposing these projects to public scrutiny. 
The interconnectedness of systems, and the tight network of bureaucrats, 
consulting firms and technology companies are combining to create systems 
that jeopardise the interests of the public, especially those whose lives are 
most engaged with government. In 2019, the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights reported: 
… the embrace of the digital welfare state is presented as an altruistic and noble 
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enterprise designed to ensure that citizens benefit from new technologies, 
experience more efficient government, and enjoy higher levels of well-being. 
Often, however, the digitization of welfare systems has been accompanied by 
deep reductions in the overall welfare budget, a narrowing of the beneficiary 
pool, the elimination of some services, the introduction of demanding and 
intrusive forms of conditionality, the pursuit of behavioural modification goals, 
the imposition of stronger sanctions regimes, and a complete reversal of the 
traditional notion that the state should be accountable to the individual (Alston 
2019, 3). 
Of signal importance to my argument, the Special Rapporteur also concluded 
that  
Big Tech operates in an almost human rights free-zone, and that this is especially 
problematic when the private sector is taking a leading role in designing, 
constructing, and even operating significant parts of the digital welfare state. (op. 
cit., 1, emphasis added)  
The promise of increased efficiency, reduced costs and maximised compliance 
has been essential to gain support from central government for such a costly 
and risky program. The need to deliver on that promise has driven 
government departments into the arms of integrators and developers of 
prefabricated software and thus to the adoption of a global digital service 
model designed by multinationals to satisfy their clients’ desire for low cost 
government. 
Research question 
So, in the pages that follow, my task is to understand this complex situation, 
how it came about and how the construction of a new mode of governance 
proceeds beyond the public gaze and counter to the promises made for digital 
government. My main research question homes in on a particular element of 
this constellation of practices: How are public- and private-sector 
proponents re-mediating the internal and external relationships of the 
public sector? In approaching this question there are two subsidiary questions: 
How do policy makers and other influencers construct a motivating 
mythology of digital government? How does the digital government 
discourse deflect attention from the real transformation and its potential 
consequences? 
Thus, the scope of attention expands from an examination of how 
governments go about adding a digital channel to their modes of service 
delivery to an engagement with broader concerns, such as the “hollowing-out 
of the state” (Rhodes 1994) and a transition to the corporate state (Kapferer 
2005b), the ideologies of the information society (Day 2001; Slack & Fejes 
1987), platform capitalism (Srnicek 2017b), the surveillance society (Lyon 
2013), and the very nature and location of contemporary governance (Foucault 
1991).  
To answer my research questions, I start with an ethnographic study of the 
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lived experience of participants in policy making and system development, at 
least as far as possible in such a secret world. The interviewees’ experience 
and my own career across several roles in this field are complemented by an 
examination of not-so-public documents in which bureaucracies are obliged to 
be more open about their corporate partners, current problems and 
imaginaries of greater control of their environments. A discourse analysis of 
the contrast between policy documents and communications with corporate 
partners provides insights into the interplay of mentalities of the market and 
social control. 
1.2  Significance/contribution 
My main aim with this project is to cast a new light on the implications of a 
bureaucratic drive to achieve greater heights of certainty in their capacity to 
see and manage the public through digital transactions. This perspective 
examines the role of digital government policies as an ideology of government 
that obscures the presence of an emerging socio-technical mode of 
governance. By focussing on the bureaucracy, rather than the “state” or the 
“government”, notions that include or even foreground elected officials, I hope 
to draw attention to the main locus of that new governance structure. 
The contribution of anthropology to this field has been substantial but has not 
explicitly addressed e-government/digital government to date. Anthropologists 
and others adopting an ethnographic approach have been active in broadly 
related fields of interest—through attention to technology (e.g., Ingold 1988; 
Lemonnier 1992; Pfaffenberger 1992), material culture (e.g., Johnson & Latour 
1988; Latour 1992), digital anthropology (e.g., Miller & Horst 2012; Pink et al. 
2016), IT in organisations (e.g., Bloomfield & Vurdubakis 1994; Hakken 1993), 
organisational studies (e.g., Czarniawska 2012), consultants (e.g., Prince 2012; 
Schultze 2000), the state (e.g., Geertz 2004; Kapferer 2005a, 2010), policy (e.g., 
Lea 2008; Shore, Wright & Però 2011; Wedel et al. 2005; Yanow 1996) and, 
according to Bernstein and Mertz (2011), only more recently the study of 
bureaucracy, (e.g., Graeber 2015; Lea 2008). 
The overwhelming majority of the literature on digital government is produced 
by the information systems field, and is utilitarian and enthusiastic in nature 
(Bekkers 2012; Heeks & Bailur 2007). There is, however, a small but salient 
and well-established body of critical literature that directly addresses e-
government/digital government. This literature sits at the boundaries of 
science and technology studies (STS), organisational studies, management, 
public administration, and political science, all but the first of which have 
generally steered away from questions of technology. In particular, several 
authors have identified the absence of technology in the literature of political 
science and public sector management, despite extensive use of information 
technology in government for over 50 years (Dunleavy et al. 2006, 28–39; 
Hood & Margetts 2010; Lips 2012, 240; Margetts 2009; Meijer 2007; Pollitt 2010, 
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2011; Snellen 2007, 205). This lacuna in the literature and practice of politics 
and public sector management reveals a blind spot in those disciplines when it 
comes to being able to see and understand the ways in which (the perception 
of) technology is being exploited within contemporary government. 
The exceptions to this absence emerged in the 1980s (e.g., Kraemer & King 
1986; Kraemer & King 1987) and, despite the presence among their ranks of 
some eminent commentators such as Christopher Hood and Helen Margetts 
(Hood & Margetts 2007; Margetts 1998), have constituted a relatively minor 
stream within the literature ever since. Other scholars who have a similar long-
term engagement in digital government include Patrick Dunleavy (Dunleavy 
2009; Dunleavy et al. 2006), Jane Fountain (Fountain 2001a), Paul Henman 
(Henman 2010a), Miriam Lips and John Taylor (Lips 2006, 2012, 2014; Taylor 
& Lips 2008), Victor Bekkers and Vincent Homburg (Bekkers 2007, 2012; 
Bekkers & Homburg 2007), and Peri 6 (6 2001, 2010). In the main, this work is 
critical in approach and places digital government into the context of New 
Public Management and other neo-liberal-inspired rationalising schemes. 
Limited as it is by the inaccessibility of its subjects, my hope with this project 
is to introduce an ethnographic approach to the field. The experience of my 
interviewees, and my own involvement in the field contribute a distinctive 
perspective on the ways by which a constellation of players frame a situation 
and reconfigure institutions of the state. They provide insights into policy 
making and system building that create a foundation for understanding the 
motivational dynamics of both sets of participants. They help to tease apart 
some key abstract notions, such as state, government, technology and policy. 
This project goes behind the scenes to examine how the policies have been 
developed and how systems and communities of power are co-constructed. 
Compared to other studies, I focus more on the participation of the private 
sector in the internal arrangements of the state. 
The history of digital government policies highlights the symbolic roles of 
policies within a broader discourse, rather than as plans of action, whether 
executed or not. In the case of digital government, I argue that policy has 
come to play, in effect, a defensive role, protecting the public sector and their 
partners from scrutiny and providing them with freedom of movement to 
create new modes of governance within a corporate state. As John Law has 
argued, system builders don’t just work on the technical apparatus, but also 
the surrounding social environment through advocacy and explanation about 
what they are building (Law 1987, 230). And so, we are left with the question, 
what are the boundaries of the system that the system builders are building? I 
argue that the boundaries of the system extend well beyond the apparatus out 
to the “stakeholders”, the socio-technical infrastructure and subjects touched 
by the assemblage. 
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1.3  Scope 
While I will be examining the digital government landscape in State and 
Federal governments in Australia, I believe the Australian situation is reflective 
of the Anglosphere countries, if not Western democracies more generally 
(Dunleavy et al. 2005, 468; Henman 2018, 3). Both State and Federal Australian 
governments have been very active exponents of a global neo-liberal political 
rationality and its accompanying technologies of government (Dunleavy et al. 
2001, 12; O'Flynn 2007), and so are representative of a broader global 
movement in liberal democracies. Since the 1980s, successive governments on 
both sides of these two-party polities have introduced reforms to bring market 
disciplines into the public sector. These include principles of contestability on 
the grounds of price, in many cases opening up the bidding to the private 
sector (Barton 2009). 
Because this is a critical, rather than instrumental, analysis, I avoid any 
detailed analysis of several problematic aspects of digital government. First is 
the issue of the security of large government systems and collections of 
(personal) data. Such collections grow into attractive “honeypots”, with 
significant risks to individuals if that data is illegally obtained by parties 
outside government. However, my focus in this thesis will be on the current 
and potential lawful abuses of information by governments. 
Second is the common problem of failed system developments, especially 
large projects in the public sector (Gauld, Goldfinch & Dale 2006). Failures 
have been costly and wasteful, but I will be arguing that in some ways the 
risks to the public could be greater if the mega-projects succeed. While they 
challenge the idea of the inevitability of technological progress, project failures 
are merely speed bumps to the long-term ambitions of public servants. An 
example of this, discussed in Chapter 6, is how some current projects are 
effectively becoming a national identity system that finally realises the publicly 
rejected national identity card projects of Australian Government bureaucrats 
in the 1980s and 2000s. 
Third, the social welfare systems of surveillance and control I discuss in later 
chapters are by no means the only such systems under development by 
Australian and other governments. Intelligence and law enforcement systems 
are also making major advances in the use of personal information (Ananian-
Welsh & Williams 2014). However, my concern is the impact of more 
everyday interactions that people have with government. There is a clear 
overlap with intelligence and law enforcement functions through the 
compliance activities of government payment programs, but I confine myself 
to the latter without discussing the others sectors specifically. 
Finally, although the later chapters will be discussing social transfer payments 
systems, I will not deal substantively with welfare policy. In parallel with 
developments in digital government, there is an evolving discourse about the 
purpose and effects of welfare policies (Henman 2002, 2010b; Reference 
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Group on Welfare Reform 2015). In discussing the development of a welfare 
payments system in Chapters 6, 7 and 9, I will only touch upon issues where 
perceptions and uses of technology amplify or attenuate certain policy 
approaches or ideological rationalities. 
1.4  Chapter outline 
This first part of the thesis introduces my field of study, the research questions, 
the methodology and the theoretical framework I adopt in addressing the 
questions and the self-imposed limits on the scope of my inquiries and 
analysis. In particular, Chapter 2 describes the anthropological approach I 
have taken to finding sources of information about the policy and system 
building activities that take place behind the closed doors of bureaucracy. In 
particular, I describe the mix of ethnographic and other methods employed to 
bring to light the “policy world” (Shore & Wright 2011) constructed by a global 
community of policy makers over three decades. I use similar methods to 
investigate the closed world of government-corporate partnerships and system 
building. 
In Chapter 3, I set out the theoretical framework for the thesis, starting with 
the concept of ideology, which provides a perspective that helps to 
understand a situation where practice diverges from the dominant discourse 
and how that discourse obscures the social relations, interests and the 
mechanisms by which those interests are advanced. Within that context, the 
concepts of technology and information provide the ground for obscuring the 
social relations at work behind the ideology of digital government. Recent 
developments in the theory of surveillance and control help us account for the 
specific ways in which digital technologies deployed in certain ways enable a 
new mode of governance. 
The second part of this thesis sets out and analyses the claims being made for 
digital government through government policies and reports from industry and 
multinational organisations. Through a case study of a particular policy, 
Chapter 4 delves into the production of a policy in a particular time and place 
(Western Australia in 2004) to reveal the local and contingent nature of an 
initiative that also re-broadcasts a global narrative. This policy sets out the 
ambitions for digital government, and also illustrates the persuasive techniques 
used to frame the agenda and the relationships between the policy players in 
a particular jurisdiction. 
Chapter 5 turns to the broader digital government discourse and its place 
within the prevailing ideologies of government and technology. Specifically, I 
examine the broad ambitions behind the discourse through the customer 
service frame adopted from the private sector via the New Public Management 
movement. Here we see the construction of an online retail version of 
government and the creation of a subjectivity I call the citizen-customer. 
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The third part of the thesis examines what is actually being constructed as the 
promised features of digital government are being implemented. A case study 
of Services Australia’s2 Welfare Payments Infrastructure Transition (WPIT) 
program demonstrates the full range of agendas and social arrangements at 
work in the construction of a corporate state with extended power over the 
lives of individuals. Analysing government procurement documents and Senate 
hearings, Chapter 6 examines what is actually involved as digital government 
enters its fully developed form as envisaged in digital government policies. 
What we see is some of the promised “customer convenience” but, more 
significantly, the extension of surveillance, control and market participation in 
seeking greater certainty in the operation of government services. Also 
revealed are the difficulties of disentangling the Department and the project 
from the complex web of “legacy” systems and social payments policies.  
Based on interviews with two executives in a private firm involved in 
developing corporate systems, Chapter 7 explores the intimate relationships 
involved in the construction of a socio-technical system of the kind being 
implemented by Services Australia. In the light of these insights, I then 
investigate the relationships the Department is seeking to establish with 
private sector “partners”. Here, under the guise of technology adoption, I 
explore the mechanisms of the corporate penetration of government as 
companies collaborate in the bureaucratic agendas described in Chapters 4–6. 
The fourth part of the thesis examines the consequences of the discourses and 
the practices described in the preceding chapters, drawing together the 
elements of a new mode of governance that is becoming apparent. Chapter 8 
examines the means by which the work of government is being restructured 
to make it more amenable to private sector-inspired modes of governance, as 
well as to outsourcing and privatisation.  
Chapter 9 examines the ways in which bureaucrats are exploiting digital 
technologies and new rationalities of surveillance and control of citizen-
customers, new justifications for coercive mechanisms and the emergence of a 
new subjectivity for people who are administered by digital government.  
In conclusion, Chapter 10 considers the extent to which current trends may 
extend and further intensify, as bureaucrats imagine further possibilities for 
what Foucault calls a “house of certainty” (1977, 202) and they become 
familiar with the capabilities of the new socio-technical connections they have 
made. The chapter concludes with an overview of the arguments and insights 
the thesis has advanced. It summarises a situation in which a new power 
structure can assert its purview and control over citizens while withdrawing 
from direct engagement with them. 
  
 
2 This Department of the Australian Government was called the Department of Human 
Services until 2019. In the relevant chapters, I refer to it as the Department. 
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CHAPTER 2  APPROACH/METHODOLOGY 
2.1  Introduction 
Put simply, I approach the question of how the interplay of the ideology of 
digital government and the construction of systems produces a new mode of 
governance by contrasting digital government discourse with what is actually 
happening. On the one hand, the policies promise a world of convenience 
and accessibility, while the transformation programs that are meant to bring 
that world about open up opportunities for system builders to extend their 
gaze and control. The disparity between them calls each into question. Both 
policy making and system building are complex social processes involving 
many people across organisations and layers of “technologies of government” 
(Rose 1996, 42). An anthropological perspective is well-suited to address such 
a situation because, as Cris Shore argues, “an anthropology of policy starts 
from the premise that ‘policy’ is itself a curious and problematic social and 
cultural construct that needs to be unpacked and contextualized if its 
meanings are to be understood” (Shore 2012, 90, original emphasis). 
On the system development side, an anthropological approach also provides a 
way of avoiding the misleading dichotomies of conventional analyses. In 
proposing an anthropology of technology, Brian Pfaffenberger writes, 
To say that technology is humanised nature is to insist that it is a fundamentally 
social phenomenon: it is a social construction of the nature around us and within 
us, and once achieved, it expresses an embedded social vision, and it engages us 
in … a form of life … any behaviour that is technological is also, and at the same 
time, political, social and symbolic. (Pfaffenberger 1988, 244) 
Such perspectives provoke questions such as, who are the policy makers and 
system builders? Who do they speak and build for? How do they construct 
policies and systems and from what? What is the social and political 
environment in which the writers and builders work? With whom, and against 
whom do they work? 
I came to this project with a career background in policy and information 
technology in government; so abstract notions such as government, policy and 
system do not appear as givens, but are ambiguous, constructed, contested, 
contingent and grounded in the lives and actions of individuals. To investigate 
such phenomena anthropologically involves drilling down to the level of 
individual actors and relationships from which institutional forms such as 
organisations, policies and technologies are conceived. Janine Wedel, Cris 
Shore, Gregory Feldman and Stacy Lathrop have argued that “an 
anthropological approach attempts to uncover the constellations of actors, 
activities, and influences that shape policy decisions, their implementation, 
and their results” (Wedel et al. 2005, 30). These authors also suggest that 
anthropological methods also help to get around long-established notions such 
as state, national and local that “fail to capture current dynamics in the world 
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but actually obfuscate the understanding of many policy processes” (loc. cit.). 
Both as discourse and practice, digital government engages people, practices 
and power structures across the public sector’s internal and external 
boundaries. 
The digital government landscape involves a number of key players in and 
around government. To help determine where I needed to look in that 
landscape, I developed a rough mapping of these roles and their relationships, 
which is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The main actors in digital government 
The main actors in central government are shown in blue. They include the 
policy writers in a central executive agency (e.g., the treasury, premier’s or 
public sector management departments). The central agency executives are the 
controllers of the funding, legislation and policy programs of the government. 
Throughout the thesis, I refer to these people as the guardians.3 Nominal 
policy responsibility rests with the minister in charge of e-government or 
digital government policy. The main industry players are shown in green and 
include consultants, systems integrators and IT suppliers. They perform work 
 
3 The full phrase, coined by Aaron Wildavsky (1964), is guardians of the public purse, 
referring to the control they have over the “spending” departments. In Australian terms this 
consists of an expenditure review committee of cabinet, the core membership of which is the 
premier/prime minister, the treasurer (responsible for economic policy) and minister for 
finance (responsible for public sector expenditure), along with their departments. 
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for agencies, but also work to influence central policy makers. Individual IT 
contractors are engaged directly by, and work in, government departments 
more or less as casual staff. The key roles in government agencies, shown in 
pink, are the agency executives, chief information officers, their staff and the 
other employees of the department. Government regulators, such as freedom 
of information and privacy commissioners, auditors and procurement agencies, 
also influence and report on the activities of agencies. External agents in other 
governments, multinational organisations and the private sector are sources of 
policy. The media plays a role in reporting to the public on government policy 
and activities. 
In Figure 1, the double pink icon next to a role indicates the roles for which I 
conducted interviews. The single pink icon denotes a role in which I worked 
for at least twelve months. I worked in the Western Australian Government for 
twelve years, both within the central policy activities of the Cabinet Office and 
Treasury Department and also in information management and IT in other 
departments. Later I worked for a major consulting firm in Melbourne and as a 
ministerial policy adviser in the Australian Government in Canberra, involving 
portfolios covering human services and the IT industry. I did not engage in 
those workplaces as a card-carrying ethnographer, nor did I formally engage 
with my employers in explicit research arrangements. Having come to know 
this environment from the political frame of the policy worker, I approached 
technology policy from a political perspective, that is, as a world of competing 
interests rather than a mission in pursuit of technical correctness. But for most 
of my time in this field, I looked at it from a critical standpoint, having started 
on postgraduate research in science and technology studies in the late 1990s. 
In other words, my perception of my working environment from that time 
onwards was coloured by a critical theoretical worldview concerning the 
political and social grounding of technological discourse and practice.  
I was both an insider and an outsider, not just because of my critical 
standpoint, but also because my career alternated between roles dominated by 
either a technology or policy focus. In various cross-cutting roles, I 
commissioned consultants and system developers as well as being a consultant 
to government and private sector firms. As an internal consultant, system 
manager and developer in a global consulting firm I had a ringside seat to all 
its business lines and modes of engagement with its clients. I was also 
immersed in the overlap of information technology and “the business” in both 
government and private sectors. For the purposes of my analysis, these 
experiences provided a deep mapping of the landscape and the means of 
navigating across boundaries. In many ways, the academic literatures conform 
to those boundaries and obscure the close relationships that needed to be 
documented in this thesis. This grounded experience has provided a check on 
theory and a guide to analysis. 
However, these experiences left me straddling technical and non-technical 
social environments, with a sense of social apartheid between technical and 
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non-technical people. In various situations, I found myself switching between 
the two identities—between fetish and alienation—but also being put into one 
of those boxes by others. In the organisations within which I worked, there 
seemed to be a division between those who fetishised technology as a 
beneficial transformative agent and those who saw it as a layer of 
administrative complication that had to be endured. However, through it all, 
my abiding sensation was the extent to which normally hard-headed, 
analytical rationalists left their rationality at the door when confronting 
“technology”. This apparently paradoxical behaviour led me to suspect that 
there was something mystical lurking behind the cold, hard rationalism of the 
executives, accountants and consultants who could be spellbound by the 
promise of automated government. It was the desire to understand this 
paradox and its consequences that led me to this project. 
Given the dearth of published material about the inner workings of 
government, that personal experience has filled many gaps, as well as 
informing where to look for sources of useful data. The following sections 
describe my approach to identifying and interrogating the various sources of 
information and analysis.  
2.2  Data sources and analysis 
In summary, apart from my own experience, I relied mainly on interviews 
with two policy makers and two system builders to provide an ethnographic 
perspective on two core areas related to digital government that are not well-
researched. Second, the public products of the policy process, the “strategies”, 
“plans”, “roadmaps” and “blueprints” were crucial for my study.4 However, 
these policy documents are highly polished and unrelenting in their advocacy 
for digital government. So, it has been crucial to identify alternative discourses 
in order to understand the full range of issues involved in digitising the 
activities of government. The major sources of such evidence are procurement 
documents, the transcripts and reports of parliamentary hearings and inquiries, 
as well as audit reports. 
Interviews 
Observing or interviewing the kind of people involved in the processes I am 
examining is notoriously difficult in the studying-up of people in powerful or 
influential positions in government and industry (Nader 1972). Developing and 
upgrading digital systems in the public sector in Australia, as elsewhere, has 
yielded some successes and some spectacular failures, some involving 
hundreds of millions of dollars. This has raised the level of sensitivity about 
large IT projects within government. Add to this the reluctance of corporations 
 
4 From here on I lump all these labels together under the term policy, as there is little to 
distinguish their content. 
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to reveal information about their internal operations and relationships with 
clients, investigating this world from the outside presents some real access 
difficulties. Having worked in those areas, I knew the kind of people I needed 
to talk to, but currently serving people are mostly reluctant to talk to outsiders, 
especially about contentious aspects of their work. My direct approaches to 
people more immediately involved were declined or ignored, even where I 
had previously known them through work relationships5. In the absence of 
direct contact with active players in government or industry, I approached 
some ex-colleagues and other contacts to explore various aspects of this world 
from the edges. In many cases, these people who agreed to participate have 
held positions that were complementary to my roles and a couple have 
performed the same roles as I did. Some were ex-colleagues and some 
worked in organisations with which I had a working relationship. In all, I was 
able to conduct eleven interviews.6 
The interviews were semi-structured, with questions provided to interviewees 
beforehand. The questions were tailored to explore each of the interviewees’ 
specific roles and experience. Around half the interviews were conducted in 
person and the other half by phone or video conference and lasted from 60 to 
90 minutes. All interviews were recorded, and the transcripts provided to the 
interviewees for clearance. Given the sensitivity of the issues and the 
organisations concerned, I have, with a few exceptions, used pseudonyms to 
preserve the anonymity of interviewees, who were generally relaxed and open 
with their observations. Partly this was because my interviewees had moved 
on from the roles we were discussing, also because most knew me and, in 
some cases, had worked with me during the period in question. And because 
they were aware of my background in the field, they didn’t have to translate 
for a lay researcher. 
As the project has developed, I have made extensive use primarily of four of 
the interviews to create two case studies, one on policy making in Chapter 4 
and the other on system development in Chapter 7. In the first instance, I was 
able to combine interviews with the two policy makers with an in-depth 
analysis of a single e-government strategy for the Western Australian 
Government to create an inside view of the digital government policy process 
in a particular time and place. In the second instance, the interviews with the 
two system developers explored a private sector project that implemented 
some of the same software and systems integration methods being deployed 
by the Australian Government for delivering digital services. These interviews 
 
5 With respect to current and ex-employees of the Department of Human Services, my role as 
a policy advisor to the then Minister for Human Services may have been an additional 
impediment. 
6 The interviews were with two policy developers, an auditor general, two privacy 
commissioners, two senior IT executives, an executive in a systems integration firm, an IT 
industry advocate, a digital government consultant, a union representative, a welfare 
beneficiary, a journalist specialising in government IT and a Department of Human Services 
telephone service operator. Several interviewees had worked in more than one role. 
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threw a light on the deep engagement client organisations have with 
consultants, integrators and suppliers and the extent to which governments 
must adapt to global software frameworks to control system development and 
operating costs. 
Digital government policies and reports 
The clearest and most coherent expression of the digital government discourse 
lies in the policy documents of governments. There are also similar documents 
published by the UN, the OECD, and others by technology-related 
corporations and academia.  
Shore and Wright describe policies as “windows onto political processes in 
which actors, agents, concepts and technologies interact in different sites, 
creating or consolidating new rationalities of governance and regimes of 
knowledge and power” (Shore & Wright 2011, 1), and as an “avenue for 
studying the localization of global processes” (Shore & Wright 1997, 11). This 
is especially relevant to digital government policy, where governments and 
other organisations borrow people, policies, rhetoric, examples and 
precedents from each other and where policies made at provincial and 
national levels share fundamental similarities with their global peers over 
space and time. 
Digital government policies constitute a formally structured, if incomplete, 
account of governments’ intentions for going digital and how they frame the 
problem/situation, justify the need for action and identify and justify the 
proposed actions (Fischer 2003, 144). Such an analysis provides a partial 
insight into what people in government think they are doing, how they see 
themselves and how they see other important groups such as the public. The 
validity of this insight for this project is supported by the consistency of those 
policies with statements made in other forums, such as testimony before 
parliament, where public servants have to account verbally for what they are 
doing, and procurement documents, where public servants are communicating 
to a different, non-public audience. In later chapters I will contrast what 
proponents say they are doing with what is actually happening as the digital 
government agenda is being constructed and deployed. 
Wedel et al argue that from “an anthropological reading”, the standard 
definition of policy as a course of action “has notable similarities to that of 
‘myth’ in the Malinowskian sense of a ‘charter for action’ … or a charter 
conveying assumptions, values, and meanings about how to live” (Wedel et al. 
2005, 35). This approach stands in stark contrast to that pursued by 
conventional policy analyses. Mary Hawkesworth argues there are two main 
approaches to traditional policy analysis: “an image of policy science in 
service to democracy and an image of [a] depoliticising scientism in service to 
technocracy” (Hawkesworth 1988, 4). The latter version has been dominant in 
traditional public policy analysis, which is conducted within frames consistent 
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with those of policymakers and where the policy follows rationalist models 
weighing costs and benefits (Yanow 2000, viii). In those situations, the 
political dimension of policies is concealed behind technical language.  
Discourse analysis 
To understand the social and political grounds of a concealing technical 
discourse, some form of interpretive analysis is required. To this end, the 
raison d’être for discourse analysis is its recognition of the central role of 
discourse in social relations. In putting Foucault’s perspective on discourse to 
work (Fairclough 1992, 38), Fairclough argues: 
Discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they 
construct or ‘constitute’ them; different discourses constitute key entities (be they 
‘mental illness’, ‘citizenship’ or ‘literacy’) in different ways, and position people in 
different ways as social subjects (e.g. as doctors or patients) and it is these social 
effects of discourse that are focused upon a discourse analysis. (1992, 3–4) 
Furthermore, “Any discursive ‘event’ (i.e. any instance of discourse) is seen as 
being simultaneously a piece of text, an instance of discursive practice, and an 
instance of social practice” (op. cit., p. 4). Critical discourse analysis is a 
synthesis of critical social theory and linguistic analysis. Its objective is to 
understand power and ideology through the study of discourses, which “do 
not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or 
‘constitute’ them” (loc. cit., 3). In effect, digital government policy discourse 
creates a policy world (Shore & Wright 2011, 1–2), but, as it has turned out, 
this is not a world in which policy has determined action. Rather, as I argue 
throughout this thesis, digital government policies have played a large part in 
constructing a field of discourse in the service of a neo-liberal ideology. 
To describe the broader world of digital government policy, I analysed a 
corpus7 of 14 government policies, two reports by the United Nations (2002, 
2016) and one by the OECD (2003). In most cases, I have selected for each 
government jurisdiction a policy from the early 2000s, which I grouped as a 
first generation of policies, and one from the 2010s—the second generation, 
by which time governments had had the opportunity to implement the first-
generation policies. While the UN and OECD reports encourage member 
countries to go digital, they provide telling contrasts to the government 
policies with respect to the latter’s backgrounding of politics, politicians and 
legislatures. The 14 policy documents are all from anglophone jurisdictions. 
 
7 The 14 government policies analysed are from Australia 2000 (NOIE 2000), 2002 (NOIE 
2002), 2006 (AGIMO 2006) and 2016 (DTA 2016), Western Australia 2004 (the case study) 
(OeG 2004), 2007 (OeG 2007) and 2016 (OGCIO 2016), Victoria 2002 (MMV 2002) and 2016 
(2016), New Zealand 2001 (State Services Commission 2003), UK 2000 (CITU 2000) and 2012 
(Cabinet Office 2012), USA 2002 (OMB 2002) and 2014 (USDS 2014). Appendix A lists the 
details of these documents and, where possible, where they can be retrieved. All but two of 
the first generation government policies are no longer available from their original 
governments, but some are available from other sources. 
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Relative to global trends, this introduces a bias towards jurisdictions that have 
adopted New Public Management reforms more enthusiastically than, say, 
many European countries (Saint-Martin 1998, 2004). 
After a careful reading of the reports, I applied some basic discourse analysis 
methods, using the NVivo text analysis application. The first step in that 
analysis was to understand the extent to which the corpus covered or ignored 
various issues. I developed an initial coding structure based on a close reading 
of a few documents, then refined it as I read and analysed more documents. 
The analysis process started with word counts for about 90 keywords selected 
initially on the basis of their frequency of use in the corpus. But I also wanted 
to identify absences. From my work in public sector management policy in the 
Western Australian Cabinet Office and my involvement in a Treasury 
Department information policy unit, I was aware of several major 
controversies about the governance and the mismanagement of information. 
So I included other keywords relating to information governance, mainly 
based on two major inquiries into government in Western Australia (WA): the 
Royal Commission into Commercial Activities of Government and Other 
Matters, known as the WA Inc. Royal Commission and the Commission on 
Government, which followed up on the work of the Royal Commission.8 Both 
inquiries raised major issues concerning the use and abuse of information in 
the Western Australian public sector and their adverse effects on the quality of 
government in that state. These included questions such as secrecy, openness, 
public records and the publicity machines of government. Otherwise, I looked 
for words identified in the critical literature that were “loaded” with rhetorical 
impact—words such as tool, transform, challenge and partnership. This 
selection was informed by the (critical) literature on technology, information, 
management and government, as well as my previous study of metaphor in 
those fields. These sorts of tropes are discussed in the context of theory in the 
next chapter, in Chapter 4 on the ideology of digital government, or in 
Chapter 7 concerning the transformation plans for digital welfare. 
Using word trees in NVivo I also examined how those keywords were 
associated with other words to determine how they were used in phrases. For 
example, for the word barrier, we learn that the barriers to digital government 
can be financial, external, legal, legislative or technological (to name a few); 
that barriers can be overcome, removed, surmountable or broken down (and 
many more good things); and that there can be barriers to change, innovation, 
initiative, cooperation and other positive practices. Further analysis using 
NVivo contexts illustrated how the words worked within the broader text of 
each document. The resulting data for each word, its derivatives or synonyms 
 
8 These inquiries were significant from a much broader perspective than that of the Western 
Australian Government. Along with the 1987–89 Fitzgerald Inquiry in Queensland (Crime and 
Corruption Commision 2019), the WA Inc. Royal Commission and the Commission on 
Government were given a wide brief to review systemic shortcomings of government, not just 
specific acts of corruption or incompetence of the executive (Peachment 2006, xiii–xiv). 
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were summarised. This analysis made it possible to identify the common 
building blocks of the discourse and indirectly the overall consistency of the 
language used in the corpus. The results of this analysis are reflected in 
Chapter 5 on the ideology of digital government. 
The next step in the analysis of this digital government discourse is the 
broader analysis of the similarities and variations in the corpus. The 
consistency of the policy documents supports Raymond Apthorpe’s suggestion 
that, “It is useful to think of policy writing as a ‘genre’. Genre makes a written 
artefact analysable” (1997, 34). For Chiapello and Fairclough, “Discourse as 
part of social activity constitutes genres. Genres are diverse ways of acting, of 
producing social life, in the semiotic mode” (2002, 193). The 14 government 
digital government policy documents are representative of a genre we might 
call digital government policy. The authors had pre-existing models to draw on 
from other public policy areas in their own jurisdictions, as well as from the 
emerging field of e-government globally. As genre, the key commonalities and 
social relations include the field (subject matter), the (persuasive) purpose and 
form, the institutional context (central policy agencies writing polices for the 
whole of government), the authors (professional bureaucrats), audiences 
(senior elected officials and executives) and the frequent cross-referencing, 
and use of policies and initiatives from other jurisdictions as rhetorical 
authorities and warrants (Toulmin 2003, 91–95). Digital government policies 
have been developed by many, if not most jurisdictions for at least 26 years.9 
Their publicness distinguishes them from other representations of policy 
intent, such as internal business cases.10 Being public, the e-government/digital 
government policies are also likely to require careful crafting to communicate 
with multiple audiences with incommensurable interests (Fleming et al. 1990). 
Because of the consistency of the genre, I have taken one policy as a 
representative case study to analyse its origins and context to illustrate how a 
broad range of factors come together to construct a policy (see Chapter 4). As 
Cris Shore suggests, “In contrast to … overly rationalistic and statist models of 
policy, anthropological approaches emphasize the contingency, fluidity and 
‘messiness’ of policy processes” (Shore 2012, 92).  The interviews with the two 
authors of Western Australian digital government policies amply demonstrate 
this point. Moreover, in conjunction with the discourse analysis of the broader 
digital government corpus, we can see how the local, personal, institutional 
and political contingencies highlighted by Shore interplay with global 
discursive forms. Selecting a past policy, rather than a contemporary one, also 
has the advantage of demonstrating the ephemerality of policies, which have a 
 
9 The first is conventionally regarded as the US National Information Infrastructure initiative of 
1993 (Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) 1993), but there were less high profile 
policies from the late 1980s, such as the UK and WA Governments policies on managing 
information as a resource, which are referred to in Chapter 4. 
10 An example of a less public genre that concerns the digitisation of government, a request 
for tender, is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
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life-span and a mortality that may be experienced for any number of reasons, 
especially the loss of support from key stakeholders (Latour 1996). A current 
policy, with its future orientation, always carries the possibility that it could be 
effective—it remains alive. That policies, at least in a documented form, 
eventually die is evidenced by their disappearance from the public record 
when they no longer represent the intentions of government or represent any 
aspect of reality. Most of the first generation of policies are neither referenced 
in subsequent policies nor available from their governments’ websites. 
The Western Australian case study raised a critical question concerning the 
relationship between policy and action that also applies to other jurisdictions 
to some extent. The standard conventional sense of policy from a rational 
action perspective is that it represents a “course of action” (Wedel et al. 2005, 
35), with the main implication that it is carried out, and a weaker reciprocal 
implication that actions are the result of policy. As I describe in Chapter 4, the 
e-government transformation proposed by the policy did not occur in Western 
Australia and rarely elsewhere, at least in the intended time-frame. The same 
narrative emerged in another Western Australian policy 12 years later, 
suggesting that policy works in other ways. As Cris Shore points out, policy is 
not 
simply constraining, instrumental-rational rational forces imposed from above by 
some authoritative entity. Rather, policy is both productive and performative, a 
complex, creative process that produces new kinds of relationships, new spaces 
for exchange, and new kinds of subjectivity (Shore 2012, 92).  
In this latter respect, and as part of a broader global discourse, digital 
government policy has ongoing effects, in particular its obscuration of new 
structures of governance and power. 
Alternative discourses 
In Part 3 of the thesis I turn to an examination of what is being built ostensibly 
in pursuit of the digital government dream. In doing so I move from Western 
Australia to the Australian Government and its implementation of one of the 
largest IT projects in the country, the Welfare Payments Infrastructure 
Transformation (WPIT) (LeMay 2015). I also discuss several other Australian 
Government projects. These were chosen because they demonstrate an 
emerging capacity to surveil and control the public and the willingness of 
public officials to exploit the additional power afforded by new systems. Each 
of these projects was also exposed through oversight mechanisms, such as 
parliamentary inquiries. Otherwise, such activities are usually obscured from 
external scrutiny. There are several sources of useful information that provide 
a view of action rather than intent and which serve as a counterpoint to the 
positive spin of policy statements, annual reports and industry papers. One 
major source is the procurement documents produced by departments for 
external service providers. Other, more limited, accounts of what is actually 
being constructed by way of digital government are the independent voices of 
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oversight organisations, such as parliamentary committees and auditors. In 
relation to the Multi-Agency Data Integration Project described in Section 9.3, 
privacy impact statements provided a valuable source of information 
concerning the transgression of privacy laws by multiple government agencies.  
This section describes the main genres of government documents that I have 
used to observe the transition to digital government. In the absence of direct 
access to the officials involved in these projects, these sources provide an 
incomplete and secondary insight into the actions and intentions of public 
officials, only partly ameliorated by my experience in several roles within the 
field. Nevertheless, these disparate sources provide several cross-sections of 
the field that allow a glimpse of what is occurring behind the veils of public 
policies and bureaucratic secrecy. 
Procurement documents 
Issuing tenders and other approaches to market (ATMs)11 for products and 
services is a point at which government has to come at least partly clean over 
the state of existing systems, new system requirements and complex transition 
issues. They also provide some insight into the commercial relationships that 
departments seek with potential suppliers, as well as the way departments 
present themselves and their projects to industry, in contrast to the broader 
public. Much of the information on which Chapter 6 is based is drawn from 
various approaches to market prepared by the Department when it sought 
advice and/or services from commercial suppliers for a $1.5 billion program to 
replace its welfare payments system. The two main documents on which I rely 
are a Request for Tender (RFT) for the procurement of a systems integrator 
panel (DHS 2016b), the most informative part of which was Attachment H: 
Programme overview. The second approach to market was a Request for 
expression of interest (REOI) for the provision of an entitlement calculation 
engine solution (DHS 2018b). These two sets of documents, since withheld 
from the public, present a very different story than the digital government 
policies described in the earlier chapters. In particular, they highlight the 
various bureaucratic and commercial agendas added to the digital government 
dream of customer convenience as the systems are designed and built. 
Senate estimates hearings 
Normally the digital government discourse is highly controlled. The policy 
documents and industry pitches discussed elsewhere are finely crafted to 
navigate their various audiences and present their authors as competent, 
innovative and masterful agents. Complexity, failure and side-effects, along 
with unintended and unannounced consequences, are carefully backgrounded 
 
11 Approach to market is the general term for requests for tenders, requests for information, 
requests for expressions of interest and requests for proposals. 
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and contained through a focus on future promise. The disparity between the 
mythical promise and the troubled experience is carefully side-stepped.  
One place where this disparity is publicly aired is in parliamentary hearings. 
Notwithstanding the skill of senior officials and ministers at evading 
questions12, their testimony in Senate hearings reveals a world in stark contrast 
to that painted in digital government narratives. These differences can be 
summarised as: the existence, impact and complexity of existing mediations 
and technological infrastructure; the difficulty of transitioning from these 
mediations to the kind of environments eulogised in the digital government 
mythology and the failures that have occurred in most of these transitions; the 
secrecy around digital government initiatives; the unintended and 
unannounced consequences of digital government; and government 
entanglement with the IT industry and its role in digital government. Each of 
these aspects of digitising government has come under the scrutiny of 
parliamentary investigations. 
In the Australian Government, Senate committees question public officials 
three times each year on the conduct of their programs and their plans for the 
future. In each of these Senate Estimates hearings, lasting one or two days for 
each policy area, senior officials are questioned, sometimes interrogated, by 
opposition and government senators on topics chosen by the senators. The 
ostensible purpose of the hearings is to give parliamentarians the opportunity 
to explore how executive government is managing the expenditure authorised 
by parliament through budget or appropriation legislation. Opposition 
senators zero-in on issues that may expose weaknesses of administration on 
the part of the political leadership or the public officials themselves. 
Government senators will ask friendly questions that draw out the 
government’s or departments’ achievements and prospects.  
On the downside, Estimates hearings can appear somewhat random in the 
issues that senators choose to examine. Given the limited time available, the 
wide range of potential issues and the turnover of senators’ policy 
responsibilities, senators tend to jump around between subjects from one 
hearing to another. A seven-year project such as the Welfare Payments 
Infrastructure Transformation (WPIT) discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, may only 
attract attention every now and then, depending on whether a problem has 
attracted the attention of an opposition senator. Nevertheless, Estimates 
hearings proved useful in revealing information about the WPIT program in its 
first three years, as well as occasional insights into related system issues, such 
as problems in replacing old systems, and the “Robo-debt” program, all of 
which play a role in the story below. Following the testimony over time 
provided insights into the lead-up to, and fallout from, these issues—in some 
 
12 As a ministerial advisor, I was involved in pre-hearing briefings and rehearsals designed to 
anticipate likely questions and refine responses. In addition, senior bureaucrats receive 
training in giving evidence to parliamentary committees. 
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cases before they became exposed in the spotlight of public controversy. 
Parliamentary inquiries 
Several parliamentary inquiries into digital government provided useful 
insights into bureaucratic processes, as well as requiring bureaucrats to answer 
questions, generally in a better-informed environment than the Estimates 
Committees. Inquiries can delve more deeply and systematically into a critical 
issue. The committees also have staff to undertake research and write reports. 
Importantly, interested government and non-government organisations have 
the opportunity to present submissions addressing specific terms of reference. 
Inquiries do suffer to a lesser extent from some of the same shortcomings of 
Estimates hearings: an emphasis on short-term failures and political 
controversies, missing the cumulative long-term effects of government 
initiatives.13 
Academic commentators on Australian Government digital government initiatives 
The final source of data about the Australian Government’s digitising of its 
services is academic literature that uses Australia as a case study in digital 
government. Several authors have specifically studied the systems of Services 
Australia and its predecessors, the Department of Human Services and the 
Department of Social Security. In conjunction with its substantial theoretical 
contributions, this work has covered the history the Australian Government’s 
social payments system and its broader organisational, policy and ideological 
contexts. First among these authors is Paul Henman, who has written 
extensively on the Department over the last 20 years from a governmentality 
perspective, his main work being Governing electronically: e-government and 
the reconfiguration of public administration, policy and power (2010a). His 
other work tracking the development of social payments programs and 
systems from their origins up to the present day, including the recent Robo-
debt debacle, has compensated for many of the gaps in the primary sources 
(1997, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2010b, 2017, 2018; 2008). 
 
13 The main inquiries I relied on were: the 2018 inquiry into Digital delivery of government 
services by the Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee (FPARC 
2018a); the Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee 2020 report of its inquiry 
into Impact of changes to service delivery models on the administration and running of 
Government programs (LCARC 2020); the 2017 report on the Robo-debt program by the 
Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Design, scope, cost-benefit analysis, contracts 
awarded and implementation associated with the Better Management of the Social Welfare 
System initiative (CARC 2017); and a report on the consolidation of government identity data 
based on facial recognition by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 
Review of the Identity-matching Services Bill 2018 and the Australian Passports Amendment 
(Identity-matching Services) Bill 2018 (JCIS 2019). At the time of writing (late 2020), there is 
an ongoing inquiry on the Robo-debt program by the Senate Standing Committee on 
Community Affairs References Committee, titled Centrelink's compliance program. So far this 




Patrick Dunleavy, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane Tinkler have also 
written about the Australian social payments system, usually in comparative 
analyses of such systems in multiple countries, and usually in the contexts of 
the neo-liberal program of New Public Management and the role of the private 
sector in welfare payments systems (Dunleavy et al. 2004, 2005, 2006; 
Dunleavy et al. 2001).  
All these authors and others have analysed the evolution of digital government 
within various theoretical frameworks of value to this thesis. Henman and 
colleagues have observed digital government through the lens of the 
relationship between the use of digital technologies and forms of governance. 
Dunleavy and colleagues have examined digital government from the context 
of prevailing discourses in public sector management and the involvement of 
private sector vendors and consultants. The following chapter discusses the 
broader theoretical basis for the analysis I have undertaken. 
General literature on digital government 
The above empirical work is part of a wider critique of digital government, in 
which these authors play an important part. Some of the other notable and 
useful exceptions that I draw upon throughout this thesis include the work of 
Claudio Ciborra (2005), Kenneth Kraemer and colleagues (Kraemer & King 
2006), Jane Fountain (Fountain 2001a), Victor Bekkers and Vincent Homburg 
(Bekkers & Homburg 2007), Miriam Lips and John Taylor (Taylor & Lips 2008), 
Ignace Snellen (2009), Mark Bovens and Stavros Zouridis (Bovens & Zouridis 
2002), and Jeffrey Seifert and Eric Petersen (Seifert & Petersen 2001). 
Otherwise, this is generally a field where the rationalist ideologies of 
technology, management and government converge. The academic literature 
and the primary sources (produced by governments, the IT industry and 
international organisations such as the OECD), are both generally utilitarian 
and optimistic in orientation (e.g. West 2004), if not outrightly promotional 




CHAPTER 3  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1  The ideologies of rationality, government and 
technology 
In this thesis I argue that the digitisation of government, while being sold as a 
major advance in the interests of the public, constitutes a substantial shift in 
power and mode of governance that is not necessarily in the public interest, 
nor occurring within the light of public awareness. Moreover, the discourse 
that describes and justifies digital government systematically conceals the shift 
in power, those involved and the interests being advanced or retarded. Finally, 
while building on existing modes of rationality in government, such as those 
defined by Max Weber (1970 [1922], 214 & 284), there are several aspects that 
make it qualitatively unprecedented. 
The first section in this chapter discusses how a broadly Althusserian concept 
of ideology provides a theoretical perspective on a situation where practice 
diverges from the dominant discourse and how that discourse obscures the 
interests and the mechanisms by which those interests are advanced. In this 
respect, the concept of ideology, supported by critical discourse analysis, 
provides the basis for understanding how these processes are structured and 
enacted. The second section draws on a diverse critique of rational choice 
theories concerning intention, agency and action that permeate bureaucratic, 
managerial and neo-liberal modes of thinking, especially about the 
relationship between policy and action. The third section critiques the ideas of 
government that are reflected in the advocacy of digital modes of governance. 
The concept of the corporate state provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding how the introduction of complex technology into government 
brings with it increased entanglement with the corporate sector. It is one of 
the mechanisms by which contemporary public governance becomes a more 
hybrid and porous structure, straddled across state and market. Critical to the 
analysis of ideology is interrogating its capacity to obscure as much as reveal 
(Day & Ma 2011, 26; Foucault 1988, 86). In the case of digital government, an 
online retail view of government overshadows a transforming mode of 
governance, its participants and its methods. 
Throughout this thesis I portray digital government as an obscuring or 
covering ideology, by which I mean that one of its strongest effects is to hide 
substantial aspects of the actual construction of digitally mediated government. 
However, as I argue in this chapter, I am not suggesting that this necessarily 
amounts to a Marxist-type critique of a program of deception. Rather, I suggest 
that several structural factors, discussed in this chapter and Chapters 4 and 5, 
constrain the discourse. First. the bureaucratic origins of the narrative preclude 
coverage of issues that involve conflicts of interests. In bureaucratic discourse 
intended for public consumption, the alignment of public, political, 
bureaucratic and industrial interests is always maintained. Second, bureaucrats, 
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especially when writing in the voice of “the government” are not inclined to 
reveal the internal thinking and working of the bureaucracy. Third, the 
contemporary managerialist focus on service delivery confines the narrative to 
the surface of government programs. Fourth, the digital frame privileges the 
agency of technology over human actors in government and the marketplace, 
and thereby reinforces the other three factors. 
Building on the analysis of ideology and rationalism, the fourth and fifth 
sections introduce theories that critically examine two of the foundational 
terms in the discourse—technology and information and their union, 
information technology, or IT. As Raymond Apthorpe warns, “we should … be 
suspicious of a term which is agreed among so many people, which 
everybody likes, and which everybody is in favour of” (1997, 41). A close 
examination of these “magic” terms (Pollitt & Hupe 2011) reveals how they 
perform heavy rhetorical lifting to obscure and neutralise critique by hiding 
the social relations of technology. This provides a deep insight into the weak 
foundations of the I/T discourse in general and the digital government 
discourse in particular. 
The final section reviews recent developments in the theory of surveillance 
and control that help us account for the specific ways in which digital 
technologies are deployed to enable a new mode of governance. In parallel 
with surveilling corporations such as Google and Facebook, this perspective 
accounts for the ways in which bureaucrats are both willing and able to 
accumulate large “shadow texts” concerning citizen-customers without their 
knowledge or consent. And, as with their private sector counterparts, the 
capacity to surveil and control is obscured by narratives of connectivity, 
convenience, privacy and government as service delivery. These large, shared 
data collections belie the impression conveyed in privacy legislation and 
privacy notices that only small amounts of personal data pass through the 
legislated loopholes. 
3.2  Ideology 
A number of developments in the theorisation of ideology make the concept 
useful for understanding the power relations and discourse of digital 
government. At the heart of this thesis is an argument that there is a persistent 
disparity between the official discourse on digital government and what has 
been unfolding in practice as governments build digitally mediated modes of 
operation. I also argue that there are internal inconsistencies in the 
discourse—between a rhetoric of public empowerment on the one hand, and 
the need to legitimate a rationalising program of efficiency on the other. At the 
most fundamental level, applying an ideological framework clearly recasts the 
digital government discourse from the technical realm to the political realm 
(Chiapello 2003, 160; Freeden 1996, 48), a perspective that digital government 
itself, like other technocratic ideologies, attempts to eschew (Althusser 2004, 
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700). Digital government policies across many jurisdictions present a 
remarkably consistent manifesto for re-mediating relations with the public. In 
doing so, the policies construct a particular view of government, technology 
and information that appeals to broader community values of rationality, 
fairness, democracy and service. However, that narrative promises a new form 
of governance without ever exploring the consequential changes in power 
relations and glosses over the non-technological causes and effects of this new 
regime.  
While the concept of ideology plays a useful role in understanding the 
disparity between the discourse and practice, as well as its persistence, there 
are pitfalls in applying such a theoretical frame. Not the least of these pitfalls is 
that “the term ‘ideology’ has itself become thoroughly ideologized” (Geertz 
1973, 193). While theoretical work elaborating the concept has attempted to 
understand ideology as more than mere propaganda, it nevertheless conveys a 
tinge of insult when applied to the beliefs and practices of an observed group 
(Thompson 1984, 1–2). Typically, observers, taking an objective stance, ascribe 
ideology to others, never to themselves (Althusser 2004, 700). Describing 
digital government discourse as ideology directly confronts its presentation as 
an apolitical program of rational improvement.  
In a nutshell, the fundamental divide, or problem, in the study of ideology 
might be characterised as a critical versus neutral stance on the place of 
ideology in society (Chiapello 2003; Thompson 1984, 4). The former 
emphasises the deceptive function of ideologies in the interest of powerful 
social groups. It is a basis of the critical analysis of discourse (Fairclough 1992, 
12). Various early versions of this approach, such as that applied by Karl Marx, 
relied on contrasting ideology with (social) science and their respective 
authority as truth claims. Such analyses regarded ideology as intellectual 
“error” or even “depravity” (Geertz 1973, 197), working to cynically deceive 
oppressed social groups in the interest of dominant groups. However, I do not 
argue that the digital government policies are objectively wrong. Nor does a 
reading of those documents reveal that they are grounded in non-scientific 
falsehoods, let alone consciously devised propaganda.  
More recent theorists have attempted to combine the critical perspective with 
an acknowledgement of the broader, necessary social functions of ideology. 
Paul Ricoeur has suggested that the function of legitimation is an effective way 
of bridging the divide between the critical and neutral stances “because 
ideology in its group integration function tends to legitimise a social order in 
its current state (trying to ensure the preservation and reproduction thereof) 
that it is a theatre of distortion” (Chiapello 2003, 160). For Ricoeur, the key lies 
in the role that ideology plays in the legitimation of a social order involving 
the unequal distribution of power: 
Ideology must bridge the tension that characterizes the legitimation process, a 
tension between the claim to legitimacy made by the authority and the belief in 
this legitimacy offered by the citizenry … the equivalence of belief with claim is 
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never totally actual but rather always more or less a cultural fabrication (Ricœur & 
Taylor 1986, 13). 
The function of legitimation was central to Anthony Giddens’s view of 
ideology “as the mode in which forms of signification are incorporated within 
systems of domination so as to sanction their continuance” (1983, 19). The 
question of what is being legitimated is also important here. The established 
theories of ideology tend to focus on broad social domination, but the kind of 
positioning I discuss in this thesis only indirectly concerns this level of social 
relations. While I emphasise the way that digital government ideology draws 
on broader ideologies, such as neo-liberalism, rationalism, managerialism, 
technology and information, it also feeds into and reinforces the narratives of 
those ideologies (Fisher 2010, 11). Giddens’ approach is elaborated by Martin 
Allor in the context of information-related ideologies, using Gramsci’s notion 
of ideology as 
… power exercised through representations … To proceed to a concrete 
knowledge of hegemony we should assert that there is no ideology in general, 
only specific, historical connections between institutions, representations, and 
human individuals. This suggests that ideology has its existence in a set of 
relationships: between images and terms—a question of discourse—and between 
discourse and institutions. And the set of relationships clustered around the term 
information provides us with a key example of the work of ideology (Allor 1987, 
21, original emphasis). 
This underscores the importance of discourse as social practice within which 
ideology is embedded (Fairclough 1992, 87). In this respect Norman 
Fairclough argues (after Althusser) that ideology “has a material existence in 
the practices of institutions, which opens up the way to investigating 
discursive practices as material forms of ideology” and “that ideology 
interpellates subjects” (loc. cit.) and is thus crucial in the constitution of 
subjects; something that can be observed in the way that digital government 
discourse constructs the citizen-customer in the mould of the ideal neo-liberal 
subject. 
Ideological work is not necessarily conducted with ruthless, conscious 
calculation. One might say deception is most successful when one deceives 
oneself first (Tallis 2002, 144). But beyond that, the assumption of deception, 
even self-deception, conveyed in earlier notions of ideology has been 
challenged by Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek. In their view, Marx’s 
formulation “they do not know it, but they are doing it” implies a lack of 
awareness that does not apply in the current era. For instance, when it comes 
to understanding the consequences of digital government, it is questionable 
whether or how much they can be described as unintended or unanticipated, 
either by the powerful or the disempowered. Thus, Sloterdijk suggested 
instead a formula reflecting a more “cynical milieu”: “they know very well 
what they are doing, but still, they are doing it” (Žižek 1989, 25). 
As he describes in relation to the panopticon, which I discuss later in this 
chapter, Foucault’s concept of power further emphasises the active 
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engagement of all parties in a power relationship. As Barbara Cruikshank 
argues: 
Welfare, bureaucracy, and administration are not modes of governance that 
cancel out citizenship by producing subjects, dependence and quiescence. They 
are modes of government that work upon the capacities of citizens to act on their 
own behalf (Cruikshank 1999, 38–39). 
As Cruikshank has illustrated (op. cit.), this perspective on power is crucial to 
understanding the relationships developed on all sides in the delivery of 
government programs. Those relationships are being transformed as they 
become digitally mediated and as the modes of governance are adjusted to 
accommodate and exploit those new mediations. By mode of governance, I 
refer to a particular configuration of what Rose and Miller call “technologies of 
government” (2010 [1992], 281–82) that are at play within a particular “political 
rationality” (op. cit., 276–77).14 After Latour, Rose and Miller argue that power 
is the effect of the arrangement of the technologies of government, both 
intended and unintended, rather than the cause of such arrangements (loc. 
cit.). In this situation, what I refer to as ideology corresponds to a particular 
attempt to define, explain and justify what is going on (Latour 1984, 273). In 
the case of digital government, the policy discourse constructs one definition 
that occupies an otherwise fairly vacant ground, due mainly to the lack of 
other attempts to identify and explain digital government as a totality. 
A similar conclusion to Foucault’s concerning the essential role of the subject 
in sustaining a power imbalance has been reached from a political psychology 
perspective on ideology. A detailed analysis of the subjective dimension of 
ideological justification can be found in the work of John Jost, Mahzarin Banaji 
and their colleagues (Jost & Banaji 1994; Jost, Banaji & Nosek 2004; van der 
Toorn et al. 2015). They argue that “contemporary researchers are much closer 
than were the members of the Frankfurt School to understanding the 
connections between the discursive superstructure of ideology and its 
motivational substructure” (Jost, Federico & Napier 2009, 327, emphasis 
added).  
The discursive superstructure refers to the network of socially constructed 
attitudes, values, and beliefs bound up with a particular ideological position at a 
particular time and place...Defined in this way, the discursive superstructure can 
be thought of as a “social representation”...that guides political judgment in a top-
down schematic fashion and is typically transmitted from political elites to the 
public at large... (Jost, Federico & Napier 2009, 315)  
Labelled as “system justification theory”, this work examines the ways in 
which broadly accepted social stereotypes form the basis for justifying the 
dominance or privilege of one group over another. It forms an empirical base 
for the analysis of ideology by explaining why disadvantaged groups accept 
their disadvantage and support a status quo which depicts their group as 
 




inherently inferior (Jost, Banaji & Nosek 2004). In this way we can see how, 
say, those disadvantaged by the introduction of digitised government may 
accept its inevitability and broader social value. This emphasis on motivational 
substructure grounds ideology in the subjectivity of participants. Jost, Federico 
and Napier define this substructure as “the ensemble of social and 
psychological needs, goals, and motives that drive the political interests of 
ordinary citizens in a bottom-up fashion and are served by the discursive 
contents of ideology” (Jost, Federico & Napier 2009, 315). This fundamental 
point is better made by Judith Butler, who describes the (political) subject as 
“an accomplishment regulated and produced in advance”, although “never 
fully constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again” (Butler 1992, 
13). In this way the power relation is constructed dynamically by each 
participant in the course of everyday life as part of our identity-making and 
our understanding of how the world works. 
The unconscious dimension of ideology 
A related caution in adopting a discourse-centric approach is the 
unconsciousness of ideology. Freeden argues that “The tension between the 
conscious and the unconscious emerges as a central facet of the analysis of 
ideologies” (1996, 21), and Althusser points out that 
Ideology is indeed a system of representations, but in the majority of cases these 
representations have nothing to do with “consciousness” … it is above all as 
structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via their 
“consciousness” … it is within this ideological unconsciousness that men succeed 
in altering the “lived” relation between them and the world and acquiring that 
new form of specific unconsciousness called “consciousness” (Althusser & 
Brewster 1969, 233, original emphasis). 
An inherent characteristic of a justification is to get an audience to accept 
givens through the use of rhetorical strategies, which can evoke assumptions 
and feelings without making explicit statements. As Perelman explains, “… the 
most solid beliefs are those which are not only admitted without proof, but 
very often not even made explicit” (1969, 8). This persuasive work is what 
makes the analysis of rhetoric particularly relevant to ideology analysis (Geertz 
1973, 208–13). Much of the work performed by ideologies is therefore 
background work involved in bolstering those premises in discussions that are 
not explicitly concerned about a specific power relation. Thus, a term such as 
technology, with its attendant but unconscious entailments of autonomy, 
inevitability and agency can be effectively evoked, unquestioned by an 
audience. To this end, the everyday and inescapable use of metaphor is 
critical to understanding the world in familiar terms, as well as shaping ideas 
within the arguments we use to persuade others to our cause (Geertz 1973, 
208–13; Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 45). Metaphor can do this by never making or 
requiring an explicit link between the source domain and the target domain. 
In this context, the concept of fetish is useful for highlighting the obscuring 
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power of two of the key terms in this thesis, technology and information, 
because of the way these terms obscure the social relations and cognitive 
effort involved in their “production” and “use”. Perhaps one could argue that 
such obscurations are useful shortcuts to describe complex social relations, but 
they effectively serve to hide the interests, presence and agency of key players 
in pushing products and markets into new realms. For instance, Brian 
Pfaffenberger accounts for the technology fetish in the following terms: 
...technology, under the sway of Western culture, is seen as a disembodied entity, 
emptied of social relations, and composed almost entirely of tools and products. 
It stands before us, in other words, in what Marx would call fetishised form: what 
is in reality produced by relations among people appears before us in a fantastic 
form as relations among things (Pfaffenberger 1988, 242, original emphasis). 
Throughout the various digital government narratives there is an unwavering 
assumption of the inevitability, autonomy and beneficence of digital 
technologies. There is little, if any, indication of their market origins and the 
effort, creativity and collaboration required to give them their apparent 
momentum. 
The materiality of ideology 
Another danger of a purely linguistic view of ideology is that it can distract us 
from the ways in which ideology is embedded in practice, or as Althusser 
describes it, “actions inserted into practices [which] are governed by the rituals 
in which these practices are inscribed, within the material existence of an 
ideological apparatus, be it only a small part of that apparatus …” (Althusser 
2004, 696, original emphasis). However, the ideal and the material need not 
be diametrically opposed. One of Giddens’ theses on ideology is that analysis 
of ideology should come to terms with language not so much as a medium of 
description but as “praxis or as the ‘other side of action’” (1983, 23). 
This is because the most subtle and interesting forms of ideology are those 
incorporated within day-to-day practices. While not necessarily propositional 
beliefs, these forms of ideology are very often the modes in which signification is 
incorporated as part and parcel of what one does in daily life. … The insulation 
of the economic from the political I take to be one of the major mechanisms of 
class domination (loc. cit.). 
Furthermore, Greg Terrill has observed that political communication consists 
of not just words, but also action, silence, inaction and timing (2000, 5, 
emphasis added). The communicative power of these modes highlights the 
role of expectation and, more broadly, context as essential grounds for 
communication (Hymes 1972, 38). Both of these are backgrounded in the 
“content”-dominated discourse of information technology. 
A material view of ideology recognises the embeddedness of ideology in the 
design and use of apparatus, especially when it comes to large, highly 
complex symbolic systems such as those involved in digital government. 
“Rules embedded in computer code govern invisibly and powerfully” 
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(Fountain 2001a, 64), providing system designers with an effective tool for 
imposing order on others in ways that are not readily apparent (Lessig 2006, 
125). It is often difficult for people to understand that the behaviour of 
computers is an expression of (contestable) policy at some level. As we will 
see later, the Australian Government’s new welfare and health benefits system 
will not only incorporate over 3,000 pages of legislation (DHS 2016a, s 12.11), 
but will incorporate other less visible rules that govern the way that people 
use the system and enact their relationship with government. This is to say 
nothing of the embedded rules and practices associated with the computing 
devices used by the public and the many layers of public and private 
technologies mediating the relations between government and the public, such 
as mobile devices (Sleep & Tranter 2017). 
3.3  Critiques of rationalism 
The discourses of technology, information, information technology, 
management and government are all permeated by an ideology of 
rationalisation that has been characterised by Weber (1964, 196-244), the 
Frankfurt School (e.g. Horkheimer & Adorno 1972), Habermas (1984) and 
others.15 The Enlightenment roots of modernity run deep in the justification of 
rational action, driven by the belief in the destiny of “man” and “his” ability to 
control nature and human affairs. The long genealogy of the Western will to 
control and improve the world has been analysed by authors such as Eric 
Voegelin concerning mass ideological movements (2004), David Noble in 
relation to technology (1999), as well as Erik Davis (1998), Margaret Wertheim 
(1999) and Richard Coyne (1999) who focus on long-held millenarian 
yearnings sated by IT dreaming, and Philip Mirowski in relation to the 
cybernetic aspirations of economics (2002). An underlying argument behind 
each of these authors is that instrumental rationalism is driven by “distant 
dreams, spiritual yearnings for supernatural redemption” (Noble 1999, 3). At 
the root of this thinking is the separation of man and nature, based on a 
common interpretation of Genesis 1:26: 
Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them 
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the 
cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the 
earth.’ 
Within modernity, a desire for certainty through rational methods is a common 
foundation for what motivates people engaged in these diverse movements, 
what they value, how they present themselves and how they appeal to other 
groups, including those outside their immediate professional milieu. In this 
vein, rationalism is what provides a synergising force to the combination of 
 
15 For the purposes of this thesis, I focus on rationalism as the crucial characteristic of a 
modern, social order, rather than, say, capitalism (Weber, Baehr & Wells 2002), individualism 
(Dumont 1977) or modernity (Giddens 1990), although these are all interrelated. 
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government and technology and provides a higher source of authority for 
each of those ideological discourses to appeal to. 
As an overarching ideology, rationalism performs all the fundamental functions 
of ideology discussed above—legitimation, meaning-making, obfuscation, 
framing, social cohesion and identity. Being rational (not just reasonable) is an 
ideal form of behaviour, an exemplary mode of being, speaking and acting 
(Feldman & March 1987, 177–78). For its adherents, demonstrating the 
rationality of oneself and one’s work is a necessary performance for 
establishing and presenting a competent identity and in constructing a 
convincing narrative in, say, policy documents and appearances before 
parliamentary committees (Brunsson 2006,17). 
In relation to the context of this thesis, rationalist thinking in everyday practice 
can be summarised by several interlinking concepts: instrumentality—the 
exploitation of, and mastery over, the world and people, as discussed above; 
agency—a direct linear relationship between intention, action, results and 
outcomes (Giddens 1984, 5–14); control—many of the key discourses, such as 
governing, organising, managing, changing, steering, engineering, have the 
theme of control at their heart (Mirowski 2002); scientism—belief in the 
superior truth claims of scientific knowledge over other ways of knowing 
(Pusey 1991, 160); quantification—placing a high value on information 
derived from quantifiable phenomena (Bowker & Star 2001), reflected in a 
range of management mantras, such as: if it can’t be measured, it shouldn’t be 
done/can’t be improved/can’t be managed/isn’t important/doesn’t exist; 
formalism—reliance on documented rules and processes rather than oral 
transmission and human memory—associated with the idea of thought as 
language; rule-based institutional forms—the institutionalisation of authority 
through rational organisation (Weber, Gerth & Mills 1970 [1922], 230); rational 
method—the use of step-by-step sequences, reduction of events to repeatable 
sequences to standardise work and other activities; specialisation—the 
standardised division of labour within and between organisations and 
institutions; systems—understanding complex social and natural phenomena 
through structured technology-derived metaphors (Morgan 1998, 11–31; Siskin 
2016); functionalism—seeing complex natural and social phenomena as 
artefacts designed for a purpose; technocracy—a willingness to acknowledge 
the authority of technical experts; rationalisation in two senses, (1) the (re) 
alignment of production elements to goals, and subsequently substitution of 
means for goals in a hierarchy of goals (Simon 1997), and (2)—accounting for 
past actions and decisions in rational(ist) terms, even if the original thinking 
was unknown, unknowable or irrational (Brunsson 2006, 22); decision-centric 
theories of management—which treat authority as a sequence of rational 
choices—while it has tended to move from absolute to “bounded” notions of 
rationality, the original ideals live on implicitly in contemporary management 
practice (March 1988); and managerialism—of particular interest to this 
thesis—in one sense the primacy of formalism in the practice of management 
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generally; in a more specific sense, the adoption of (private sector) rationalist 
management techniques and language to the public sector (Rhodes 1996) and 
broader life. 
Constituted by these features, rationalism works to build the world in its 
image. These become the principles by which we shape the world, and by 
which the world is made to be more amenable to rational methods (Scott 
1998). George Lakoff explains this process in the following terms: 
Contemporary markets are carefully crafted, legislated and monitored so that 
various kinds of rational-choice models can be used effectively, so that business 
can be made ‘rational’ and kept that way. In short, the rational choice model is 
not just descriptive of natural behaviour; rather it has been made prescriptive, 
with markets tailored so that such models can most effectively be used (Lakoff & 
Johnson 1999, 531, original emphasis). 
As a theory of how people think and act, the foundations of rationalism have 
been comprehensively challenged, if not repudiated for over a century 
(Barnard 1968 [1938]; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Lindblom 1959, 1979; Meyer 
1983; Schön 1983; Weber, Gerth & Mills 1970 [1922], 220). Ironically, one of 
the most sustained sources of this critique has been in the field of 
management (the heartland of rational action theory) by the movement 
labelled new institutionalism (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). Despite this well-
established critique, simple rationalism persists—as a theory of action, a theory 
of cognition and as an ideal mode of behaviour—which suggests that there is 
at work a profound motivation for adhering to rationalism as an ideology. 
Rationalism eschews myth, ritual and symbolism, but several new 
institutionalists (e.g., Davis 1998; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Ogbor 2000) argue 
that these omnipresent aspects of human culture are merely sublimated in 
modernity, as they weave their work unconsciously. Most pointedly, James 
March observes, 
In a society based on reason, rationality, and a conception of intentional human 
control over destiny, decision making is a sacred activity. The world is imagined 
to be produced by deliberate human action and responsive to human intention. 
Intention is imagined to be transformed into action through choice and power. 
And choice is imagined to be guided by reason. 
These traditions of rationalism and anthropocentrism find mythic and ritual 
manifestation in the idea of decision making. As a result, the process of making a 
choice in a modern setting is surrounded with as much symbolic and ritual 
paraphernalia as the divining of God’s will in the Middle Ages. The rituals of 
choice tie routine events to beliefs about the nature of things. They give us 
meaning. They emphasize the centrality of human agency—humans are 
responsible for choices and thus for the course of history. They validate that the 
world is organised by choice (March 1994, 216). 
March’s account goes to the heart of my argument that the primary motivation 
behind the bureaucratic reach for power is to satisfy the expectations 
encouraged by such a worldview. I argue that such motivations energise the 
advocates and engineers of digital government and have the power to 
overcome the disparity between belief and experience. Daniel Isenberg 
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describes the performative value of rationality thus: 
Obviously, decisions do get made in organizations and these are frequently 
justified by data and logic. In particular, when viewed retrospectively over a long 
time period, effective executives often appear quite rational. Yet when studying 
their concurrent thinking processes, being ‘rational’ does not best describe what 
the manager presiding over the decision-making process thinks about nor how he 
or she thinks (Isenberg 1984, 82, original emphasis). 
The theory of rational action is therefore used as much in rationalising what 
has happened rather than being an accurate account of action. As in any 
culture, there are significant gaps between ideological statements of how 
people should act and their actual behaviour. As Jonathan Smith suggests: “It 
is here, as they face the gap, that any society’s genius and creativity, as well as 
its ordinary and understandable humanity, is to be located. It is its skill at 
rationalization, accommodation, and adjustment” (Smith 1982, 62). There are 
two important points here. The gap Smith is referring to is not between the 
perception of participants and the “superior” perception of an observer, but 
between the participants’ own perceptions of what should happen and what 
they understand did happen. Second, Smith suggests that,  
… among other things, ritual represents the creation of a controlled environment 
where the [variability and contingencies] of ordinary life may be displaced 
precisely because they are felt to be so overwhelmingly present and powerful. 
Ritual is a way of performing the way things ought to be in conscious tension to 
the way things are [, and] in such a way that this ritualized perfection is 
recollected in the ordinary, uncontrolled course of things (Smith 1982, 63, original 
emphasis). 
Rationalism rejects the essential roles of ideology, rhetoric and metaphor, and 
favours their opposites: scientific positivism, objectivity and literal expression 
(Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 513). My argument on this issue is twofold—first, that 
rationalism and rationalised thought, statements and actions are highly 
metaphorical, rhetorical and ideological; second, that the successful strategy of 
suppressing the notions of metaphor, rhetoric and ideology through the use of 
rationalist metaphor, rhetoric and ideology is one of the great illusions and 
strategic triumphs of modernity. 
Rationalism’s repudiation of ritual, myth and tradition renders it vulnerable to 
its own myths and rituals, which remain heavily obscured in a world that 
denies their existence. ’Twas ever thus; like ideology, myths and rituals are 
what other people have. Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of this problem is 
summarised by Robert Pippin: 
What poses in modernity as a rationally enlightened attack on superstition, mythic 
consciousness, religion, and feudal social practices is presented by [Horkheimer 
and Adorno] as not only narrowing the arena of rational discourse … but as a 
form of thought incapable of, and deeply resistant to, self critique, and as a way 
of linking rationality in the natural sciences and social sphere with total control 
and predictability, in a way that again cannot assess or reflect on the ends served 
by such control. Incapable of such deeper reflection, Enlightenment thus itself 
becomes a myth or ideology, a promotion of control or power for its own sake, 
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to the point of pathology (Pippin 1995, 49).  
The following sections discuss more specific ideologies that rely to a 
significant degree on appealing to rationalist ideals such as certainty and 
mastery through the state, technology, information and surveillance. 
3.4  Government 
A major field of divergence between the digital government discourse and 
emerging practice concerns the boundaries of the state and the location of 
public governance. The digital government discourse adheres to a version of 
“statist” orthodoxy originally favoured by political science (Mitchell 1991, 78–
81) and public sector management literature, in which the state-as-jurisdiction 
is “a freestanding entity, whether an agent, instrument, organization, or 
structure, located apart from, and opposed to, another entity called economy 
or society” (Mitchell 1999, 95). This view has been particularly embraced by 
the central agency authors of digital government policies, who want to present 
their government as an autonomous, rationally acting singularity. The digital 
government discourse marginalises the non-state players involved in 
advocating for it, and, as we will discover later, to be deeply involved in it. 
Timothy Mitchel argues this view of the state privileges policy making, 
recognising the state as a purely rational entity, 
a system of decision making [the essence of which is] in the formation and 
expression of authoritative intentions. Construed as a machinery of intentions—
usually termed “rule making,” “decision making,” or “policy making”—the state 
becomes essentially a subjective realm of plans, programs, or ideas (Mitchell 
1991, 82, original emphasis). 
In this schema, the idea of organisation is modelled on a paradigm of the 
clear-minded individual, an institution in modern society defined by Nils 
Brunsson as a self-sustaining entity whose identity is formed by its intentions 
and preferences. These are well-adapted to a future orientation in which what 
is and what ought to be are clearly distinguished, as are the means for moving 
from one state to another (2006, 17).  
There are several aspects of digital government discourse and practice that call 
into question the monolithic view of the state and call for a broader 
conceptual framework that breaks apart the statist orthodoxy to extend 
government beyond the state. First, the similarity and timing of digital 
government policies across multiple jurisdictions suggest the presence of 
global patterns of thinking and rule-following—that governments do not 
construct policies from the ground up, as suggested by rational choice theory, 
but rather adopt models from elsewhere. Their capacity and willingness to do 
so is a sign of a shared governmentality. Second, the participation of global 
non-state players in the digital government discourse and in its 
implementation calls into question the self-sufficiency of the state. The 
dependence of governments upon non-state players, in activities ranging from 
 
36 
the formation of policy to the operation of systems, calls for a way of 
understanding government that accommodates hybrid forms of public-private 
production. Third, three decades of public sector reform in the image of the 
private sector (under the banner of New Public Management) means that 
guidance on good governance comes not from theories of state but from 
theories of the market. Fourth, the active and independent agency of 
bureaucrats in the formation and advocacy of digital government opens up a 
cleft within the state, between bureaucrats and politicians. In this thesis, I 
argue that the bureaucracy is the key government player in a realignment of 
power through digital government in its quest for certainty through a program 
of technology-enabled rationalisation. This perspective challenges the statist 
view of the bureaucracy as the tool of legislation working in the broad public 
interest (Bourdieu 1994, 2). Fifth, the complete dependence of digitally 
mediated governance on private sector infrastructure, skills and techniques for 
the design, implementation and operation of systems also calls for a broader 
framework, as does the global extent of such systems and the isomorphism of 
the discourse, institutions and technologies across multiple jurisdictions. 
Such a framework is provided by Michel Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality, which “denotes an ‘analytics of government’ that includes 
‘mentalities of government’, ‘regimes of practices’ and ‘programmes of 
government’” (Henman 2013, 1401) and “seeks to identify the ways in which 
specific discourses, techniques and strategies actively render domains 
governable” (Henman 2013, 1398). But governmentality also represents the 
broad mode of state order that prevails in modernity (Foucault 1991, 102–03). 
Rather than being an order imposed from above, Nikolas Rose explains that 
the bottom-up constitution of state power  
is a resultant, not a cause, an outcome of the composition and assembling of 
actors, flows, buildings, relations of authority into relatively durable associations 
mobilized, to a greater or lesser extent, towards the achievement of particular 
objectives by common means. (Rose 1996, 43) 
In this respect it is vital to recognise the importance and variety of the myriad 
of techniques, institutions and technologies involved in the constitution of a 
governmentality. Rose identifies this diversity of arrangements in the following 
terms: 
As an array of technologies of government, governmentality is to be analyzed in 
terms of the strategies, techniques and procedures through which different 
authorities seek to enact programmes of government in relation to the materials 
and forces to hand and the resistances and oppositions anticipated or 
encountered. Hence, this is not a matter of the implementation of idealized 
schema in the real by an act of will, but of the complex assemblage of diverse 
forces (legal, architectural, professional, administrative, financial, judgmental), 
techniques (notation, computation, calculation, examination, evaluation), devices 
(surveys and charts, systems of training, building forms) that promise to regulate 
decisions and actions of individuals, groups, organizations in relation to 
authoritative criteria (Rose 1996, 42, original emphasis). 
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The depth and breadth of technologies of government merely hinted at in 
Rose’s examples are critical for this thesis. As discussed later in this chapter, 
the contemporary technology discourse narrows down “technology” to 
physical apparatus, ignoring all the other ordering mechanisms that are 
intertwined with material apparatus, and without which such artefacts are 
meaningless.  
The other critical element of structuring proposed by the theorists of 
governmentality is the notion of an overarching governmental rationality, 
which Colin Gordon describes as 
a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who 
can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making 
some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and 
to those upon whom it was practised” (Gordon 1991, 3) 
For Foucault and others, neo-liberalism is the preeminent (but not sole) 
governmental rationality that guides the technologies of government in 
contemporary societies. For Foucault, neo-liberalism is “the overall exercise of 
political power … modeled on the principles of a market economy … taking 
the formal principles of a market economy and referring and relating them to, 
of projecting them on to a general art of government” (Foucault & Senellart 
2008, 131).  
In the 40 years since Foucault made these observations about neo-liberalism, 
its processes have evolved and become manifest in ways that Foucault did not 
fully develop. Wendy Brown has identified several that are salient to this 
thesis: “austerity politics”, the “marketisation and outsourcing of the state”, the 
“meshing of political and business lexicons”, “the antipathy of governance to 
politics”, the “responsibilization of the subject” and the “bracketing of law, 
democratic principle, and social welfare in favor of other metrics, including 
those of efficacy, control, and an advantageous economic climate” (Brown 
2015, 71–72). 
I argue throughout this thesis that all these trends have been deepened and 
expanded by the way that governments have embraced information 
technologies and their associated techniques, social arrangements, producers 
and practitioners. They culminate in a mode of government that Bruce 
Kapferer describes as the corporate state. This concept is of particular value to 
framing the broader context of the corporate infiltration of government 
through large system development. In summoning the idea of the corporate 
state, Kapferer has depicted a model of the state that highlights the openness 
and interconnectedness of government to corporations. 
… there are developments in corporate control and organization that are taking 
on a more firm state dimension. This is so in corporations’ appropriation of 
domains of public space and service, previously in control of states … increasing 
determination of state policies by corporations … the formation of transnational 
or transterritorial organizational structures in which corporate alliances (often 
involving governments) are beginning to have major force over populations 
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(Kapferer 2005b, n. 1, 20). 
I will argue that some of the most influential of such alliances involve 
corporations that promote, design, produce, implement, operate and integrate 
digital technologies and related techniques of governance into public sector 
organisations. These new organisational arrangements feed and accelerate the 
emergence of more technocratic modes of government in support of a neo-
liberalism that, as Wendy Brown argues,  
aims at limiting and containing the political, detaching it from sovereignty, 
eliminating its democratic form, and starving its democratic energies. From its 
“postideological” aspirations and affirmation of technocracy to its economization 
and privatization of government activities (2019, 57) 
These alliances and their effects are particularly evidenced in Part 3 of this 
thesis, which describes the relationships sought and developed in the design 
and construction of a welfare payments system They are also evident in the 
processes of co-opting democratic engagement through technocratic methods 
of public consultation described in Chapter 9. 
Yet in the advocacy and practice of digital government, there seems to be a 
drive that is not fully explained by the deeply held commitment to the neo-
liberal conception of government, and that is the desire for certainty. This 
bureaucratic rationality described by Weber (1970 [1922], 214–16) thrives in 
new forms such as the yearning to control risk (Beck 1992 [1986], 4). These 
kinds of underlying desires feature in some of the documents produced in 
creation of the organisational relationships at the heart of digital government 
(see Chapter 7). These desires produce some of the key characteristics of a 
new mode of governance, such as the breakdown of the subject into 
characteristics and the growth of surveillance as a measure to prevent 
uncertainty. As Robert Castel explains: 
These preventive policies thus promote a new mode of surveillance: that of 
systematic predetection … now surveillance can be practised without any contact 
with, or even any immediate representation of, the subjects under scrutiny … the 
logic of such subterranean dossiers now attains the sophisticated and proudly 
proclaimed form of ‘scientific’ predetection (Castel 1991, 287). 
The Australian government has announced plans to follow people through 
various life stages (such as the birth of a child, education, co-habitation, 
marriage, (un)employment, illness and death) in order to anticipate needs for 
assistance (DTA 2018), but also to check eligibility for existing benefits. This 
cradle-to-grave oversight of human lives perfectly illustrates Foucault’s notion 
of biopower, a form of power  
exercised over persons specifically in so far as they are thought of as living 
beings: a politics concerned with subjects as members of a population, in which 
issues of individual sexual and reproductive conduct interconnect with issues of 
national policy and power. (Gordon 1991, 4–5). 
In Chapter 9, I examine the ways in which a government program aims to 
anticipate citizen needs and behaviour through a “Circumstance based 
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approach to managing Customers” (DHS 2016a, s. 18.1). 
3.5  Technology as ideology 
This section describes two divergent deterministic ideologies of technology 
and also their critiques, which explore the deep ways in which technology is 
inherently social, and how those ideologies, despite their differences, each 
work to obscure those social relations.  
Technological determinism 
The digital government discourse relies in large part on its audience’s taking-
for-granted the imperatives of a widely held, but discredited, ideology of 
technology, known as technological determinism. This perspective confers on 
technology characteristics of agency, autonomy, social neutrality, inevitability 
and benevolence (Fisher 2010, 17). There is a long and evolving critique of 
this deeply ingrained perception of technology (Marx 1997; Noble 1999, 206; 
Pippin 1995; Winner 1978, 1980) that calls into question the way that various 
technologies are promoted by their advocates. While the prevailing technology 
discourse is just over a century old (Marx 1997, 966), in the last 70 years 
information technology has emerged as the most problematised class of 
apparatus; and as the most influential in providing images and metaphors for a 
complex society—thus remaking society in the image of technology, making it 
more amenable to technological intervention (Fisher 2010, 22). Information 
technology is both a means for ordering (Winner 1978, 202) and an ideal for 
ordering, offering a promise of greater certainty in human affairs. 
The broad justification performed by this ideology is to centre technology in 
the world, creating an acceptance of technology as an external force acting 
upon social life. The very labels of digital government, information society, 
knowledge economy and so on serve to frame technology as the most salient 
feature of contemporary life (Ampuja 2016; Bowker 1994; May 2002). This 
manoeuvre further privileges the technocrat, who: 
… has become the essential middleman between the people and the divinity. 
Like the old Christian priest, he holds the key to the tabernacle out of which, 
from time to time, he distributes the wafer—those minimal nibbles at the divinity 
which leave the supplicant hungry for more. The wafer is knowledge, 
understanding, access, the hint of power (Saul 1992, 22). 
An integral part of technological determinism is the inevitability of 
technology’s impact on society; both in terms of it happening and the form 
that it will take. Extrapolating the historical momentum towards a more 
technically mediated, complex and interconnected world, the theory follows a 
discredited but widely and deeply-held view of unilinear cultural evolution in 
which Western culture is at the vanguard; and now IT is at the pointy end of 
that vanguard. Moreover, the technology has a direction, a historical trajectory, 
a teleology, that cannot be resisted, and need not be resisted. This leads to a 
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spectrum of responses from ebullience to resignation in the face of progress—
but always perceiving technology in the same way, as if it were a natural 
force. But, as Zuboff suggests, it also reflects a moral bankruptcy by ruling out 
any opportunity for human agency or control. 
Every doctrine of inevitability carries a weaponized virus of moral nihilism 
programmed to target human agency and delete resistance and creativity from the 
text of human possibility. Inevitability rhetoric is a cunning fraud designed to 
render us helpless and passive in the face of implacable forces that are and must 
always be indifferent to the merely human (Zuboff 2019, 225). 
The deterministic view of technological progress is part of a broader belief 
central to Western identity. For centuries technology has been the mark of 
distinction by which Westerners have set themselves in relation to other 
cultures. In Machines as the measure of men: science, technology, and 
ideologies of Western dominance, Michael Adas (2014) has illustrated the 
extent to which technology became the West’s self-defining criterion of 
advancement—the mark of moral superiority and a justification for conquest, 
colonisation and slavery.16  
Social constructivism 
The reciprocal position to technological determinism is social constructivism. 
In this world, technology is entirely socially determined, and the relationship 
is one-directional. Social constructivism is prevalent in the social sciences and, 
in particular, organisational studies and management literature, which have an 
influence on the discourses and practices of public sector management. In 
those discourses, artefacts, and materiality have essentially been rendered as 
an “absent presence” (Orlikowski 2010, 128–29), the explanation being 
… that technology is either invisible or irrelevant to researchers trained in social, 
political, economic and institutional analyses of organisations. For these 
researchers, ontological priority is given to human actors and social structures 
and, as a result, technological artifacts (and materiality more generally) tend to 
disappear into the background and become taken for granted (Orlikowski 2010, 
128).  
A purely social determinist position is undermined by the prevalence of 
unintended consequences and a misplaced rationalist belief in the 
intentionality of human action (Giddens 1984, pp. 8-14). The master/slave 
metaphor breaks down when “… the slave has gained the upper hand, for the 
condition of the master’s independence is a dependency of a radical sort: 
dependence on the slave himself” (Winner 1978, 188). The purely social 
constructivist conception is also challenged when we question the degree of 
control that is possible with large complex systems, whether technological or 
human in nature (Winner 1978, 283–85). That is, to what extent can any social 
 
16 Adas points out that science and technology did not become the decisive mark of 
distinction until the 18th century, before which Christianity was the main distinctive mark of 
superiority (Adas 2014, 7). 
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group bend a large system to its will? In Chapter 6, I will explore this question 
in the context of a national welfare payments “system”. Long story short: such 
systems embed a variety of rationalities, rules and values that are not all 
visible, let alone manipulable, to all those in a position to influence the 
system, let alone those subject to it.  
Both of the deterministic accounts are unsatisfactory as they each separate the 
technical from the social (Fisher 2010, 17). Ultimately, the cause-effect 
structure of either form of determinism is only possible through this a priori 
separation. Treating them as separate entities makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to account for their intimate multi-way interconnectedness. One 
way or the other, the separation of technology from the realm of the social 
plays an important role. For the proponents of large IT systems, it is possible 
to introduce substantial changes below the radar of political oversight. Social 
constructivists can pretend that technological systems will unproblematically 
do what they are told, ignoring the consequences of delegating large swathes 
of public sector activities to digital apparatus, and the consequences of the 
hybrid public/private governance which controls that infrastructure. 
The critical perspectives offered by a non-binary view 
In its present sense, the term technology was invented at the turn of the 20th 
century to fill a “semantic void” to make sense of large transport, 
communication and manufacturing systems that had become prevalent by that 
time (Marx 1994, 244). As such, it is very much an idea sprung forth from, and 
about, modernity (Pfaffenberger 1988). In his 1997 article titled “Technology”: 
the emergence of a hazardous concept, Leo Marx describes the historically and 
culturally contingent origins and subsequent impact of the term (1997). He 
points out that the term only entered academic and general discourse with 
Veblen’s 1904 work on business organisations (1904), soon followed by the 
scientific management movement led by Frederick Taylor.  
The emergence of such extensive, complex and interconnected systems 
marked a transition in human artefacts from tools wielded by people to 
systems which subsume people, or in Zuboff’s terms, when infrastructure 
changes “from a thing that we have to a thing that has us” (Zuboff 2019, 204). 
It was a period in which people became more conscious of the 
interrelationship of science and what was then known as the mechanical arts 
or practical arts. It was also a period when there was an unquestioned notion 
of progress, as represented by the expansion of mechanised systems, such as 
electricity, motor cars and telephones, into new areas of life. 
Leo Marx concluded his article by pointing out the ultimate risk presented by 
the idea of technology as an extra-social force. 
The popularity of the belief that technology is the primary force shaping the 
postmodern world is a measure of our growing reliance on instrumental 
standards of judgment, and our corresponding neglect of moral and political 
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standards, in making decisive choices about the direction of society. To expose 
this hazard is a vital task for the human sciences (1997, 984). 
As Leo Marx also pointed out, “the discursive triumph of the concept of 
technology is in large measure attributable to its vague, intangible, 
indeterminate character—the fact that it does not refer to anything as specific 
or tangible as a tool or machine” (op. cit., p. 982). The abstraction involved in 
the term technology removes contingencies of the social context. As an 
antidote, Zuboff suggests that: “A worthwhile exercise would be to delete the 
word ‘technology’ from our vocabularies in order to see how quickly 
capitalism’s objectives are exposed” (Zuboff 2019, 16).17 
The term has become such an entrenched, unquestioned objectification in 
modernity that various theorists have felt compelled to define and account for 
it as a given phenomenon in its own right (Vaccari 2002, 3). Thus, technology 
could become the ground of the causation debates described above, but also 
reified to become an object of fetish and alienation. On one side, technology 
is enthusiastically fetishised in the sense that the social relations involved in its 
design, production and use are obscured. On the other side, alienation arises 
from the disconnection of people from the apparatus and techniques used in 
everyday life, both in terms of their knowledge of how they work and also a 
sense of detachment or even apprehension in dealing with something they 
(know they) don’t understand. As Langdon Winner explains: 
Society is composed of persons who cannot design, build, repair, or even operate 
most of the devices upon which their lives depend. In this sense, specialists of 
various stripes are left to trade on each other’s ignorance … The totality of such 
connections … is something which is no longer comprehensible to anyone … 
Under these circumstances, all persons do and, indeed, must accept a great 
number of things on faith … Their way of understanding, however, is basically 
religious rather than scientific; only a small portion of one’s everyday experience 
in the technological society can be made scientific. For the rest, everyone is 
forced to depend upon and have faith in matters about which one has little 
information or intelligent grasp (Winner 1978, 284). 
This view of alienation is similar to Karl Marx’s account of people’s separation 
from the means of production (Slack & Wise 2015, 67). For my purposes, this 
detachment is experienced by bureaucrats and public sector academics who 
have generally ignored technology-related issues in organisational and public 
management discourses (Fountain 2001a, 9; Lips 2007, 243; Orlikowski & Scott 
2008; Snellen 2007, 205). Snellen’s explanation for this is that “public 
administrationists and the public administrative discipline are oriented on the 
interests of politicians and higher level practitioners: politics and policy 
making, not policy implementation … [or] … in (the effects of) ICT 
applications.” (2007, 205)  
So how does one break down the conceptual framework behind the fetish 
 
17 When “technology” is used in the context of physical apparatus, one way of doing this is to 
substitute “technology” with “product” to emphasise its typical origins within and for a market. 
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and the alienation? The process of reconnecting the technological and the 
social perhaps starts with those aspects of cognitive and social ordering with 
which apparatus is most closely connected. As Winner points out, 
Apparatus almost always requires refined technique: an elaborate, knowledgeable 
kind of human practice to guarantee its successful working. In the great majority 
of cases, however, both apparatus and technique require the presence of well-
developed, rational, social organization … Apparatus, technique, and 
organization are interdependent, that is, reciprocally necessary for each other’s 
operation (1978, 200, emphasis added). 
David Harvey makes a case for an even deeper interconnection of technology 
with social relations and ways of seeing the world: 
We cannot understand the development of technology, social relations, our 
mental conceptions of the world, and our distinctive modes of dealing with 
nature and sustaining material life without seeing them all as dialectically 
intertwined, as “internal relations,” each of the other. The study of technology 
should reveal these relations (2003, 4). 
The concept of material culture goes one step further in dissolving the 
distinction. From an anthropological perspective, Pierre Lemonnier describes 
the cultural embeddedness of technology. Starting at a material level, he 
argues, “the basic question of an anthropology of technology [is] the problem 
of the relation between the physical function of the material culture and the 
social (symbolic) representations of which it is a materialization” (1992, 99). In 
taking a process-orientation rather than an object orientation, he argues that 
“to be called ‘technological,’ an action needs to involve at least some physical 
intervention which leads to a real transformation of matter … every technique 
has five related components: matter, energy, objects, gestures and specific 
knowledge, “which may be conscious or unconscious” (op. cit., 5-6). The 
unconscious dimension of materiality is also emphasised in Daniel Miller’s 
account of the “humility of things” (1987, 85-108) which takes the role of 
objects (and, by implication place) beyond both objectivity and symbolism. He 
concludes that 
… objects are important not because they are evident and physically constrain or 
enable, but often precisely because we do not “see” them. The less we are aware 
of them, the more powerfully they can determine our expectations by setting the 
scene and ensuring normative behaviour, without being open to challenge. They 
determine what takes place to the extent that we are unconscious of their 
capacity to do so. 
Such a perspective seems properly described as “material culture,” since it implies 
that much of what we are exists not through our consciousness or body, but as 
an exterior environment that habituates and prompts us. (2005, 5) 
There is another perspective for understanding information technologies in 
particular as material culture. As a means of ordering, they are closely related 
to other modes of ordering thought and practice. These include 
classification/categorisation (Bowker & Star 1999), standardisation (Brunsson, 
Jacobsson & Associates 2000), methods, processes and rules (March, Schultz & 
Zhou 2000). These modes of ordering are closely related to each other; for 
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instance, processes, standards and rules all rely on classification to group 
things and events so they can be managed in a similar way. Constellations of 
such factors are just part of what Rose and Miller call the “technologies of 
government”, that is, “the complex of mundane programmes, calculations, 
techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities 
seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions” (2010 [1992], 273), 
where government is seen as “the conduct of conduct” (Dean 1996, 47). In this 
light, information technologies are a continuance of the rationalised ordering 
that governments have been pursuing for well over a century. Moreover, 
digital systems are constituted in large part by sharply defined categories, rules 
and processes. Mitchell Dean warns of the danger of associating Foucault’s use 
of the term technology too closely with its conventional use, and that it is 
more appropriate to interpret technologies of government as “the art or techne 
of government” (1996, 48). This approach recognises the underlying non-
rationalist basis of governance and ameliorates the tendency to see 
government as the effective operation of a hierarchy of rational ordering. In 
short, we need to see all the ordering factors as a whole to understand the 
sociotechnical systems in which humans act, and within which Winner 
suggests, 
The direction of governance flows from the technical conditions to people and 
their social arrangements, not the other way around. What we find, then, is not a 
tool waiting passively to be used but a technical ensemble that demands 
routinized behavior (Winner 1978, 202).  
Each of these modes of ordering suggests a vast range of social connections, 
networks, professions and legislation—and at multiple levels, from 
international agreements to the physical habituation of tool use and personal 
identity. Such connections open the way to understanding the relationship 
between technology and power. Defining the social relations brings to the 
surface the advocates and beneficiaries, as well as what is being justified, and 
how those relations are obscured. In particular, it highlights the IT industry 
and the specific and conflicting interests of designers, planners, producers, 
manufacturer, consultants, managers and users. It also highlights how the 
instrumental ideology favours those in power (Cecez-Kecmanovic 2008). 
This thesis will be examining the development of a new configuration of 
technologies of government under the banner of e-government or digital 
government (Henman 2010a, 42–43). Central to this is the argument that 
introducing new apparatus alone is impossible—the apparatus brings with it 
people, discourse, organisations, institutions and other techniques of 
government from which it cannot be separated; as well as opening up new 
opportunities for pursuing power not previously possible. 
There is another dimension of the IT discourse that deserves a separate 
treatment. While the emergence of IT invigorated and commandeered the 
technology discourse, so has an ideological view of information energised the 
IT discourse. Even at its broadest definition, the analysis of information 
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technology does not account for what is said to be passing through it. The 
contemporary concept of information, too, has a crucial ideological dimension. 
3.6  Information as ideology 
Intertwined with the ideology of information technology is an ideology of 
information. Ronald Day describes the nature and impact of this ideology in 
the following terms: 
“Information” is a central term of ideology because it determines and patrols its 
own meaning over a vast expanse of social and cultural spaces. Through 
information, vocabularies for the future are included or excluded, shaping history 
in a way that is fit for information and for little else. (Day 2001, 117). 
This section describes the claims made for objectified information, their impact 
and what they obscure. I treat it separately here because it plays a substantial 
role in promoting the market expansion of information technology and in the 
emergence of new forms of governance. As a companion or subsidiary 
discourse to the discourse of technology, its presence and impacts are often 
obscured, but they are relevant to the discourse around the use of information 
in government. Information is given a life independent from forms of 
apparatus. Martin Allor suggests an approach to analysing information as 
ideology: 
We should begin to analyze the ideological function of the term information by 
analyzing its status within specific discourses (e.g. information and computer 
science) and the relationship of the term (and the discourses) to other terms, 
other networks of terms … the second move should be to document and analyze 
… the ways in which particular institutions have taken up, altered, and deployed 
the discourse of information (Allor 1987, 22). 
The term information as it is used today emerged in the mid 20th century with 
the development of electronic computing, information theory and cybernetics 
(Geoghegan 2016, 173). The meaning of the word has transitioned from “the 
quality of being informed” (Day 2001, 120) to “an entity that has ontologically 
stable properties, preserving its integrity under various transformations” 
(Mirowski 2002, 16). Information as an autonomous entity was conceptualised 
in the “information theory”18 of Shannon and Weaver and the cybernetics of 
Norbert Wiener. Cybernetics in particular was conceived by Wiener as a 
universal science of control and communication (Wiener 1961, 11–12). As 
Philip Mirowski puts it, 
Ultimately, the blurred ontology of the cyborg sciences19 derives from the need to 
 
18 This label is a difficult one. Strictly speaking, information theory refers to a body of work 
that emerged in the 1930s and 1940s, which addressed information explicitly as a problem 
(Nauta 1972, 215-16). However, the term is commonly used to refer to the particular theory of 
“information” developed by Shannon and Weaver (Shannon & Weaver 1963). The problem 
with this use of “information theory’” is that it focuses on a limited aspect of the field, namely 
the accurate transmission of signals. 
19 The “cyborg sciences” are the inheritors of the cybernetic, information-centric world view 
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subject heterogeneous agglomerations of the actors, machines, messages, and (let 
it not be forgotten) opponents to a hierarchical real-time regime of surveillance 
and control. (2002, 17) 
Wiener declared information to be a quantifiable characteristic of a message 
(Wiener 1961, 64). The ensuing cybernetic discourse of the 1950s and 1960s 
(while long-gone as a distinct discipline) was extremely influential in 
establishing information as a discrete entity with its own laws (Mirowski 2002, 
12; Morgan 1998, 393). The fundamental confusion at work in this ideology is 
the implicit proposition that meaning, ideas, messages, thoughts and feelings 
can be contained or conveyed within signals, where a signal is a physical 
pattern of some sort, such as air vibrations or electric modulations (Reddy 
1993, 166–68). The following figure sets out an example of the container 
structure implied by the view of information as autonomous: 
Sender → (Signal (Message (Information (Meaning/Idea/Thought)))) → Receiver 
Figure 2—Container metaphors for information 
There are many variations on this schema, involving any entity that is said to 
contain information, whether a database, book or poem; or any other human 
mental experience presented as a contained object. The consequence of this is 
a 
… model of communication [that] objectifies meaning in a misleading and 
dehumanizing fashion. It influences us to talk and think about thoughts as if they 
had the same kind of external, intersubjective reality as lamps and tables (Reddy 
1993, 186). 
The model ignores the cognitive skill required by the speaker or writer to 
construct a signal that can be appreciated by the audience as intended 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 23–24) and the work of readers (Eco 
1979) and listeners, who “face a difficult and highly creative task of 
reconstruction and hypothesis testing” (Reddy 1993, 186). In contrast, the 
model presents communication as non-problematic transfer of meaning from 
one person to another. But any unity of meaning expressed in this model is an 
artefact of an observer (Morgan 1998, 255). A further consequence is “… the 
creation of a mystique of information that makes basic intellectual 
discriminations between data, knowledge, judgement, imagination, insight, 
and wisdom impossible (Roszak 1994, xix).  
Once information is successfully presented as being independent of writer and 
reader, something with inherent value and meaning, it can be set up as 
“standing reserve” (Heidegger 1993, 322)—yet another resource available for 
exploitation, something that 
… is on stand-by for humans to call upon. A resource that can be unlocked, 
 
and include economics and “information theory, molecular biology, cognitive science, 
neuropsychology, computer science, artificial intelligence, operations research … 
sociobiology, artificial life, and last but not least, game theory” (Mirowski 2002, 12). 
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transformed, stored and distributed in chains of activities, all linked into a big 
network of stores, all on immediate stand-by (standing-reserve) for humanity to 
command-forth (Introna 2002, 230).  
In this schema, information can be used as a relatively unprocessed resource20; 
or as a commodity to which value is added as it passes through a production 
chain (Braman 1989). At its most extreme, the resource approach was 
extended to knowledge. The discipline of knowledge management was one of 
the boldest forays into separating information from its human host—essentially 
an attempt by organisations to co-opt the tacit knowledge of its employees 
(Clegg & Ray 2003).  
Ivan Illich sums up the situation thus: 
The world does not contain any information. It is as it is. Information about it is 
created in the organism [a human being] through its interaction with the world. 
To speak about the storage of information is to fall into a semantic trap. Books or 
computers are parts of the world. They can yield information when they are 
looked upon. We move the problem of learning and cognition nicely into the 
blind spot of our intellectual vision if we confuse vehicles for potential 
information with information itself. (Illich 1973: 101) 
As with the idea of technology, there is a fetish at work here, where 
information is objectified and commodified and its cognitive and social 
grounds obscured, along with the social relations involved, especially in the 
digitally mediated generation and exchange of signals. At the same time, the 
commercial infrastructure of commodified information is obscured. The fetish 
is most evident in the fantastic claims made for the Internet and all the 
“knowledge” it contains and makes available to the world (Day 2001, 61). As 
Reddy argued in relation to libraries, the problem with such a claim is that 
… there is no culture at all unless it is reconstructed carefully and painstakingly 
in the living brains of each new generation. All that is preserved in libraries is the 
mere opportunity to perform this reconstruction. But if the language skills and the 
habit of engaging in reconstruction are not similarly preserved, then there will be 
no culture, no matter how large and complete the libraries may become … (1993, 
187) 
In summary, the ideology of information, itself grounded in the conduit 
metaphor, is the foundation for privileging intermediaries over the original 
speaker and hearer. For recordable signals, it justifies the ability of one 
original party or a third party to capture, store, manipulate, combine and share 
communications to create an imbalance of knowledge/power. 
The intersection of the ideologies of information and rationalism is also central 
to the perception and resolution of uncertainty. The assumption behind 
 
20 This approach has been the basis for several government policies, such as the WA 
Government’s 1992 Managing the information resource (Western Australian Information Policy 
Committee 1992), to be discussed in a later chapter; and the Australian Government’s data 
sharing policy, which aims to “increase availability and use of data to boost innovation and 
competition in Australia” (Productivity Commission 2017). 
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rational action theories is that the evaluation of options for action will improve 
with more information. The value of information to the normative theory of 
decisions (Nauta 1972, 102–03) is that information is good and that more 
information is better (Feldman & March 1987, 178). The value of information 
in rational choices is reduced to its role in making decisions. According to 
Fritz Machlup, in rationalist theory “information, to be information, has to have 
value, has to be used for decision-making, and has to be designed to lead to 
action” (Machlup 1983, 649, original emphasis). Furthermore, to have value, 
information “must reduce uncertainty” (loc. cit., original emphasis). Feldman 
and March summarise the consequences of systemic forces in organisations 
that drive people to collect more information than is ever used in decisions: 
…most organizations and individuals often collect more information than they 
use or can reasonably expect to use in the making of decisions. At the same time, 
they appear to be constantly needing or requesting more information, or 
complaining about inadequacies in information (Feldman & March 1987, 174). 
The government projects I describe later demonstrate the power of the belief 
that perfect information will eliminate uncertainty. 
The combined impact of the technology and information discourses 
The ideology of information buttresses the ideology of autonomous 
technology to further fetishise information/technology by hiding the social 
relations and cognitive effort required to construct meaning from the signals 
exchanged by humans. By separating out the discussion on information 
ideology, I have hoped to illustrate the combined power of the ideologies of 
technology and information. Ronald Kline explains how the combined effect 
emerged, its promoters and its impact: 
The practice of combining the revolutionary meaning of information with the 
technologically determinist, artifactual meaning of technology in the compound-
word information technology intensified during the 1980s when the term came 
into widespread use … Business groups, social scientists, and policy analysts took 
a parallel discursive path, combining the new meanings of technology and 
information to create a different meaning of the term information technology: an 
industrial art that produces artifacts and systems having the power of a social 
force … Information technology formed the basis for the technologically 
deterministic theories of an “information society. (Kline 2006, 532–35, original 
emphasis). 
The co-option of the term “information” by cybernetics (the science of control) 
and the subsequent application of information/technology to a utilitarian 
program of rationalisation supported a power imbalance that is still unfolding 
as we enter a more reflexive era in which the affordances for control become 
better understood. One of the main asymmetries of knowledge/power hidden 
by the abstraction of information is the capacity of some social groups to 
surveil others in their quest for certainty and control. The following section 
examines the way that privileged groups justify their capacity to observe 
others without being visible themselves. 
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3.7  Surveillance and control 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new mode of governance that has to 
be justified by the advocates of digital government is its emerging mode of 
surveillance and control. In her recent book, The age of surveillance 
capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power (2019), 
Shoshana Zuboff argues that the rise of a new form of capitalism is going 
unexamined because we do not have the concepts and language to 
understand this unprecedented phenomenon. Our inability to understand it in 
Fordist terms renders the new form largely invisible (Zuboff 2019, 14). This 
lack of awareness is itself both an enabling factor in the rise of a predatory 
form of capitalism and the collective failure to limit its excesses.  
One explanation for surveillance capitalism’s many triumphs floats above them 
all: it is unprecedented. The unprecedented is necessarily unrecognizable. When 
we encounter something unprecedented, we automatically interpret it through the 
lenses of familiar categories, thereby rendering invisible precisely that which is 
unprecedented … This is how the unprecedented reliably confounds 
understanding; existing lenses illuminate the familiar, thus obscuring the original 
by turning the unprecedented into an extension of the past (Zuboff 2019, 12). 
I argue that this account also applies generally to the emergence of a digitally-
based form of public sector governance, for which we lack a framework to 
allow us to identify and assess it and to understand what is required to make it 
accountable. 
Zuboff focuses on the surveillance conducted by large search and social media 
companies such as Google and Facebook and less on the advertising, 
insurance and other organisations that pay those companies billions of dollars 
for information to target and influence individuals. Crucially, surveilling 
governments fill both these roles, providing a more focused point of attention 
and power. As will be seen in Chapter 9, governments collect, use and re-use 
a surprisingly broad range of data about individuals, and the extensive 
digitisation of its activities provides opportunities for increasing the volume 
and type of data collected and how it is, or could be, used. Much of Zuboff’s 
framework for understanding the private sector surveillance regime is 
applicable to the public sector, with the proviso that there are fundamental 
differences in their respective “business models”. Many of the powerful 
commercial dynamics of surveillance capitalism are not present in digital 
government, while governments have more coercive power. On the other 
hand, there are similar dynamics that derive from broad rationalist appetites 
for control, knowledge and certainty through ever-expanding capacities for 
surveillance and, ultimately, behaviour modification.  
There are also several vital points of contact between surveillance capitalism 
and government as they co-evolve. Within the context of a corporate state, the 
relationship between surveillance capitalism and “surveillance government” 
include: first, a population preconditioned by surveillance capitalism to accept 
the devil’s bargain of surrendering personal data (and loss of control) in 
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exchange for convenience; second, governments use data collected by 
surveillance capitalists—for instance, Services Australia collects social media, 
credit agency and online trading (e.g. eBay) information to validate welfare 
eligibility and payments (Services Australia 2020a); third, similar approaches to 
exploiting the capabilities of digital technology and the practices associated 
with it, motivated in large part for a desire for certainty; fourth, the 
involvement of consultants and IT companies in the design of government 
systems (whether through commercial software or strategy); and, fifth, the use 
of private sector-derived methods and systems, such as customer relationship 
management, to collect and analyse data about “customers” (Lips 2006, 42; 
Taylor & Lips 2008, 148–49). 
Several of Zuboff’s key concepts are valuable for understanding some of the 
crucial aspects of the new public governance. The first concerns the trail of 
data produced by digital transactions and automation. In Zuboff’s terms, to 
automate is to informate—in The age of the smart machine (1988) she 
illustrates how automation generates a text that can be used in a variety of 
ways within organisations. This has substantial implications for the distribution 
of knowledge and power within organisations, in terms of who gets to 
structure and observe that data. Zuboff and others have suggested that the 
general tendency of such changes, while not an inevitable result of the 
technology itself (Zuboff 2019, 15), is to concentrate power in the hands of 
system designers and upper levels of management, at the expense of lower 
levels in the organisation (Homburg 2009, 12; Kraemer & King 2006, 10–11; 
Myers & Young 1997, 237; Snellen 2002, 48; Zuurmond 1998, 270–71). 
In the broader social context of surveillance capitalism, the digitisation of 
transactions has created two digital texts; the first being a primary text 
consisting of the information provided by users and which they share with 
others; the second text, which Zuboff calls the shadow text, is data about users 
that they do not necessarily provide or know is being collected (Zuboff 2019, 
186–87). This text includes metadata about transactions, such as time and 
location and interlocutors (“friends”); data matched from other sources such 
as data integrators; and derived or imputed data. 
As they digitise their own transactions with the public, governments generate 
their own shadow text. Beyond the primary text that the public writes and 
reads, the public sector shadow text includes primary text that moves through 
privacy loopholes to be shared with other agencies, the primary text’s 
metadata (time, medium and location of transactions, etc.), data derived or 
inferred from the primary data, data shared from other organisations through 
data matching, and “de-identified” data that are combined with other 
government data for the purposes of research and policy evaluation, including 
profiling of social groups and refining techniques of observation and control. 
In Chapter 9, I describe the ways in which a shadow text is being accumulated 
and consolidated to provide a unified view of a citizen across government. 
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The house of certainty 
The last of Zuboff’s salient points is that the fundamental consequence of 
surveillance is not just that someone is being observed but the discipline that 
surveillance elicits. A maldistribution of knowledge reflects a maldistribution in 
capacity to influence behaviour—in other words, power. As Zuboff observes, 
while the predictability of behaviour afforded by surveillance is essential, the 
best way of predicting the future is to control it (Zuboff 2019, 297). 
Large surveilling systems are in many ways elaborate exemplars of the 
powerful metaphor of the panopticon, “a functional mechanism that must 
improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more 
effective, a design of subtle coercion” (Foucault 1977, 209). Michel Foucault’s 
interpretation of the panopticon is an effective heuristic metaphor for 
understanding the prevalent form of discipline in modernity—or in Lyon’s 
words, “Seeing the Panopticon as a secular parody of divine omniscience … 
provides some crucial components of critique” (Lyon 1993, 675). In this regard 
discipline is intimately intertwined with rationality and technology (in the 
broad sense). In Foucault’s terms,  
‘Discipline’ may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it 
is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of 
instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ 
or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology (1977, 215).  
What is critical about the panopticon is the work done by the subject and the 
system’s capacity to operate remotely on behalf of those applying the 
discipline. At its root, the concept of the panopticon metaphor is an effective 
rebuttal of traditional and still-present conventional views of coercive power, 
discipline and compliance. The active participation of the subject is crucial; 
subjects are “caught up in a power situation which they themselves are the 
bearers” (Foucault 1977, 201). In a world of self-service and mobile apps, the 
subjects of surveillance engage directly with the disciplinary apparatus and 
enter most of the data by which they are surveilled (Sleep & Tranter 2017). 
The idea of “individualising discipline” (Foucault 1977, 199) resonates in a 
world of customer-centric databases, self-service and the comprehensive 
rendition of human objects. 
Of relevance to this project is the panopticon’s role as a laboratory with which 
to study the interaction of behaviour and policy interventions. Foucault 
described the panopticon as a “laboratory of power”, that “could be used as a 
machine to carry out experiments, to alter behaviour, to train and correct 
individuals” (Foucault 1977, 203–04). Google and Facebook all pursue 
experimentation to better understand, predict and control the behaviour of 
their objects and the effectiveness of their surveillance and advertising 
products (Zuboff 2019, 298). Services Australia is developing a hereto 
unavailable capacity to explore policy options, and will in consequence be 
able to model the interactions of customer behaviour and their own 
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administrative interventions (DHS 2018b, 12).  
Several authors have pointed out the limits to Foucault’s version of the 
panopticon in a digital environment. Firstly, bearing in mind that Foucault 
presents the concept as an ideal, there is probably more reciprocity and lateral 
visibility than allowed for in the one-way ideal, and therefore greater 
opportunities for resistance than in a physical panopticon. Anthony Giddens’s 
main reservation was the lack of recognition of human agency allowed for in 
the model (Lyon 1993) and the potential for people to “answer back”. Further, 
a view of the subject from a panopticon perspective frames that individual in 
terms of the function of the discipline in question, at the cost of ignoring other 
aspects of the person’s life. 
The second proviso is that the panopticon metaphor is ineffective to the extent 
that people are unaware they are being observed and/or unaware of the 
consequences of being observed. In a more abstract setting than a physical 
building, compliance is dependent on factors such as the subjects’ 
understanding of the constancy and depth of the gaze, the rules they are 
meant to be complying with, the scope, cohesion and capabilities of the 
regulatory regime.  
The third proviso is that, in discussing the panopticon as a “diagram of a 
mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form” (Foucault 1977, 205), in a less 
carceral environment than a prison, we need to understand what might hold 
people within the “small theatre” in which “each actor is alone, perfectly 
individualised and constantly visible” (Foucault 1977, 200). At face value, in 
workplaces it may be financial reward and/or professional commitments that 
bind people to the discipline; for welfare recipients it may be the financial 
benefit and accompanying security. At another level, there is an additional 
commitment based on acceptance of the legitimacy of the power relation 
embedded in the disciplinary apparatus and the associated sense of self. This 
is where commitment to an ideology plays a crucial role. 
In summary, using the lens of ideology to understand the interplay of digital 
government discourse and practice provides a multi-dimensional view of the 
complex factors at play. Overtly, the discourse frames the field (its inclusions 
and exclusions), the identities of those involved, the social goals, the ways in 
which a program can be simultaneously materially embedded and deeply 
unconscious. The power of the ideology is revealed by its capacity to obscure 
an extensive program of surveillance and control, as well as the formation of a 
new power structure in which corporations are intimately entangled in both 
the development of systems and the restructuring of government 
organisations, work and policies. 
The next two chapters of this thesis explore the way in which digital 
government is advocated and thus how adherence is obtained from 
practitioners and public to the digital government ideology, starting with an 
account of the digital government policies developed by a single jurisdiction 




PART 2  SELLING DIGITAL GOVERNMENT 
CHAPTER 4  DIGITAL GOVERNMENT POLICY MAKING 
4.1  Introduction 
Scene 2: Perth, Western Australia, Wednesday, 11 August 2004 
It was a cold, dry winter morning in the central business district of Perth. In the 
warm Terrace Room of the 5-star Parmelia Hilton hotel, over 100 government 
and industry executives were eating breakfast (Gallop 2004). Before them stood 
the Premier of Western Australia, Dr Geoff Gallop. He was outlining an 
initiative that promised to transform the relationship between citizens, 
government and business by 2010. In the next six years, a new type of 
government was to emerge, in which 
… the relationship between citizens, government and business has been 
transformed … 
Citizens and business have an implicit trust and confidence in their engagement 
with government, and the concept of “government as a servant of the public” is 
truly realised … 
Government itself is highly accountable, and the mechanisms for soliciting 
feedback from citizens have been replaced by mechanisms that afford citizens a 
highly participative role in decision-making, direction and policy. 
[Government would be] establishing new ways for citizens to participate in the 
decision and policy-making processes of government … [and] new avenues for 
government to increase its accountability to the citizenry through greater openness 
and transparency of its operations (OeG 2004, 15 & 18). 
The document describing this transformation was not the draft of a new 
constitution for the State of Western Australia but the e-Government Strategy 
for the Western Australian Public Sector. The total transformation of 
government would be brought about through a set of technology-related 
initiatives, enfolded within the banner of “e-government”. Coordinating this 
initiative was the Office of e-Government, a special policy body created within 
the Premier’s own department in the previous year. 
Scene 3: Perth, Western Australia, Wednesday, 25 May 2016 
A crisp, dry autumn morning. The Western Australian Minister for State 
Development; Transport; and Innovation releases Western Australia’s “first 
whole-of-government ICT strategy". Fourteen years after the e-government 
Strategy, the Digital WA strategy commits the Western Australian government to 
conducting 75 percent of all its transactions with the public online by 2020. It 
offered a similar vision to the Strategy of 2004. While still “transforming how 
government operates”, (OGCIO 2016) the stated aims of the initiative were also 
“to lower the cost of Government services to taxpayers” and “curb growth in the 
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State Government’s current $1 to $2 billion annual ICT spend” (Marmion 
2016). 
This time, the implementation was being coordinated by the Office of the 
Government Chief Information Officer, created in the previous year.  
 
This chapter sets out the claims made by digital government policies by 
presenting a case study that is representative of the genre and describes the 
organisational ground from which it sprang. It addresses the question of how 
policy makers and other influencers construct a motivating ideology of digital 
government. It also puts the policy into a historical context that highlights how 
this policy, and the unit which produced it, were just one of several attempts 
made in one jurisdiction to digitise government over nearly 30 years, as 
illustrated in the scenes above. The policy I examine is the Western Australian 
Government’s 2004 e-government strategy, documented in e-Government 
Strategy for the Western Australian Public Sector (OeG 2004) (which I refer to 
as the Strategy from here on).21 A single initiative and its focal document 
capture the threads of the e-government discourse in a particular time and 
place, around which many themes converge and diverge. 
4.2  Case study of the 2004 Western Australian e-
government strategy 
This case study summarises the main claims made by the Strategy, the 
organisational environment of the group that produced it (the Office of e-
Government), the Strategy’s audience and its sources of legitimation and ideas. 
I have selected the Strategy as the focus of this analysis because, having 
worked in the fields of information policy and public sector management 
policy in Western Australia, I am familiar with the policy context at that time, 
as well as some of the Strategy’s antecedents and successors. The Strategy is a 
comprehensive and cohesive statement produced by a policy group seeking 
support for a broad agenda that drew on international sources such as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
United Nations and global IT consultants. The Strategy is representative of 
other policy documents produced by provincial and national governments in 
that era and later. Unlike general IT discourse within government 
organisations, this discourse occurs at the interface of the bureaucracy, 
ministers and the public. Moreover, the authors of this document have been 
explicit about their audience, the origins of the content and their relationships 
with similar bodies, which form a mutually supportive network for promoting 
the e-government concept through Australian and international public sectors. 
The Strategy also cites a number of other documents that are used as 
 
21 The document is no longer available from the Western Australian Government. It can be 
found at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan023000.pdf 
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justifications in other jurisdictions, revealing common patterns of legitimation, 
as well as common concepts, language and texts. It is these connections and 
commonalities that made e-government a coherent discourse across the 
nation, around the Western world and into the developing world through 
international bodies. 
My previous engagement in the field meant that I was able to interview the 
Strategy’s principal author, Steven, who was in charge of strategy and policy in 
the Office of e-Government through most of the Office’s existence. I also 
interviewed Alan, the principal author of a previous Western Australian policy 
in the field. Titled Managing the information resource (Western Australian 
Information Policy Committee 1992), it was produced 12 years earlier by a 
predecessor to the Office of e-Government. I interacted with Alan extensively 
during the development of that policy. These interviews provided an inside 
view of the process and the relationships involved, as well as the myriad of 
contingencies that shape policies, policy organisations and their life-cycles. 
The proponents 
Authorship and its representation in government documents involves several 
roles. After Goffman, Norman Fairclough suggests that  
… the concept of “text producer” is more complicated than it may seem. It is 
useful to deconstruct the producer into a set of positions, which may be occupied 
by the same person or by different people. Goffman ([Forms of talk] 1981:144) 
suggests a distinction between “animator”, the person who actually makes the 
sounds, or the marks on paper, “author”, the one who puts the words together 
and is responsible for the wording, and “principal”, the one whose position is 
represented by the words (Fairclough 1992, 78). 
In many ways, the authors are the critical players in constructing the digital 
government narrative. In contemporary policy organisations, where highly 
paid professionals do their own typing, they are also the animators. More 
importantly, they are the ones who assemble the text from global sources that 
they identify and select, as well as weaving that discourse into a local context. 
But they are also active in persuading senior bureaucrats, ministers and other 
influencers to create policy units, develop policies and fund projects. My 
contact with them has shown them to be the group most committed to the 
cause of digital government. Also, in Western Australia, as elsewhere, these 
people constituted a small evolving network that persisted through multiple 
successive IT policy units over nearly twenty years, despite attempts to start 
new policy units with new people and a new approach. 
The Strategy was aimed at “placing e-government on the public sector agenda” 
(OeG 2004, 6). The implication was that e-government was a policy green 
field. It may therefore have come as a surprise to the Strategy’s readers that 
the Western Australian Government had initiated ICT-related strategies over 
the previous 20 years. While not mentioning those previous strategic ICT 
statements, the Strategy was published twenty years after the then Labor 
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government created the Department of Computing and Information 
Technology (DOCIT) as the flagship for what was then a ground-breaking 
approach to focusing on information technology as a driver for stimulating 
both the Western Australian economy and public sector reform.  
Unlike more continuous policy fields at a whole-of-government level, such as 
economic and social policy, digital government policy production tends to 
depend on the establishment of specialist units. The emergence of such units 
can be contingent upon the views and effectiveness of particular individuals in 
the public sector. For instance, in 1990 Alan and I were policy officers in the 
Department of Cabinet and pushed for the decision to wind up DOCIT. We 
were the only policy people who had an interest in, or knew anything about, 
IT and so were given responsibility for advising the Premier in that area. 
Those of us in the Department of Cabinet believed that a new policy 
orientation was required—one that prioritised information management rather 
than the coordinated procurement of hardware. As a result, in 1991 a new 
policy group, the Information Policy Unit (IPU) was established in the 
Treasury Department. But, seeing that the new IPU, made up and led by ex-
DOCIT people, was not delivering on its mandate, Alan decided he would be 
better placed working directly in the IPU. 
[Alan:] I don’t think anything had happened prior to me going down there, which 
is one of the problems that we had. They weren’t picking up the hints at all. And 
so that was my primary reason for going down to start pulling together the 
threads of this, which is why I ended up working with a contractor, rather than 
the existing staff that were down there, who were so indoctrinated in the way 
they’d always done things … They were trying to fiddle round with the next 
version of their IT strategy.22  
Leveraging his origins and continuing connection to us in the Department of 
Cabinet, Alan was able to research, develop and write the policy he wanted, 
and the policy was published in November 1992. His “policy patron” was 
Marcelle Anderson, head of the Department of Cabinet, who had an interest in 
the field and was the most influential member of the IPU’s steering committee 
of senior bureaucrats. 
[Alan:] in terms of the setting and the approach, it was the initial drivers, which 
came from Premier and Cabinet, about architecting a shift from technology focus 
to an information focus essentially.  
Despite the differences between the adherents of IT management and 
information management, we advocates of what would later become known 
as e-government were firm believers in the affordances that IT offered to 
improving government. We felt that we needed to overcome a prevailing 
apathy among senior bureaucrats and politicians concerning the need to get 
on board the IT train. 
This type of policy document is typically written by a handful of people 
 
22 All quotes from Alan are from an interview conducted on 27 July 2018. 
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working within a small special-purpose policy unit of 12–20 people located 
within a central government agency. In many cases they were policy 
specialists in the field of information technology or information management, 
working as career public servants. Alan was the primary author in a team of 
three in the IPU that wrote Managing the information resource in 1992. A 
second author was a policy specialist who had worked for the Information 
Policy Unit’s two predecessors who was sympathetic to Alan’s position and a 
third author was an external consultant, a previous business partner of mine 
who I had recommended to Alan. Alan’s connection to the Cabinet Office 
made sure his colleagues in the Information Policy Unit didn’t revert back to a 
narrow technology focus.  
While Alan left the IPU’s successor organisation a few years later, many of his 
IPU colleagues from DOCIT continued on through the next few policy bodies, 
with one of them eventually becoming the Executive Director of the Office of 
e-Government in 2003. Twelve years after Managing the information resource, 
that successor group produced the 2004 e-government Strategy as a green-
fields policy. Its lead author was Steven, unusually an import from interstate. 
The principals 
In a formal sense, the proponent of the Strategy was the executive 
government of the state of Western Australia. However, it is clear that the 
specific source and proponent was the Office of e-Government. The Office 
was a unit of the Department of Premier and Cabinet, a central agency 
responsible for whole-of-government policy advice, public sector 
management, federal relations and some general administrative and 
ceremonial functions of the State (Department of Premier and Cabinet 2003a, 
9). The Office of e-Government was established in February 2003. It took over 
the State government’s central information technology policy role from the 
Information and Communication Policy Directorate of the Department of 
Industry and Technology23, when that department was restructured as part of 
the new government’s “machinery of government” reforms. 
As with earlier and later initiatives in the field of government technology, the 
policy approach adopted by the government had three main components: a 
policy unit, a high-level oversight committee of department chief executives 
and, in due course, a core document as the material representation of an 
overarching policy, developed by the unit under the oversight of the 
committee. It is one thing for an issue-specific initiative to have such sturdy 
institutional foundations, but Steven recalls that the e-government also had 
 
23 The peripatetic history of the State’s central ICT policy function over the last 30 years is 
itself a reflection of the uncertainties and ambiguities governments have manifested in 
managing and presenting a position on the subject. In the 12 years between the IPU and the 




strong personal backing from the new premier: 
[Steven:] I think, primarily, it came out of Premier Geoff Gallop’s vision. It was in 
his first term … And he was quite … a conceptual thinker and a bit of an over-
the-horizon thinker. He certainly didn’t mind looking at things a bit academically. 
And I think he just saw this area of e-government as a really fundamental thing 
that we needed to do, and do well, hopefully. And so, he was really the driver of 
that … And then that was in the Department of Premier and Cabinet. So, he 
wanted to keep it close to his sphere because he was really the driver.24  
Establishing a policy office within the Department of Premier and Cabinet was 
a way for the government to signify the importance of e-government to the 
public sector and/or the public. The new location gave it significant status—a 
licence to coordinate and easier entrée to senior public sector executives. 
Nevertheless, this kind of endorsement did not give the Office of e-
Government all the power and attention it needed to gain adherence to its 
mission. It did not have a mandate to compel agencies to comply with its 
policies, even if they were specific enough to comply with unambiguously. 
The Office of e-Government had a limited capacity to create or influence 
budgets or legislation that could deliver it such power. Its location gave it 
some influence over funding as an incentive for agencies to participate in e-
government initiatives. Otherwise, it had to rely on persuasion to obtain 
adherence to its worldview and its programs.  
Alan explained the limitations of an approach that relied on a grand strategy 
document and persuasion: 
Basically, one of the problems of doing policy is that you’ve got no money to 
actually do it. See, you’re coming up with good ideas and I guess in order to … 
point to the policy framework and say, “You’re not doing that,” [it’s retrospective]. 
So, it’s more carrot than stick when it comes to getting these ideas implemented. 
Which is why we had to demonstrate what was possible, highlight the people 
who are doing good stuff, and shift the others and basically try to help them 
through it all … Let the managers manage and all that sort of thing was all part of 
it and wasn’t top-down other than it was in a strategic document, but it wasn’t a 
command thing. 
A further motivational challenge faced by Office of e-Government was that e-
government was not the only priority for which the Government sought 
commitment from public sector agencies. In November 2003, the Government 
released its overall strategic planning framework for the public sector. Titled 
Better Planning: Better Services, it listed 72 “strategic outcomes” grouped 
under five “strategic goals”. Only one strategic outcome referred to information 
technology: under Goal 5 (“to govern for all Western Australians in an open, 
effective and efficient manner that also ensures a sustainable future”) was a 
strategic outcome that sought “Increased use of Information Communications 
and Technology to provide better services to the community” (Department of 
Premier and Cabinet 2003b, 10). This gives some indication of the general 
 
24 All quotes from Steven are from an interview conducted on 9 August 2018. 
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status of digital government within the overall priorities of government, mostly 
because it is regarded as an internal administrative matter. 
The argument 
In terms of its message, the Strategy was deliberately pitched high: 
[Steven:] … the strategy really was, in our view, a proper strategy. It wasn’t a 
program of works. It wasn’t a list of initiatives. It was the vision, what needs to 
change to get us there, what are the big picture elements. I still recall one of the 
things that we needed was, what are the enablers that need to be in place for this 
to happen? 
The vision that the Office of e-Government sought to bring into being was a 
“more efficient public sector that delivers integrated services and improved 
opportunities for community participation” (OeG 2004, 6). The vision was 
expanded in the following terms: 
This vision is one of a seamless interface between agencies and between 
government and its constituents. It involves integrated service delivery and a 
corporate Western Australian Government approach. In the context of this 
Strategy, the term “corporate” refers to a collective identity amongst government 
agencies working toward common goals and objectives from a whole-of-
government, rather than single agency, perspective. 
e-Government adoption can lead to increased levels of citizen trust and 
confidence in government. Efficiency, improved and integrated service delivery, 
and the ability for Western Australians to communicate with agencies and with 
the Government are the three key drivers for this Strategy (loc. cit., emphasis 
added). 
The document outlined a six-year plan that was to culminate in nothing less 
than “a transformed government” (op. cit., 15). Service delivery would be 
transformed by “push” services customised to the needs of individual citizens, 
non-digital channels would be reduced, services from multiple agencies would 
be delivered to citizens “as and when required”. Internal efficiency would be 
transformed through “cross-agency collaboration” and the sharing of 
information and costs between agencies. Community participation would be 
transformed as citizens increasingly choose to interact with government online 
(op. cit., 25).  
This vision was a distillation of the prevailing global discourse promoting e-
government as the Next Big Thing in public sector reform, tailored to the 
context of Western Australia. It expressed the rationalist belief in the power to 
transform human relations on a grand scale and the role of technology as a 
driver or an agent of that change. The primary argument lay in a section called 
“Understanding e-Government” (op. cit., 8-18). The Strategy stated, “e-
Government involves focusing on the use of Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) to assist in the transformation of government structures and 
operations for cooperative and integrated service delivery” (op. cit., 8). 
Specifically, it “can be defined as the comprehensive application of 
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Information and Communications Technology to government services” (loc. 
cit.). The Strategy immediately expands this by explaining: 
This definition challenges the misconception that e-government is simply about 
developing more ICT projects across government. Certainly, if agencies are to 
operate effectively in the global environment of the 21st century and improve 
their decision-making, services, communication and participation with Western 
Australians, then improvements in the application and use of ICT is involved (op. 
cit., 8, emphasis added). 
As a set of solutions to some imagined problems faced by the community and 
the government, the Strategy presented six “key” benefits of e-government: 
• Assists in the development of a culture of integration and collaboration within 
and between agencies; 
• Allows easier access for citizens to participate in government decision-making; 
• Provides greater choice for citizens to access the type of information and 
services that best suits their individual circumstances;  
• Minimises citizens needing to know how government is organised or who 
provides the information and services they require; 
• Allows citizens to access information and services at times more convenient to 
them; and 
• Allows agencies to deliver information and services more effectively, cheaply 
and conveniently (op. cit., 9). 
Of fundamental importance in understanding the polemical nature of this 
document, no costs or disadvantages were identified. This aspect will be 
discussed further in Chapter 5. 
In a section called “Why Pursue e-Government?”, the Strategy systematically 
aligned itself with the government’s broader public sector policy agenda, 
Better Planning: Better Services (Department of Premier and Cabinet 2003b). It 
did this by explaining how e-government “will” enable the implementation of 
the Government’s other 71 strategic outcomes. “If strategically employed, ICT 
can form the backbone of initiatives that will help agencies achieve results 
against each of the five core goals of Better Planning: Better Services” (OeG 
2004, 10). In a public sector policy agenda that otherwise neglected ICT, this 
move comprehensively reinterpreted it so that it must depend on ICT to have 
any real chance of succeeding. 
The next section, called Transforming Government—Characteristics of the 
Four e-Government Phases, outlined how the status quo “online presence” 
would grow into a situation in which “e-Government has redefined and 
transformed the operations of government and its relationships between and 
with citizens and business” (op. cit., 13). This was to occur as governments 
transitioned through four phases of maturity, based on a model promoted by 
Gartner Inc., a global IT consulting firm25 (Baum & Di Maio 2000). The four 
 
25 Perhaps not coincidentally, a year earlier, there appeared at least two other four-stage 
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phases are presence, interaction, transaction and transformation. They reflect 
progressing levels of sophistication in the types of things online systems could 
do, the level of integration of government services and the wider and deeper 
changes required within public sector agencies to deliver services online. In 
the early phases, governments publish a web site to complement their existing 
service channels26 such as face-to-face and telephone. In the later stages, on-
line channels largely replace the more traditional channels, eventually to 
become the primary means of delivering government services. This would 
require radical changes to government structures and processes to align 
agencies to online service delivery. According to Gartner, this total 
transformation 
… is the long-term goal of almost all national and local e-government initiatives. 
It is characterized by redefining the delivery of government services by providing 
a single point of contact to constituents that makes government organization 
totally transparent to citizens. This phase relies on robust customer relationship 
management tools and new methods of alternative service delivery capabilities 
that reshape relationships between citizens, businesses and governments. It also 
enhances the ability of constituents to participate more directly in government 
activities (e.g., “e-referendums and “e-voting”) (Baum & Di Maio 2000, 2, 
emphasis added). 
The development of technical and organisational infrastructure alluded to is 
very much the hidden 90 percent of the iceberg in considering the work 
required to deliver this stage four vision, and is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
As we will see in those chapters, the final transformation would involve the 
imposition of a technocratic ideology through a restructuring of the material 
infrastructure of government.  
Patrick Dunleavy suggests that this last and most difficult stage is relegated to 
a distant future and smothered in utopian rhetoric (Dunleavy 2009, 413–14). 
But most significantly, this model sets out a deterministic path and 
destination—a “roadmap” which is not just desirable but also necessary and 
inevitable. This tone of inevitability was only the most obvious in which the 
Strategy and other policies exploited technological determinism, an aspect 
which will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
A critical part of this reorganisation involves presenting “citizen centric” service 
environment in which citizens can interact with government without being 
“concerned” about (or, presumably, even knowing) which agency is providing 
the service. The Strategy claimed to quote from The e-government imperative27 
 
models: the Australian National Audit Office’s more prosaically-presented four-stage model 
(ANAO 1999, 36), and a maturity model developed by Karen Layne and Jungwoo Lee (2001). 
26 An import from marketing, channel refers to alternative means of communicating with 
(potential) customers. It is also used in relation to methods of “delivering” services or products 
to customers. 
27 This quotation from the Strategy does not actually appear in either the full document or the 
executive summary of the OECD’s The e-government imperative as published on the OECD 
web site, www.oecd.org. It is in fact quoted from an enthusiastic academic paper extolling the 
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of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to underline 
the scale of the transformation: 
e-Government enables the dual goals of efficiency and democracy to be met 
more cheaply and easily than previously envisaged but the new technologies go 
much further than this. They are starting to redefine the landscape of government 
by changing the relationships (power and responsibility) between players – 
between service providers and industry, between the public and private sectors 
and between government and citizen – by forging new organisational and 
economic structures, by introducing new processes at work and in the community 
and above all by opening new opportunities as well as posing new challenges, 
not least the threat of new digital divides (OeG 2004, 15, emphasis added). 
A crucial feature of this quote is that democracy had been reduced to a 
bureaucratic program goal. It also begs the question of redistributing power 
between major sectors of society, presumably in favour of the less powerful, 
but ignoring the likelihood that existing dominant interests could resist such a 
redistribution—if it threatened to reduce their influence. Importantly, what we 
see at work here is one way the political realm can be subsumed into the 
bureaucratic realm. As I will discuss in Chapter 9, the new “democratic” 
opportunities involve the public, as isolated users, connecting to the 
bureaucracy. A second feature of the quote is that for bureaucrats, something 
that could radically progress the cause of “doing more with less” was close to 
being a holy grail.  
The next chapter in the Strategy, titled Western Australian Context, defined the 
key players to be involved in the delivery of the e-government program. First 
among these was the Office of e-Government itself, which would provide 
“strategic leadership”, lay “foundations and frameworks”, “coordinate and 
develop whole-of-government and cross-agency initiatives” and “raise 
awareness and promote the benefits of e-government” (OeG 2004, 20). Then 
there were listed a number of players, with which the Office of e-Government 
would have strategic partnerships, including local, state and federal 
departments, business and industry, the non-government sector and the 
community. Along with other Western Australian government organisations, 
which do not rate a partner status in this section, this provides an indication of 
the Office of e-Government’s network, which is reflected in the discussion and 
references throughout the Strategy document. Notably, in using the term 
partnership, the Office of e-Government frames these relationships using a 
commercial term. As will be seen in Chapter 7, this is a common approach 
used by the IT sector to reframe customer-supplier relationships in large IT 
projects. 
The final chapter, called The Strategy, sets out the six principles of e-
government: citizen centricity, accessibility and choice, trust, confidence and 
security, better governance, collaboration and integration, and accountability 
(op. cit., 26-7). By centralising the role of information technology in delivering 
 
virtues of some exemplary e-government projects (Millard 2002). 
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the government’s public sector reform agenda and centralising the Office of e-
Government in delivering the e-government agenda, the Office of e-
Government was legitimising itself as a major player in the government’s 
public sector reform and broader economic and social development program. 
As I argue in the next chapter, linking e-government to the prevailing public 
sector reform ethos of New Public Management is central to the rhetorical task 
of e-government policies. Leadership was a key role for the Office of e-
Government, which also wanted the e-government cause to be personally 
embraced by senior executives. The Office of e-Government wanted senior 
executives to 
champion and integrate the vision, goals and principles of e-government into 
every aspect of their strategic decision-making and business planning … e-
Government transformation will not succeed if senior management relegate the 
carriage and implementation of e-government initiatives to their Information 
Technology departments. The development and maintenance of e-government 
initiatives needs to involve every level and aspect of agency business (op. cit., 
31). 
This aspiration was tacit recognition that senior public sector executives tend 
to relegate what they see as IT issues to their IT branches.  
The Office of e-Government’s specific intention was not simply to inform but 
to achieve some behavioural change, especially in terms of getting agencies to 
work together to deliver integrated services to the community. 
[Steven:] I think what we were looking for was that agencies would start doing 
things in a joined-up way. That was probably the key for us … because … things 
were happening. And as I said, Landgate [and] … other agencies were doing good 
things, too. It was maybe quite isolated here and there, but there were good 
things out there. But what we wanted to do was to start doing it in a joined-up 
way which would of course require someone—and that’s what we thought we 
were there for—to identify the best and most achievable joined-up way, and then 
require or encourage agencies to do things that way rather than doing things in a 
bespoke way that would then still result in lots of different, albeit electronic, silos. 
[DLB:] So was that what was behind having a citizen-centric approach, where 
people didn’t have to navigate the bowels of the bureaucracy?  
[Steven:] Exactly. 
“Joined-up” government was a catch-phrase of the New Public Management 
movement (Rhodes 2000, 359), suggesting that the public should be able to 
deal with government as a seamless whole, rather than a confusing array of 
disparate agencies. The strongest recurring theme concerning the 
implementation of e-government was the need for a whole-of-government 
approach. It appears that if anything was to stop or slow the advent of e-
government, it would be the “agency-centric” approach to delivering services. 
The Strategy expanded on its bold vision of a cross-jurisdictional, unified 
“corporate” state in these terms: 
For e-government transformation to succeed, a fundamental cultural shift will 
need to take place at every level of government. The public sector should not be 
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perceived as a collection of disparate agencies delivering services to citizens 
engaged on agency terms. Rather, the public sector should be viewed as a 
coordinated entity delivering services to the community in ways that best suit 
citizens’ needs. 
In short, the public sector needs to start thinking of itself as “corporate Western 
Australia”. Without this sense of corporate identity, agencies will always remain 
limited to the possibilities available within their individual organisations and not 
be open to the opportunities for sharing and capitalising on the wealth of 
information, skills, knowledge and support that resides in the public sector as a 
whole (OeG 2004, 32, emphasis added). 
As I explain in later chapters, in the process of developing a more cohesive 
relationship with a citizen, the state also expands its capacity to surveil the 
citizen as a single entity across government. This passage is also revealing as 
an early attempt to (re)assert a centralised view of government over the New 
Public Management ideal of government as a collection of stand-alone 
corporate-style entities. 
The problems of intergovernmental barriers were going to be resolved by the 
third enabler, “governance mechanisms”. Here the focus is firstly on the 
removal of legal constraints on e-government and secondly the allocation of 
the development and operating costs of e-government. According to the 
Strategy, implementation of e-government requires nothing less than 
wholesale changes to the laws that structure the federal nature of Australian 
government: 
Our current system of government is supported by legislation and regulations that 
segment information and services between Federal, State and Local Governments 
and often at agency level. e-Government will challenge these existing rules and 
regulations. A robust governance framework is required to support transformation 
to an integrated service delivery model (op. cit., 34). 
Note in this phrasing that the goal is “an integrated service delivery model” 
and the means are a “robust governance framework”—public governance is 
made subservient to delivering services. Here, e-government is depicted as an 
autonomous force for good that will necessarily and inevitably break down the 
constitutional barriers to a singular state and its capacity to develop a 
customised relationship with the citizen-customer. 
Subsequent experience indicates that this type of integration has only been 
achieved in the Australian and NSW governments by first integrating the 
service delivery functions of several departments into a separate department. 
In this arrangement, “policy” departments outsource transactions with the 
public to the service delivery department. This trend is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6.  
The fourth enabler was a “citizen-centric approach” based on the principle that 
“services and information would be designed and focused on the needs of 
Western Australians” (op. cit., 36, emphasis added). Collections of services 
would be integrated around citizen needs. The unaddressed difficulty with this 
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is that the fundamental relation in question is a consumer-provider nexus. This 
is a one-to-many relationship in which the one inevitably must construct the 
many as a single abstract category. Without any sense of irony, the Strategy 
depicts the final, citizen-centric transformative stage of e-government this way: 
 
Figure 3: The “citizen-centric” phase of the e-Government transformation, (OeG 2004, 17) 
This arrangement, with government in the centre and citizens arranged around 
the periphery, reminiscent of ants feeding on a blob of nectar, is reflected 
throughout the text, despite the overt assertions to the contrary. As mentioned 
above, the Strategy identified the primary challenge to e-government as the 
“agency centric” approach to service delivery still practiced by government 
organisations. While it doesn’t explicitly say so, it is clear that the Strategy 
would, in effect, replace this with a government-centric approach. The primary 
struggle would be between the agency-centric and government-centric 
approaches and, as the elephants dance, a powerless and fragmented citizenry 
would likely be relegated further to the periphery. 
A potential snag in the strategy was the possible lack of public access to the 
technology required to participate in e-government. The Strategy 
acknowledged that government 
not only has to understand the needs of citizens, but also be able to identify their 
preferences such as: their most convenient means for accessing services, the 
channels for delivery they have available to them, and how they perceive their 
service delivery choices (op. cit., 36). 
Any hope that this choice included non-electronic channels is dissipated as the 
Strategy went on to suggest that “ICT incorporates a number of different 
technologies each with their own benefits and appeal of access to different 
user groups” and that governments should step in to provide the 
disadvantaged with better access to technology (loc. cit.). This latter claim 
picks up the argument made by the IT industry in relation to the “digital 
divide”: governments should be responsible for eliminating the gap between 
the information “haves and have-nots” by filling the holes left by private sector 
ICT service providers. One might reasonably expect that the shortcomings of 
ICT channels would be addressed by using non-electronic channels, but 
instead, the argument is that governments should roll-out ICTs to the 
disadvantaged until there are no more gaps. Thus, with universal access to the 
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appropriate apparatus, there would be no barriers to enjoying the benefits of 
e-only government. 
This section of the Strategy also repeated another IT industry claim that IT can 
be used to build communities: “ICT is emerging as a vital tool in building 
social capital and community sustainability” (OeG 2004). To this end, the 
Office of e-Government was working on “e-Engagement Guidelines” to 
encourage agencies to “actively engage with citizens” (op. cit, 37). As it turns 
out, this part of the agenda has not flourished in subsequent years. Rather, it 
has run up against the neo-liberal program to eliminate collectives (Bourdieu 
1998), especially as the few new avenues of online connection with 
government are limited to dealing with the bureaucracy. This aspect is 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
Style 
The Strategy document itself came in the form of a full-colour, professionally 
designed, 47-page A4 landscape booklet, which was also available in portable 
document format (PDF) on the Office of e-Government website28 along with 
the Premier’s launch speech and the press release. The polished design gives a 
clue to the flagship status that the Strategy had within the range of documents 
that were issued by the Office of e-Government. We are looking at a 
document that represents a hybrid of rational technical policy statement and 
promotional booklet. That is, it sets out what is apparently a rational 
argument, building on basic premises to develop a course of action, but which 
focuses on benefits and neglects disadvantages, costs and risks. The full-colour 
presentation29 includes photographs of technology and people at work.  
 
28 The web site longer exists. Along with everything else produced by the Office of e-
Government, it is no longer available on a Western Australian Government website—the slate 
is clean. The strategy is, however, still available from the UN, in its collection of e-government 
policies: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan023000.pdf 
29 To get a full impression of the visual design and layout of the document, the reader is 




Figure 4: The page layout and graphic style of the e-Government Strategy 
The introduction of a promotional style brings with it a marketing context in 
which the producer, product and consumer are jointly constructed in the 
discourse. As “strategic discourse par excellence”, advertising seeks to 
differentiate otherwise standard products and construct product, producer and 
consumer in way that will bond the three in the mind of the consumer 
(Fairclough 1992, 210–11). The e-government strategy was one of many 
policies promoted by the government. The strategy must therefore be 
differentiated and the audience positioned to engage with the Strategy and the 
Office of e-Government. For this to happen, senior executives (and other 
targets) must be encouraged to construct a harmonised image of themselves, 
the e-government strategy and the Office of e-Government. Along with other 
design elements, a “visual image can, if it works, instantaneously create a 
world which potential consumer, producer and product can jointly inhabit, 
before a reader gets to read … the language of the advertisement” (loc. cit.). 
The advertising perspective helps us understand the selective treatment of the 
advantages and disadvantages of e-government and, to some extent, the 
language. 
The Strategy deviated from the arguments and styles of internal, non-public 
policy documents. Typically, such papers are confidential and written for 
senior bureaucrats or ministers. They canvass, and seek to resolve, multiple 
points of view and are problem oriented (Feldman 1989, 10-13), including 
components such as cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments, if not with the 
full rigour idealised by rational choice theory (Brunsson 2006, 21–22). In 
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Chapters 6 and 7, I examine procurement documents, a class of documents 
that, in contrast to the policies, is far more forthcoming about the scale, 
complexity and risks involved in delivering government digitally. 
Developing the policy 
By 2003, the global e-government movement had matured sufficiently for the 
Office of e-Government to have a well-developed and supported model of e-
government (and associated documents) on which to draw. The e-government 
movement had been rolling-on for around seven years (Henman 2010a, 34). 
The term derives from e-commerce which was coined around 1994 to eulogise 
the potential of commercial transactions conducted over the Internet (loc. cit.). 
While e-commerce was originally conceptualised in the pre-Internet days of 
private commercial networks, the arrival of the Internet allowed online 
transactions to be extended to the public and a wider range of smaller 
companies. Moreover, organisations such as the Organisation for Economic 
Co-ordination and Development (The e-government imperative (2003) an 
authority quoted in the Strategy) and the United Nations (Benchmarking e-
government: a global perspective: assessing the progress of the UN member states 
(2002)30) had issued reports exhorting member states to get on board with e-
government for the good of everybody. 
This focus on the transactional network-based aspects of e-commerce reflects 
a long-standing schism in the literature (both practical and academic), between 
networks and computing (Henman 2010a, 34–36; Negroponte 1995, 106). 
Thus, the network focus in the Strategy paid little attention to the kind of 
backroom computational and social complexities that I will describe in later 
chapters. 
The global e-government movement provided a ready-made wave on which to 
deliver the “Premier’s” vision. Perhaps because of this established e-
government paradigm, the Office of e-Government did not (need to) look far 
and wide. In making this point, Steven summarises the various sources that 
policy makers might seek out when embarking on a policy: 
[Steven:] We didn’t really go much beyond [the sources mentioned above] to be 
honest, from memory at least. We didn’t go all out where we might bring in some 
thinkers, bring in some radical thinkers from overseas, or people like that to have 
brainstorming sessions with our staff or stakeholders. Or visits, places like 
Singapore or whatever, or Estonia. We didn’t do any of that, in fact. Our ways of 
going about our work were extremely frugal and modest. So, anything like that, 
the grand tour, or getting some brilliant e-government thinker and sponsoring 
them to come over here and talk to us, and talk to the parliament, or individual 
parliamentarians or as a group. Or talk to the community or universities, hardly 
happened at all. Sorry, it never happened, frankly. With universities I don’t recall 
that we actually did all that much, if anything at all, even with local universities or 
 
30 The UN report ranked member states in a league table according to their “e-government 
capability,” (op. cit., 7). In 2001, Australia ranked 2nd after the USA. 
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academics, which in hindsight I think was probably a shame. 
By 2004, the well-refined e-government discourse was based on a mutually 
supportive web of cross-justification between national and state jurisdictions 
and transnational agencies that could serve as an irrefutable foundation for the 
arguments made in the Strategy. 
Sources of legitimation 
A number of expert and powerful authorities were drawn upon to provide 
legitimacy for the positions being promoted by the Strategy. In this section, I 
discuss the sources overtly acknowledged in the Strategy and the contribution 
they made to the Office of e-Government’s arguments.  
One thing that a close examination of the Strategy and its context makes clear 
is the complex web of audiences and sources of legitimation that come into 
play in a policy environment. For instance, the support of one audience, the 
Premier, is sought in part to persuade another audience, the senior executives. 
From one perspective, the Premier is asked to speak on behalf of the Office of 
e-Government through the Foreword to the Strategy, the press release and the 
launch speech. From another perspective, the Office of e-Government wants 
to be seen to speak on behalf of the Premier—it is his wishes they want to be 
seen to be implementing, rather than their own. The Strategy made it clear 
that it drew on a number of specific authorities. Those cited or alluded to 
include the following: the Premier; the Western Australian Government’s 
public sector reform program; the policies and successes of other 
governments, including other Australian governments and other countries—
what the Strategy calls the “international e-government community”; local e-
government initiatives as examples of the feasibility and practicality of e-
government; the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development 
and its e-government strategy; private sector consultants/analysts; business and 
industry generally; the ICT industry in particular; intergovernmental 
agreements; and international technical standards. Each of these sources of 
legitimation could be deployed in seeking support from others in this list, 
establishing a network of mutually supportive authorities and audiences. This 
network clearly exemplifies the subtle legitimation of an ideology in a web of 
relations, rather than relying on a single explicit assertion or source of 
authority. Moreover, this web of authorities also provides a clear illustration of 
the type of interlocking relationships that are constitutive of the contemporary 
corporate state. 
These sources of legitimation are also sources of the discursive superstructure 
of frames, metaphors, arguments and silences. There are major similarities 
between the Strategy and related documents from international governments, 
other governments in Australia (both national and State), the Organisation for 
Economic Co-ordination and Development and private sector analysts, in 
particular the Gartner Group. It is important to emphasise that, like most 
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instances of this genre, it was not developed from scratch based on the 
situation in Western Australia. This illustrates James March’s pointed critique of 
rational action theory (March 1994, 58), which he argues blinds us to other 
modes of decision making, such as the rule-following that permeates digital 
government policy development. The Federal government policy of two years 
before (NOIE 2002) was also cited. Some Western Australian readers may well 
have been encouraged to know the Federal government was out there with an 
e-government strategy as well—the Federal strategy’s main rationale, according 
to the minister’s forward, was that pursuing e-government was an investment 
in Australia’s international competitiveness (op. cit., iii). 
The audiences and the support sought 
The Strategy explicitly and implicitly addressed a number of audiences from 
whom it sought certain kinds of support. Audiences are very much a product 
of the proponent’s perception of the audience’s membership of social groups, 
and the authors’ perception of how their audiences view the world, what they 
want, what they believe, expect and know and what it takes for the audience 
to deliver their support (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 14-26). This 
section describes what support was required from the respective audiences. 
The prime audience for the Strategy, as well as the 1992 Managing the 
information resource was the chief executives and senior management of 
government agencies.  
[Steven:] The primary audience was executive and management level Western 
Australian government agency officers, and then secondary would have been 
elected government, the Cabinet, local government, and then a distant third, 
everyone else. 
[Alan:] … it was a government paper. It wasn’t an industrial or industry 
development thing. It was basically central agencies and operational agencies. 
That both dictated the tone and how we said things and what we said … but I 
didn’t want a document for CIOs or IT managers. It was aimed more at CEO 
executive level. That was the intent. 
The Strategy document reveals that the Office of e-Government believed it 
could persuade these executives to put e-government to the forefront of their 
everyday thinking, planning and acting. As mentioned above, the authors of 
both documents strongly wanted e-government to be taken up as a 
mainstream corporate management responsibility, and definitely not as an IT 
project. This reflects a widespread but largely unaddressed tendency for IT-
related projects to be marginalised within organisations (OECD 2003, 15 & 91). 
However, it is reasonable to expect that, given the demands on department 
heads, such as the Gallop government’s other 71 strategic outcomes and a 
plethora of routine compliance requirements, let alone everyday operations, 
that no single initiative would ever have that kind of prominence. As Brunsson 
(1989) has observed, when multiple legitimate demands outstrip resources, 
organisations are more likely to produce talk rather than action to demonstrate 
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their commitment to those demands in order to maintain external support for 
the organisation. And this is largely what happened with central e-government 
policies. 
[Alan:] The IT managers often, say, took [the policy] to work out what sort of 
words they needed to put into their submissions to Treasury to get more money 
and then they just get the money and do whatever the hell they wanted with it. 
[DLB:] Like a budget-bid lexicon? 
[Alan:] Yeah, exactly. Yeah, we get a lot of that. It’s interesting [that a decade 
earlier, the Department of Computing and Information Technology] went in with 
the same thing and all the bureaucrats kept on coming back with the word 
technology peppered through their proposals without knowing what on earth 
they were talking about … 
Thus, the authors of the Strategy encountered resistance in moving an 
audience that saw IT as marginal, had a lot of other things on its mind and 
was more aligned to its line minister than the programs of central government. 
The response 
Some of the “challenges” identified by the Strategy turned out to be sufficiently 
tough for agencies to successfully resist or ignore it. In this regard, the Strategy 
repeated the experience of the earlier policy initiative, Managing the 
information resource. Both policies relied on a persuasive approach, with few 
material incentives to encourage agencies to comply. 
These policies demonstrate the limitations on the power of central agencies 
beyond their control of budgets and legislation. As Alan explains: 
… [on] the broader issue of how the agencies responded to the policy … there’s 
always this tension between the centre and the [periphery] because we were in 
the early days of [the New Public Management ethos of] “let the managers 
manage” in those days as well. So, there’s this tension between the centre and the 
periphery. 
Like the Information Policy Unit 12 years before, while there was generally a 
good relationship with digitally advanced departments (so long as they let 
them have their heads), the response from most agencies was lacking. It was 
here, where the realities of the Westminster system of government, dominated 
by the intimate alignment of departments with their ministers, that the Strategy 
recognised, and was confronted by, a “challenge”. 
[Steven:] And then you had other agencies for whom the whole e-government 
space was kind of this luxury that they haven’t been able to invest in. So, really, 
they’d prefer to just be left alone to do their thing … they weren’t going to be 
congratulated by their minister for doing something for the whole-of-government 
greater good. They were only going to be congratulated by their minister for 
doing the thing in their portfolio the minister could then hold up. And again, 
entirely rational. Unfortunate, but entirely rational. And so, for them, a lot of what 
we talked about was, I think they felt, largely irrelevant. Yeah. So that’s probably 
the agency rationale. Not a lot of love. 
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These tensions persist in Australian governments to this day. In the context of 
current digital government issues in the Australian Government, several 
interviewees I spoke to who are familiar with the field raised this tension as a 
barrier to “joining-up” government through integrated systems or data sharing. 
In short, the vision of a unified “corporate” government collided with the 
Westminster system of representative government and came out second best. 
As digitally-enabled joined-up government has played out, this has been the 
clearest locus of tension between this new mode of governance on the one 
hand, and the traditional institutions of government and the agency-oriented 
perspective of New Public Management and the traditional 
minister/department nexus on the other. 
Aftermath 
The 2004 Western Australian e-Government Strategy was one of a first 
generation of such whole-of-government initiatives developed by most 
Western governments in the early 2000s. Since then, further strategies have 
been developed in Western Australia and other jurisdictions, including what I 
call a second generation of such strategies that have been developed in the 
2010s, this time re-branded as digital government. In between, governments 
have added online channels to an ever-expanding range of activities (UN 
2016, 5), especially in process-intensive fields such as taxation, social 
payments and immigration. Despite the announcement of Government 2.0 and 
Government 3.0 in the 2010s (Lips 2020, 4), whether this expansion has 
delivered the coherence proposed by whole-of-government policies is unlikely 
(UN 2016, 2). I suggested to Steven that perhaps over time across many 
jurisdictions the growth of digital government had been incremental and 
opportunistic, rather than resulting from a concerted top-down process driven 
by central government. 
[Steven:] I think that’s right. And again, we sort of had to change tack on that, 
where in the early days, under Gallop, it was all very much brave new world, 
and the Premier’s behind this, and let’s be visionary and make it happen. But 
yeah, very quickly we had to readjust that to be a lot more realistic, and a lot less 
idealistic, and a lot more opportunistic, as you say. I think that’s exactly right. 
Like the Information Policy Unit before it, the Office of e-Government was up 
against strong forces, and with its backing diminishing. 
[Steven:] I think the Office of e-Government and the strategy of it, it never 
achieved its full potential for various reasons but certainly one of those was that 
we didn’t really have … a big powerful champion, particularly after Geoff Gallop 
left. 
The critical source of support, the Premier, Geoff Gallop, resigned in 2006, 
only two years after the Strategy was released. The new Premier, Alan 
Carpenter, who was less committed to the e-government cause, lost power in 
2008, and, with a change of government, the Office of e-Government was 
transferred to the newly-formed Public Sector Commission (PSC) in November 
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2008 (Department of Premier and Cabinet 2009, 109).  
[Steven:] … we even struggled while [Gallop] was there, but at least you sort of 
had that baseline assumed support where this was a recommendation coming out 
of a report that was dear to his heart, and we can always wave that flag about. 
Once he left, I think Alan Carpenter was briefly Premier or relatively briefly 
[January 2006 to September 2008]. Alan Carpenter and his administration—it just 
wasn’t their priority, and good or bad, that was their call. They were in charge, 
and … it was quite clearly a shift. When it was Geoff Gallop, there was that 
conceptual support. When there wasn’t Geoff Gallop, there wasn’t that support, 
and even at the sort of director general level, we never had the really strong 
powerful champion in the bureaucracy, even, that would really help us drive this. 
By the end of 2008, having lost its political cover, the Office of e-Government 
was in the hands of an organisation with little grasp of the role of technology 
in contemporary government. The focus of the Public Sector Commission was 
human resource management and public sector governance. This places that 
organisation very much in in the tradition of social constructivism, in which 
technology is regarded as a non-strategic factor. 
[Steven:] … when I left or shortly before I left, [the Office of e-Government in 
early 2009] was still very much a going concern, had the executive structure in 
place. [The Executive Director of Office of e-Government] reported to Mal 
[Wauchope, the Director General]. 
[DLB:] And was the senior PSC leadership generally supportive? 
[Steven:] I think so, but it was an adjustment period, and it was an adjustment 
period for everyone in the PSC … But, yeah, it became apparent, I think, that 
Office of e-Government felt like a bit of an orphan, not because of any hostility 
from others in PSC. But I think just because it was a case of this is not a natural 
home for it, but where is? And really by that stage, I think the support for what 
we were doing conceptually … Carpenter left, that support is largely gone, and I 
think by this stage … any remnants [of support] were fairly weak.  
Over the next two years the activities of the Office of e-Government were 
wound back to the point where those functions disappeared from view 
(Public Sector Commission 2009, 2010). 
[DLB:] So, were you aware what kind of process finally unravelled it, or do you 
think it was just lack of support from key stakeholders, budgetary pressures 
forcing people to press down on it? 
[Steven:] Yeah, it was probably a combination of those. I think probably more so 
the lack of support from key stakeholders, I’d say … if you look at some of its 
functions, I think what went fairly quickly … was the real visionary leadership of 
the brave new world. I think that was either already gone or was very quickly 
and obviously disappearing. But having said that, there was still plenty of other 
things that the Office of e-Government, in whatever it’s—it may have lost its title 
by that point, but was doing and that was still useful. 
The experience Steven describes here matches a broader trend evident in the 
digital government policies over time.31 The first generation (1997–2010) 
 
31 My analysis of the broader genre covered 14 digital government policy documents from a 
range of state and national jurisdictions in English-speaking countries and two reports from 
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including the Strategy and the 1992 Managing the information resource, were 
generally more visionary in their language, while the later generation (2010–
2017) was more pragmatic and project focussed. However, the consistency in 
ambition and argument over time indicates the importance of the policies in 
establishing digital government as a way of seeing the world, rather than as 
effective plans of action. 
4.3  Conclusion 
Perhaps the most significant observation from the Western Australian 
experience, before, during and after the Strategy is the distinct separation of 
policy and practice, both in time and space. The promised transformation was 
not realised in the ambitious six-year timeframe, or even eight years after that, 
when a new policy launched a similar, but rebranded, vision (OGCIO 2016). 
The policy makers were organisationally divorced from those who would 
implement the change (the audience of the policy) or the “reformees”—the 
public servants whose work, and the citizens whose lives, would be 
transformed. There was also an organisational separation over time, with 
successive policy units rebranded and rehoused in different agencies, 
providing clear air for fresh policy initiatives. The Strategy also avoided talking 
about the contingencies and resistances of practice, the likely consequences of 
the policy or the lessons from previous policies. Some of the Strategy’s authors 
had worked on at least two major Western Australian IT reform programs in 
the previous 15 years, but there were no references to the factors that may 
have led to their lack of success.  
These tendencies reflect the pattern of organisational reform described by Nils 
Brunsson in Mechanisms of hope (2006) in which he provides a critique of the 
rationalist nexus of plans and action. Based on studies of several organisations 
over a long period of time, he observed that to maintain hope for idealised 
rational reform there must be a separation of policy from practice. Several 
mechanisms serve to preserve hope for rationality and the creation of rational 
organisations and programs in which “the world of practice” does not “disturb 
the world of idea” despite the contradictory experience of reforms (op. cit., 
185). This involves three general strategies: (1) plans that avoid questions of 
practice by failing to consider experience and consequences; (2) selecting only 
positive examples of practice; (3) interpreting practice in terms that do not 
threaten the policy (op. cit., 186). The Strategy engaged all three of these 
general approaches. It was able to pit flawed current practice against the 
rationality of future policy (op. cit., 200). The location of the policy makers in 
a central government policy unit also provided a looser coupling between 
policy and practice, the latter being the responsibility of line agencies.  
And still, this eternal reaching out for a rational future continues. Most 
 
OECD and the UN. These are discussed in the next chapter. 
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recently, the Australian Government issued a new Digital transformation 
strategy in 2018, promising “the digital transformation of government itself” 
(DTA 2018, 6). There are interesting similarities and differences between the 
strategies over time and between jurisdictions that reveal the underlying 
ideology and rhetorical tactics they share. The following chapter critically 
examines the discourse in the global ideologies of public sector management 




CHAPTER 5  THE IDEOLOGIES OF DIGITAL GOVERNMENT 
5.1  Introduction 
The Western Australian Strategy was just one of a number of similar 
documents that have been produced by most neo-liberally inclined 
governments from the late 1990s to the present day. They share many 
features—argumentation, language, subject matter (inclusions and exclusions), 
structure, ideological orientation, sources of legitimation, style, organisational 
auspice and target audiences. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the 
common characteristics of the corpus32, examine the broader 
movement/discourse of which the corpus is part, and, given the similarities, 
analyse the underlying influences and motivations behind the development of 
a standardised global discourse that is fundamentally ideological. In this 
chapter I draw on discourse analysis of fourteen digital government policies 
and contextualise these within a larger exploration of the ideologies of New 
Public Management, technology and information as they are expressed within 
and beyond the public sector. 
The origins of the policy documents and the persistence and consistency of 
the digital government agenda across governments in time and space indicate 
this transformational agenda is driven primarily by bureaucracies (with the 
vigorous support of their industry “partners”), albeit under the bipartisan 
patronage of the political mainstream, and with the occasional impetus of a 
political champion. The main challenge for the digital government movement 
has been to graft a technological transformation agenda to a managerial 
reform agenda. As I have suggested in Chapters 2 and 3, these agendas have 
not usually co-existed in the literatures of practice and academia. So digital 
government proponents have had to make the case to managerialists that the 
transformative power of technology will support and even accelerate the cause 
of managerialism.33 The cost to the public of this approach is that it ignores 
many of the fundamental themes of representative democracy, such as 
accountability of the executive to the legislature and the public, universal 
rights of citizenship and fairness. Thus, questions of shifting patterns of power 
come into play, and it is one of the necessary tasks of an ideology to hide 
such questions (Foucault 1988, 86). I argue that, in the case of digital 
government, this starts with the masking of social relations through the 
technology fetish and the avoidance of issues that may suggest a clash of 
 
32 The details of the corpus of policy documents and reports I examined are provided in 
Appendix A. 
33 Managerialism is described by Scott and Hart as “the planned and systematic use of power 
over individuals to achieve organizational goals” and that “Through all its waxing and waning, 
as a belief system…has remained bipartisan and has transcended liberalism and conservatism” 
in which “institutions should be managed rationally to increase their efficiency, and that 
science should be used to find methods and concepts that based rationality in general laws” 
(Scott & Hart 1991, 39–40). 
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interests between the public, government and industry. The net result is a shift 
of control from political sphere to the bureaucracy of the corporate state. The 
narrative of government as service delivery and the citizen as customer steers 
a neat path through this dilemma, providing a justification of public benefit in 
the cause of smaller government. 
5.2  Ideological foundations 
At face value, one might imagine that digital government is just about adding 
another channel to the repertoire of mediations through which government 
transacts with the public. However, as we have seen, many of the policies and 
reports overtly declare they are hoping to bring about a transformation of 
governance, or that such a change is inevitable and needs to be prepared for. 
In that case, one might imagine that digital government policies spell out a full 
spectrum of organisational, policy and social change. But, despite en passant 
concessions to the role of the political and organisational dimensions that 
might be implicated in such radical shifts, the focus of digital government’s 
strategies is on the deployment of digital technologies to deliver services. The 
pervasive impression given is that public access to convenient and responsive 
digital service mediations alone will lift the quality of governance. Such is the 
power of the digital government frame that not only are alternative channels 
negated but so are the hard organisational and back-room technology 
arrangements that enable the delivery of online services. In following chapters 
I detail the many crucial factors that the digital government discourse side-
steps.  
This section examines several ways in which other discourses of governance 
are either invoked, engaged or appealed to by the digital government 
discourse. First, the policy papers appeal to, and gain legitimacy from, the 
dominant discourse in public sector management, which has been summed up 
under the label of New Public Management (Hood 1991). Second, the 
arguments are also sustained by several themes of the ideologies of 
technology and information I discussed in Chapter 3. These themes include: 
the appeal to broader levels of deterministic change attributed to conditions 
such as information society and knowledge economy; direct appeals to 
technological determinism, such as claims that technology impacts society; the 
use of tool metaphors for depicting technology as a means of rational action 
bent to human will; and information as a frictionless, fluid resource 
independent of the original writers/speakers and readers/hearers. 
There is a distinct difference in the task performed by these two lines of 
argument. With respect to New Public Management, the digital government 
discourse is mainly appealing to the deeply imbued managerialist values of 
public managers and the central government guardians of the public purse. 
With respect to the technology pitch, the harder task is to convince that 
audience, which has historically not seen technology as a strategic factor, of its 
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value as a transformative agent that will fulfil the ultimate desires of New 
Public Management. As we saw in Chapter 4, there was a degree of apathy, if 
not resistance, among public sector executives, at least during the 1990s and 
2000s. In my interview with Martin Stewart-Weeks in 2018, he observed that 
there was still a reticence among senior bureaucrats, born of a discomfort with 
the overly-rapid pace they saw as associated with technological change.34 
New Public Management 
Emerging in the 1980s, New Public Management is an umbrella term for a 
program of prescriptions and potions for lifting bureaucracies from what was 
portrayed as their traditional bureaucratic funk into a state resembling the 
dynamism of the private sector. It sought to overthrow what Christopher Hood 
described as “progressive public administration” which made a sharp 
distinction between the mission of the public sector and private sector 
practices (Hood 1995, 93–94). In its formative days, Hood, one of the earliest 
observers of New Public Management, described its key “doctrinal 
components” as (1) departmental executives made up of professional 
managers with clear delegation to run their organisation semi-autonomously 
from the minister; (2) “explicit standards of measurement and performance”, 
mainly quantitative, with (3) a greater emphasis on output controls (i.e. results 
rather than process); (4) disaggregation of departments into functionally 
homogenous units under the control of a CEO-like executive; (5) the 
introduction of real and simulated competition through contracts and 
purchaser-provider relationships; (6) “a stress on private sector styles of 
management practice”; and (7) greater “discipline and parsimony” in the use 
of resources (Hood 1991, 4–5). New Public Management was fuelled by a 
heavy dose of managerialism, also inherited in part from the private sector, to 
the extent that the two terms are often deployed interchangeably in the 
context of the public sector (Saint-Martin 1998, 319). 
For 30 years New Public Management has been the ideological vehicle for the 
neo-liberal prescription for government, and in that period, with or without 
the digital government discourse, it has been assisted by the capabilities of 
computing and networking (Henman & Adler 2003, 148). New Public 
Management can be seen as either a “shorthand phrase for a set of loosely 
related ideas about government and public service reform” (Hood & Dixon 
2015, 265) or a “dominant academic ‘quasi-paradigm’ … [with] a managerialist 
emphasis on organizational arrangements and strong corporate leadership” 
(Margetts & Dunleavy 2013, 2). Both as reform movement and as an academic 
category, New Public Management has dominated the direction of public 
management since the early 1980s. The movement originated and flourished 
most strongly in the Westminster polities of the Anglosphere, and also in the 
 




USA and northern Europe (Pollitt 2000, 185; Sahlin-Andersson 2000b, 6). 
Despite its neglect of digital technologies throughout its lifetime (Pollitt 2017, 
558), New Public Management has served as an ideological foundation for the 
digital government story. It is the New Public Management view of 
government to which the digital government discourse adheres. New Public 
Management practices and discourse have paved the way for digital 
government in a number of ways. First, it established a language and practice 
for the public sector that makes it receptive to private sector thinking about IT. 
This accounts in part for the absence of politics and legislatures in the digital 
government discourse. Second, it was a source of legitimacy to which digital 
government advocates could appeal; for instance, digital government makes a 
strong pitch about “doing more with less”. Third, it was New Public 
Management which introduced into the public sector a strong emphasis on 
customer centricity, derived from the quality management movement 
(Fountain 2001b, 55). Fourth, it promoted standardised business processes and 
an over-dependence on quantification that were amenable to automation, 
based on the business process re-engineering movement (Fox 1996, 258–59; 
Gore 1993; Homburg 2008, 757). Fifth, New Public Management reinforced the 
division between policy and operations (Barton 2009, 231), with the former 
having temporal and moral primacy. But, as will be discussed later, New 
Public Management has had very little, if anything, to say about the growing 
presence of technology in government (Meijer 2007, 236–39; Pollitt 2017; 
Snellen 2007, 205). So, it is not a parent-child relationship; rather, New Public 
Management and digital government are discourses that are more like siblings 
born from rationalist parents. 
New Public Management had its most lurid and influential expression in the 
1992 book by two US management consultants, David Osborne and Ted 
Gaebler, called Reinventing government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is 
transforming the public sector (Osborne & Gaebler 1992). This strident call for 
small government proposed that the public sector be confined to a “steering” 
function of policy making, while outsourcing the service delivery “rowing” to 
the market, which would ensure lower cost and higher quality through 
competition.35 In particular, the book caught the imagination of the consulting 
industry, which in turn promoted it to their government clients (Saint-Martin 
1998, 320).36 Within government, the major impact of the steering/rowing 
metaphor was to reinforce a long-standing dualism in public sector thinking: 
the divide between policy and “implementation”, the latter combining 
 
35 The book strongly influenced the most high-profile early incarnation of New Public 
Management policy, the National Performance Review (NPR) produced by the incoming 
Clinton government in the US (Saint-Martin 2001, 574). In turn, both the book and NPR had a 
profound influence on other Anglosphere countries (Saint-Martin 2001, 575). 
36 I recall vividly how a consultant to the Department of Cabinet in 1992 encouraged us to 
embrace the spirit of this new book in responding to the recommendations of the “WA Inc” 
Royal Commission, even though the Commission was deeply concerned about the ethical 
shortcomings of contemporary government rather than its inefficiency. 
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everything that governments do that isn’t policy making into an amorphous 
blob.  
The digital government corpus imagines a public sector constructed in the 
form of a model corporation. This construction has no place for the unique 
institutions of government. For instance, two telling absences from the digital 
government policy corpus were politics37 and legislature.38 Of the 132 
references to political in the corpus, 129 were in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-ordination and Development and United Nations documents, 
underlining both the absence of the overtly political from the government 
policies and the difference between those policies and the non-government 
reports. However, even in those reports, the role required of the political 
sphere would be to get behind digital government and make it happen—the 
key words following political were commitment, leaders, leadership, parties, 
and will. One common preceding word was strong. The legislative arm of 
government was also a distinctive absence.39  
The disconnect between digital government and the political realm works both 
ways. While many of the government digital government policies may have 
been endorsed by political leaders in the forewords of policy documents, 
press releases and launch events, the digital transformation of government is a 
subject that is largely absent from partisan political discourse. From the 
beginning, the dream of digital government has received bi-partisan political 
support in the jurisdictions I examined most closely.40 One of my interviewees, 
an ex-Auditor General, observed that political parties tend to go easy on each 
other on the subject of technology for fear of wading into technical issues that 
might be beyond their expertise and so run the risk of embarrassing 
themselves.41 What political criticism of digital government that I have 
observed is not so much about the broad desirability or direction of digital 
government but on the managerial competence of political opponents in 
implementing a digital government strategy. This is most evident in 
parliamentary hearings, where opposition politicians attempt to pin technology 
project failures, of which there are plenty, onto the government of the day 
 
37 Based on a word search on variants of the word, which turned up only: politics, political, 
politically. Political is the most frequent, with 128 of the 132 incidences. 
38 Based on a word search on: legislature OR parliament OR congress OR legislation OR 
parliamentary OR congressional, as well as their variants. 
39 There were 118 mentions of legislatures (including legislative and legislation) in 10 
documents, 85 of which are in OECD 2003 and UN 2016, reflecting the relative paucity of 
coverage in the government documents and their laser-like focus on the service activities of 
executive government. 
40 For instance, the 310-page Australian Labor Party policy platform for 2018 does not mention 
e-government or digital government explicitly. The closest it gets is a commitment to doing a 
better job of delivering digital services in the human services field (ALP 2018, 198). Of the 37 
plans presented by the Liberal Party, the Australian Labor Party’s main opponent for the 2019 
Australian Federal election, none mentioned digital government (Liberal Party of Australia 
2019). 
41 Interview with DP on 9 August 2018. 
 
81 
(e.g., FPARC 2018a). Otherwise, in the political world, digital government 
means technology and technology is a backroom function—a question of 
internal departmental administration and not a matter of public interest. 
This situation exemplifies what Žižek and others refer to as the post-political 
condition, which is “a foreclosing of the political moment, replaced by social 
administration” (Kaethler, De Blust & Devos 2017, 177). It is 
characterized by deepening processes of de-politicization characterized by the 
increasing evacuation of the proper political dimension from the public terrain as 
technocratic management and consensual policy-making has sutured the spaces 
of democratic politics (Swyngedouw 2010, 214). 
For Žižek, this closure “takes the precise form of mental block that prevents us 
from imagining a fundamental social change, in the interests of an allegedly 
‘realistic’ and ‘mature’ attitude” (2000, 323–24, original emphasis). Thus, 
outside of a small corner of academia, there seems to be no broadly accepted 
competing narrative currently in circulation. To this extent, the movement has 
successfully put itself beyond politics and beyond policy, in the sense that it 
no longer needs to be debated. Regardless of whether the digital government 
discourse is comprehensively endorsed, adopted or understood, it is the 
narrative that digital government actors and observers have available to them. 
In that sense at least, while it is not driving action, it is the dominant account 
about what is, or should be, happening in relation to the use of digital 
technology in government. As I will argue later the discourse is reflective of 
what bureaucrats believe they are doing, even as they are doing something 
that diverges from the vision. 
This kind of depoliticising claim to neutrality is also a major characteristic of 
managerialism. Chauvière and Mick put it this way: 
So as to gain legitimacy, managerial power pretends to be neutral and impartial. 
It neutralizes the contradictions found in the workplace by positivism. It 
liquidates conflicts of interest by affirming universalistic values. The past is 
forgotten; the present is devalued. What counts is an exaltation of the future. 
Management also invents new instruments that pretend to bring transparence [sic] 
where arbitrariness reigns supreme, objectivity where contradictions dominate, 
and security where instability menaces (Chauvière & Mick 2011, 138). 
At a broader level, Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, applying Rose and Miller’s 
scheme of political rationality and technologies of government (Rose & Miller 
2010 [1992]), has described the ways that the emerging governing technologies 
of New Public Management are deployed without reference to the neo-liberal 
political rationality they sustain: 
when the reforms were initiated in practice, the programme behind these 
techniques was not always visible or explicit, but the technical elements, such as 
the introduction of new accounting systems, documentation instruments, pricing 
systems or hiring and payment procedures, were discussed and introduced in 
terms of their technical elements (Sahlin-Andersson 2000b, 9). 
Such a mindset provides a welcoming, politically inert environment for a neo-
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liberal political rationality supported by an even narrower set of governing 
technologies, namely the technologies of computation, information and 
communication. 
The ideologies of technology and information 
As foreshadowed earlier, one of the two major rhetorical tasks of the digital 
government discourse has been to convince a sometimes-sceptical audience of 
the strategic value of information technology to public sector programs. Not 
only are senior bureaucrats immersed in a public sector discourse that 
backgrounds technology, but that audience would be sensitive to the cost and 
failure rate of large IT projects (Gauld, Goldfinch & Dale 2006, 11–12), as well 
as being confronted with competing claims on resources. In short, why bother 
with a risky venture into uncharted waters when there are other things to 
focus on? As Bekkers and Homburg put it, the challenge is to “lift politicians, 
bureaucrats and policy makers out of the banality of everyday administrative 
practice and into the possibilities of institutional innovation” (Bekkers & 
Homburg 2007, 374). As we saw in the preceding chapter, the central 
government advocacy for digital government did not inspire the desired 
response from line agencies. A further barrier has been a reluctance of the 
very same central agencies and ministers who, in their role as guardians of the 
public purse, are unwilling to fund any form of non-public facing 
infrastructure, let alone high-cost, high-risk projects (OECD 2001). In times of 
fiscal restraint, the political priority is on expenditure that has a direct impact 
on the public’s attention. 
Faced with this daunting task, the authors of the 17 digital government 
documents drew heavily on the frames and omissions of the pervasive 
Western technology ideology which they had to hand and which I discussed 
in Chapter 3. In very broad terms, the discourse analysis of those documents 
revealed consistent claims that the technology that would deliver digital 
government is non-problematic, transformative only in ways that benefit the 
public, future oriented, an autonomous force independent of human agents, 
and disconnected from the other technologies of government (in Foucault’s 
sense). There was also scant acknowledgement of the inability of government 
to implement it without outside help.  
As with other motivational genres, the digital government documents often 
open with a deterministic declaration designed to establish an indisputable 
base on which to build an argument. Rhetorically, these statements are 
presumptions whose bona fides are judged by their authors as unlikely to be 
questioned by the audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 65–73). They 
form the foundations that justify the necessity of the policy as well as its 
particular recommendations. Here are two indicative examples from the 
introductions of the corpus documents: 
Data and technology continue to change how Australians live, work and prosper. 
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(DTA 2018, 4) 
Information and communications technology (ICT) is transforming the way 
government operates and the pace of change will only increase over the next few 
years. ICT advances can provide better service delivery, while at the same time 
improving efficiency and reducing the costs of government. (AGIMO 2006, 6) 
The tone of this sort of comment in the corpus is fabulous, confident, 
emphatic and unconditional. It establishes an imperative, giving no option but 
to comply. The bald technological determinism of these passages expresses a 
one-way causal relationship with no hint of possible opposing action; that is, 
whether the external force of technology could or should be resisted or 
modified. The only scope for choice is to respond either slowly or 
enthusiastically.  
Deployed into a rational institutional context, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
technology frame is very effective in obscuring human agency, convergent 
agendas, consequences and the over-arching political rationalities at play. The 
documents give little hint of specific social actors driving the technological 
change. It could, perhaps, be taken as understood by the audience that there 
is more to making digital government a reality than what is declared in the 
discourse, but the ubiquitous absence of human agency in the policy 
documents implicates the fetishising effects of the ideology of technology. 
Despite the claims for transformation of governance, the absence of any 
assessment of potential changes in power relations is also telling. For example, 
Bovens and Zouridis describe the redistribution of “administrative discretion 
and constitutional control” (Bovens & Zouridis 2002) made possible by 
automation, in which power is accumulated by “system-level bureaucrats”, at 
the expense of both “street-level” front-line bureaucrats and the higher levels 
of political decision making. There is also no mention of some of the more 
obvious and potentially contentious consequences that are made invisible by 
the technology narrative, such as staff reductions and de-skilling the 
workforce. 
The theme of the transformative impact of digital technologies on 
government, governance and services was prominent in many of the 
documents and reports.42 Transformation signifies something deeper than 
change or adjustment; rather a comprehensive re-shaping of all or most 
aspects of an organisation or activity. Yet, in the corpus the term is 
underdeveloped and ambiguous—another “magic concept” (Pollitt & Hupe 
2011). Despite its centrality to the narrative, even in the academic literature 
“there has been little focus thus far on the meanings, impacts, and implications 
of government service transformation for democratic citizen–government 
relationships” (Lips 2017, 11).  
In some instances, the transformational impact was from outside the public 
 
42 There were 291 instances of transform and its variants. 
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sector, working through public expectations and other broad social forces: 
Digital divides and disruptions are changing the fabric of many societies in a 
digitally dependent world. The use of ICTs in public administration is no 
exception. The significant evolution of e-government over the past two decades is 
an example of the transformative power of ICTs. (UN 2016, 107, emphasis added). 
The key forces of change – including globalisation, the rise of knowledge 
economies and new technology – are transforming the relationship between 
government, business and society (State Services Commission 2003, 5, emphasis 
added). 
At other times the transformation would be enacted by digital government 
initiatives: 
… the pay-off will not result from automating current processes, but rather 
through the transformation of how the government interacts with its citizens and 
customers (OMB 2002, 13, emphasis added). 
When asked to describe the ultimate benefit of e-government, the most consistent 
response given by decision-makers and public sector professionals interviewed 
for this report was that it transforms governance like no previous reform or 
reinvention imitative (UN 2002, 6, emphasis added). 
It is reasonable to expect that such substantial transformations would have 
some consequences for power relations among the parties involved. This 
makes the discourse inherently political. Summarising the critique by critical 
theorists of this sort of lacuna, Eran Fisher argues, 
In this political context technology becomes an unquestionable “good,” a 
“religion” … and a “myth” … which suggests that virtually any social problem is 
subject to a technical or technological fix … It entails the substitution of technical 
and technological discussions, with their emphasis on instrumental rationality, for 
political debate based on communicative rationality and aimed at arriving at 
substantive rationality (Fisher 2010, 19). 
While the policies promised transformation, they were vague on how the 
transformation would occur. Their action plans consisted of a combination of 
edicts, predictions and exhortations. In a document that appeared to be more 
action-oriented than most, the UK Cabinet Office’s most specific plans were 
still quite general, for instance: 
Action 01 Departmental and transactional agency boards will include an active 
digital leader … Action 02 Services handling over 100,000 transactions each year 
will be re-designed, operated and improved by a skilled, experienced and 
empowered Service Manager … Action 03 All departments will ensure that they 
have appropriate digital capability in-house, including specialist skills (Cabinet 
Office 2012, 20–22). 
By 2018, the Australian Government could be more explicit, offering to 
complete a variety of unfinished projects, such as a single identity for people 
using government services and the completion of some online social payment 
services. However in offering some future scenarios, they did not reveal some 
of the downsides, such as a joined-up service for families with a new baby 
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(DTA 2018, 25) becoming the basis for a national identity system.43 
Nevertheless, the focus of that policy document was still firmly on an idealised 
future, rather than dwelling on the slow progress and pitfalls since the first 
Australian Government policy in 1995 (Information Technology Review Group 
1995). As with the UK policy, there was scant reference to any supplementary 
means by which the transformation could transpire—other technologies of 
government that might have been involved in such a reform program, such as 
organisational structure, legislation, policy, or training, are largely 
backgrounded, if not ignored. 
After government and service, information is the third most common keyword 
in the corpus, where it is comprehensively objectified as an ontologically 
autonomous substance. This is a manifestation of the ideology of information 
discussed in Chapter 3. Once liberated from the minds of authors and 
audiences, we are led to believe one can do anything with information. The 
overwhelming sense of information presented in the digital government policy 
corpus is that it is an accessible, infinitely malleable and transmutable 
substance. Of the hundred or more terms used to describe what one can do 
with information, only a handful were not dependent on the conduit 
metaphor, which depicts information as a container for meaning, feelings and 
thought.44  
Once separated from the interactions of the original authors and audiences, 
according to this discourse, information is framed as a resource available for 
exploitation by a variety of interests. This depiction licences bureaucrats to co-
opt information provided by individuals and to use it, ostensibly for the 
broader public good. The impression conveyed by the corpus documents is 
that government information is a freely available “resource” or “asset” for all. 
And so, it can be “located”, “moved”, “contained”, “found” and “placed’. This 
is a ground for contemporary fads such as “big data” and “open government” 
and the justification for data sharing programs (Productivity Commission 2017). 
In its 2018 Digital Transformation Strategy, the Australian Government 
proclaimed, “We recognise that data is a strategic national resource that holds 
considerable value for growing the economy, improving service delivery and 
transforming policy outcomes for Australians” (DTA 2018, 33). In Chapter 9, I 
examine the extent to which bureaucrats are willing and able to pursue this 
ethos without the knowledge or consent of people who provided their 
personal information to government. 
 
43 The way this is intended to work is that “When the baby is born, [its parents] provide 
consent for the proof of birth data from the hospital to trigger the automatic creation of a 
digital identity, Medicare/Centrelink record and My Health Record for their child” and post-
natal services are offered to them (DTA 2018, 25). 
44 In the most frequent usages, information can be “accessed”, “provided”, and “shared’; it can 
“flow” or “reside”, but also “empower”, “enhance” and “pervade’. In some of the more 
interesting instances, information can also be “freed”, quantified (in references to “volume” or 
“amount’), “owned”, “manipulated”, “exploited” and “impeded’. 
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No less important is the assumption in the corpus that all information is value-
free, factual, unambiguous and non-problematic. Within the broader 
abstraction of government presented by the digital government discourse is 
the abstraction of information as a socially-neutral good. There is no 
recognition that what might be pumped through government information 
channels might include opinion, error, propaganda, misinformation, spin or 
bias. Nor is it acknowledged that government frequently concerns conflicts of 
interest between service provider and consumer, so that information can be 
highly contestable. 
5.3  Making the argument for digital government 
Among all the documents I reviewed, there is a consistency of subject scope, 
language, purpose, context, style and structure. All of the documents share a 
six-fold core narrative structure. First, a prefatory imprimatur from a higher 
authority (such as a minister) that sets a mandate for the policy. For the 
government policies, a foreword from a minister puts beyond question the 
rationale for having such a policy, leaving the policy document to focus on the 
managerial/technical issues of its design and implementation. Second, an 
executive summary for the time-challenged. Third, an enframing introduction 
that defines digital government, its rationale, the “drivers”, the key players and 
objectives. Fourth, an exposition of the benefits of digital government, usually 
conflating the objectives, benefits and outcomes. Fifth, the strategy or 
“vision”—often starting with a small number of “principles”, “pillars”, 
“priorities” or “building blocks”. How these were arrived at, and what the 
alternatives might be, are not discussed. Sixth, an outline of implementation—
a list of actions or next steps, sometimes including measures for evaluation 
and monitoring to assure performance/delivery.  
This structure creates the appearance of a rationally established plan, against 
which there is little or no alternative. However, the absence of evaluated 
alternatives is heresy in the theory of rational choice, betraying the documents’ 
fundamentally persuasive approach, rather than being the technical/factual 
documents they purport to be. They conform to the observation of Cris Shore 
and Susan Wright that “Policies are most obviously political phenomena, yet it 
is a feature of policies that their political nature is disguised by the objective, 
neutral, legal-rational idioms in which they are portrayed” (Shore & Wright 
1997, 7).  
Where and how do policy-writers start? Both policy authors I interviewed 
scanned the world for similar policies from other jurisdictions in the early 
stages of their project, and in one case spoke with the authors of some source 
documents. In this respect, authors around the world formed a loose-knit 
network of mutual referencing and cross-legitimation. For a new policy group 
with a foundational mandate to develop a specified government policy, not 
only is there the pragmatic advantage of not having to build from first 
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principles (as suggested by rational action theory), but also the chance to 
adapt a polished form in which the intricacies of persuasion have been 
refined. They are also a pool from which policy makers can cherry-pick ideas 
and language. The availability of a genre solves a set of existential problems 
for authors, especially where they share an ideological perspective with 
previous authors, and their brief is part of a managerialist reform agenda. In 
contrast to the rational decision making form reflected within such documents, 
their origins are more likely to emerge from an implicit rule-following 
approach to decision making as defined by institutional theorist James March, 
which can be expressed in three questions that hinge on the subjectivity of the 
policy maker:  
1. The question of recognition: What kind of situation is this? 
2. The question of identity: What kind of person am I? Or what kind of 
organization is this? 
3. The question of rules: What does a person such as I, or an organization such 
as this, do in a situation such as this?” (March 1994, 58, original emphasis) 
So, resorting to an established genre does much more than supply a 
boilerplate text; it also maps the here-and-now to a pattern of social relations, 
rituals of consultation with “stakeholders”, presentation style, connections to 
roles, organisations, authorities, exemplars and silences. Not only do the 
policy makers thereby construct themselves, but also adopt a suite of 
constructions for other key roles. “Through policy, the individual is 
categorized and given such statuses and roles as ‘subject’, ‘citizen’, 
‘professional’, ‘national’, ‘criminal’ and ‘deviant’” (Shore & Wright 1997, 4). It is 
an ontological model that builds, and attaches to, an image of digital 
government as a reality “out there” that is both desirable and feasible. Many of 
the policies pointed to other jurisdictions that had already implemented digital 
government projects, thereby demonstrating the feasibility of digital 
government, and also that it was already under way in other jurisdictions. 
Such comparisons also form the basis for motivational competition metaphors 
that invoke dangers, such as “falling behind” in the race to digitise. 
Networks of legitimation 
The authors of the policies and reports might be seen as a loose network of 
agents with a common task. The increased availability of the Internet that 
inspired the movement also made it possible to share documents with an ease 
previously unknown. There may have been conferences at which they met, 
especially those in Europe. Moreover, the project teams for the two 
international organisations, the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and 
Development and the United Nations, are often staffed by seconded policy 
specialists from member countries, which also supply case studies and reports 
that provide the content for those organisations’ reports (Sahlin-Andersson 
2000a, 111–12). There is thus a mutually reinforcing process of meaning-
making between international organisations and member countries. 
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Several of the strategies from the early 2000s drew upon the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 2003 document, The e-
Government Imperative (hereafter the Imperative) (2003), to make several 
pivotal moves. A major theme of the Imperative was that e-government is 
more than a technical matter; it is an “exercise in governance” (op. cit., 17, 
emphasis added). This was an attempt to ground e-government strategies 
within the public management agenda and liberate IT from the organisational 
basement.45 This document set the tone for the level of ambition that member 
countries could emulate. 
Modernising government structures, governance frameworks and processes to 
meet the e-government imperative will have fundamental impacts on how 
services are delivered, how policies are developed and how public 
administrations operate. As the impact of e-government becomes more profound, 
governments will have to strike equilibrium between protecting citizens’ rights 
and better meeting their needs with more efficient, integrated services and policy 
engagement processes. What starts as a technical exercise aimed at developing 
more responsive programs and services becomes an exercise in governance. 
(OECD 2003, 17, emphasis added) 
Coming as it did in 2003, this declaration provided a licence to member 
governments and corporations to follow suit in expounding the transformative 
beneficence of e-governance. It also neatly conflates ends and means. Does 
governance need to adjust to the “e-government imperative”, or is the e-
government imperative a path to better governance? In either case, the 
potential pitfalls and by-products of such a major reconfiguration are not 
canvassed—everything is just better.46  
One of the other widely used sources of legitimation was Gartner’s four-stage 
model discussed in the previous chapter. It formed the conceptual framework 
for several governments’ e-government strategies, including those of Western 
Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. That other governments 
were using this model provided added assurance about Gartner’s authority 
and the validity of the model to the authors and readers. For instance, the 
Western Australian Strategy closely follows the New Zealand Government’s 
presentation of Gartner’s four phases, to the point of closely adapting a 
diagram from the more detailed New Zealand report, which summarises all the 
initiatives required to achieve the e-government transformation (State Services 
Commission 2003, 14–15). The four-stage model was also a popular 
conceptual framework in the academic literature about e-government often as 
what Heeks and Bailur refer to as a “substitute for theory” (2007, 254–55). In 
 
45 As discussed earlier, this love has not been requited. The public administration discourse 
has steadfastly avoided the subject of technology (Hood & Margetts 2010). 
46 Christopher Pollitt and Peter Hupe nominate governance as one of the main magic concepts 
currently in circulation in public sector management discourse. It is “fashionable”, “woolly’, 
“value laden” and concerns change and reform. Its rhetorical success lies in its normativity and 




presentations to senior government officials, Gartner executives were more 
dramatic, providing the imperative rhetoric that turns e-government from a 
good idea into a destiny: 
Government stands at the brink of total transformation … We are fast moving into 
an era of total transformation … Technology will be the facilitator and vehicle of 
the transformation, and IT governance will provide the framework for making 
change of this magnitude possible … We are in for a roller coaster ride. 
Transformation is both exhilarating and challenging … A new age is dawning … 
the time has come to re-evaluate the business model and modus operandi that 
have become the cornerstones of government … We are starting an incredible 
journey that will lead to the transformation of government (Carr n.d., 1, emphasis 
added).47  
As with the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development’s 
reference to governance, we see in this passage a promise of transformation 
without any consideration of potential consequences for the foundations of 
government when the “cornerstones of government” get moved around. As I 
will demonstrate in later chapters, the fundamental rearrangement of modus 
operandi opens up opportunities for intervention for those who can influence 
the transformation more than citizen-customers. 
The digital government frame 
It is clear from the passages quoted above that their authors have developed a 
political imaginary that stakes out what Paul Henman has identified as “the 
governmentality of e-government...a political agenda about both the role of 
such technologies in government and the very nature of government.” 
(Henman 2010a, 33–34). In the policies I examined, references to the more 
overtly political aspects of e-government, such as citizen participation in 
decision making and voting, diminished markedly between the first and 
second generations. Nevertheless, the claims about service delivery still reflect 
the new governmentality observed by Henman. However, as I will argue in 
later chapters, the imaginary of the policy makers is vastly different to the 
governmentality that is evident in practice, now the ultimate transformation 
stage of government is “finally” being developed and rolled out. 
In 2014, the Organisation for Economic Co-ordination and Development 
offered the following definition of e-government “E-Government refers to the 
use by the governments of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), and particularly the Internet, as a tool to achieve better government” 
(OECD 2014, 6, emphasis added). However, in the digital government policy 
corpus I examined, digital government was equated to better government. Any 
 
47 This unpublished paper was presented and circulated by Dr Judy Carr, Vice President and 
Program Director, Executive Programs of the Gartner Group, to a large audience of Western 
Australian public sector senior IT managers and general executives, which I attended in Perth 
in around 2000. Many of the audience members belonged to organisations that subscribed to 
Gartner’s IT information service, which cost upward of AUD 37,000 per annum. 
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other contributors to better government were generally ignored. Some 
documents briefly located digital government within a broader frame of public 
sector reform, while others jumped right into equating digital government with 
better government. In its opening paragraph, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-ordination and Development’s e-Government imperative of the previous 
decade declared: “The impact of e-government at the broadest level is simply 
better government by enabling better policy outcomes, higher quality services, 
greater engagement with citizens and by improving other key outputs” (OECD 
2003, 11). 
The strengths of other channels of contact with the public are barely 
acknowledged except as residual methods to be resorted to when things get a 
little complicated. And so proposals are developed with slogans such as 
“digital first” or “digital by default” (e.g., Cabinet Office 2012). The rest of this 
section details how two interlocking concepts—government as service delivery 
and the citizen as customer—work to obscure the diversity of government and 
its relationships with the public. 
Government as service delivery 
As mentioned previously, the main framing devices of the digital government 
narrative are the positioning of government as a service and therefore citizens 
as customers. After government, the word service is the most frequently used 
keyword in the digital government policy corpus, reinforcing the presumption 
that services are all that governments do. The term frames a social relationship 
(Fillmore 2006 [1982], 378). At its most basic it includes a provider, a purchaser 
and an activity performed by the provider for the purchaser. It is most 
commonly understood as the exchange of an action for money. The effect of 
this frame is to pre-condition discussion about interactions between 
government and public in terms of reciprocal commercial transactions.  
New Public Management established a similar relation to set apart, and frame 
the interaction of, policy and service delivery in government. Essentially this is 
an expression of government as business ideology—the core tenet of New 
Public Management and managerialism (Henman 2010a, 39). The purchaser–
provider concept was central to New Public Management’s quest to bring 
market “discipline” into government by making activities contestable in market 
terms (Wanna, Forster & Kelly 2001, 264). Splitting government organisations 
into purchasers and providers, with the latter competing for work defined and 
procured by purchasers. This encouraged all government activities to be 
costed. It opened up government to the option of allowing private firms to 
compete for work against government bodies (Barton 2009, 231). In turn, the 
providers could deliver quantifiable “outputs” to the customers of government. 
By abstracting government activities in this way, service delivery concepts 
align government with commerce.  
This transactional discursive mechanism has had the long-term effect of 
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preconditioning bureaucrats (and others) to equate public sector with private 
sector and thus make self-evident the importation of concepts, methods, 
language, people and systems.48 The translation involves two moves, first the 
reduction of as many government functions as possible to the status of service, 
and second, ignoring whatever doesn’t fit the service model (e.g. policy 
making, compliance, enforcement, the judiciary and the legislature). For 
instance, during the heyday of the customer service movement in Western 
governments in the 1990s, in many jurisdictions (starting with the UK Citizen’s 
Charter (Mullen 2006)) agencies were required to develop a customer service 
charter. Agencies then set about redefining their activities as services, 
sometimes even describing ministers as customers.49  
This ethos has since been absorbed into routine departmental monitoring and 
reporting. A contemporary example is the “customer satisfaction” statement in 
a Department of Human Services annual report, which declared: “The 
department’s service commitments are a public expression of its vision of 
delivering excellent services to the Australian people while delivering on the 
outcomes and expectations of government” (DHS 2018a, 154). The final 
conditional phrase in this quote signals a major gap in the service paradigm. 
There are “outcomes and expectations” that governments pursue by policy or 
legislation that do not necessarily serve the needs or expectations of their 
“customers”.50 This conflicts with a market frame of commercial relationships 
with its entailments of choice on the part of both buyers and sellers. Jane 
Fountain argues, 
Customer service derives some of its conceptual power from ambiguity of 
definition. Like other political symbols and rhetoric, it can mean almost anything, 
may simultaneously mean many different things to many different people, and 
represents an idea that attracts little or no opposition from the mass public or 
political elites (2001b, 56). 
One might expect the market model to collapse when market mechanisms of 
choice don’t operate. Unlike firms that can segment markets and vary quality 
and price, government departments can’t choose who they serve or the types 
of services they provide (Ciborra 2005, 67; Fountain 2001b, 64). Public sector 
“customers” may not be able to choose whether they are “served”, who 
provides the service or the price, quality or quantity they need or want 
(Henman 2010a, 224). Furthermore, it is not always possible to identify the 
customer, such as in education (parent or child?), health (patient or family?), 
policing, courts and prisons (victim, witness, suspect or criminal?). 
 
48 In the following chapters, I will be illustrating this alignment and its consequences in more 
detail. 
49 In its 2002 charter, the Western Australian Department of Treasury and Finance nominated 
its three major customer groups as, “the Government and Parliament; the community, 
taxpayers and their agents; and State Government agencies” (Department of Treasury and 
Finance 2002). 
50 Paeans to the full-blooded dedication of the private sector to satisfy customers also forget 
that businesses also have a higher commitment, namely to shareholders (Ciborra 2005, 267) 
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The intangibility and temporality of services clashes with their objectification 
through the product-based metaphor of service delivery.51 Fountain points out 
three ways by which a service context places an onus on the customer: 
First, the intangibility of many services in contrast to the tangibility of products 
renders necessarily subjective perceptions of quality formed by customers vitally 
important … The second property is related to the first. Service production, 
delivery, and consumption often occur simultaneously … Third, customers enter 
into the production and delivery of services as coproducers. They provide 
essential inputs in real time through the verbal and written information they 
contribute as well as through their demeanor and visual cues (Fountain 2001b, 
58). 
In this frame, customer satisfaction becomes a key measure of success. Again, 
this falls foul of the government context, as it excludes other, sometimes 
conflicting or political outcomes. The problem here is that commercial 
organisations put a great deal of effort into shaping customer expectations, 
preferences and experience through advertising, pricing, product placement 
and physical service environments (Fountain 2001b, 59). Government 
departments have much less capacity to do these things, but the pressures on 
governments to measure their performance pushes them to produce 
quantitative proxies for subjective satisfaction—for example, feedback surveys 
in which “customers” indicate whether they have been treated with respect 
and given accurate, consistent and easy to understand information; whether 
staff were “prompt and efficient” (DHS 2018a, 155–157), but not, say, whether 
customers got the level of financial support they wanted or needed—that is a 
question for the policy department and government, not the service 
department.  
Finally, as will be discussed in later chapters, the service frame avoids the 
compliance and enforcement functions that are associated with many 
government “services”. To receive financial and other benefits, applicants and 
recipients must satisfy eligibility criteria and, increasingly, demonstrate 
appropriate behaviours (Henman 2010a, 156–57). While such criteria are not 
unknown in the private sector, such as in banking and insurance, this aspect 
of benefits programs is missing from the abstract treatment of services in 
whole-of-government digital government discourse. 
The citizen-customer 
In the overall corpus, those to whom services are “delivered” are mostly 
citizens (924 occurrences). It is used nearly twice as often (436 instances) as 
market-related terms (such as customer, consumer or client) or the utilitarian 
concept of user (509). More neutral terms such as person/people or individual 
(786) are the next most frequently used. However, the use of citizen fell 
 
51 The delivery metaphor reflects the way in which services are metaphorically mapped to 
products. Services are notoriously difficult to define and so talking about them relies heavily 
on seeing a service as an object. 
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markedly between generations (from 46 percent of all incidences in the first 
generation to 15 percent in the second generation).52 In the second generation, 
citizen was somewhat displaced by a preference for more neutral terms, such 
as person or individual, (rising from 17 percent to 52 percent) and user (rising 
from 17 percent to 23 percent). However, a reading of the documents reveals 
that the relationship with government experienced by citizens is still mostly 
limited to a service relationship. This indicates that the use of the term citizen 
is largely tactical and is perhaps related to the need to connect more strongly 
in the early days to public sector reform initiatives (Ciborra 2005, 267; Clarke 
et al. 2007, 2) in order to appeal to the adherents of New Public Management. 
In contrast with this trend is the continued heavy reliance on “customer” in 
contemporary practice, such as by Services Australia. As will be seen in later 
chapters, this label is now applied to health and welfare beneficiaries and 
applicants with determined consistency. 
The customer frame, introduced into government through the New Public 
Management movement (Henman 2010a, 39), resonates strongly in the digital 
government discourse. Jane Fountain argues that in using customer service as 
a metaphor for government activities, such “terminology constitutes a forceful 
framing device for thought and action; rhetoric, metaphor and language 
powerfully affect cognition and action” (2001b, 56). Online services offer to 
take customer service to a new level, and, as we have seen, the convenience 
aspects of online commercial services are an exemplar for digital government 
advocates. John Clarke et al introduce the notion of citizen-consumer, a 
“peculiar hybridised and hyphenated” concoction produced by public policy 
makers to capture the otherwise incommensurable characteristics of the two 
entities, into an impossible unity of rational self-interest (2007, 1). 
The emergence of user in the second generation of policies is a significant 
development. This term can have a neutral connotation, as in the user of a 
service, and partly reflects a dilemma in abstracting people who are served by 
government (Clarke et al. 2007, 122). However, in the context of digital 
government, user takes on a distinctly technological turn, and this is reflected 
in the corpus. In this context, a person is a user of a computer or, more 
generally, a system. In the roll-out of a large welfare payments system that I 
describe in later chapters, a welfare recipient engages with multiple levels of 
digital apparatus, from their mobile phone with its government app, though 
layers of communications networks and protocols to a multilayered 
commercial software “stack” to engage with automated decision making 
eligibility software. The connection between a person and the Department as a 
peopled organisation is remote, to say the least. And, as a “user”, one’s 
subjectivity and sense of agency is highly coloured by engagement with other 
systems, such as social media and commercial online services. 
 




5.4  The broader digital government movement 
Government policies are just one part of a larger body of advocacy for digital 
government. Other major players that are deeply involved in the digitising of 
government put a considerable effort into promoting the concept, their 
services and themselves. Governments are profoundly dependent on 
corporations to develop the large systems involved in delivering online 
services. In later chapters I will describe the co-dependence that exists 
between “machine bureaucracies” (such as welfare, taxation and immigration) 
and systems integrators, consulting firms and technology vendors—significant 
players in the expanding corporate state. Other contributors to the discourse 
include academic researchers and commercial conference organisers. It is 
important to emphasise at this point that, while nearly all this discourse is 
conducted in, and accessible to, the online public domain, the target 
audiences and actual readers are generally confined to those groups involved 
in digital government—more or less the discourse-producing organisations are 
talking among themselves. 
From the perspective of management and IT consulting firms and technology 
vendors, government is just another industry sector, albeit an important one. 
These firms promote digital government in “research” papers and other 
commentaries spruiking the advantages of technology and their unique 
capability to help governments make it happen. Presenting themselves as 
“thought leaders”, consulting firms promote the general uptake of new 
technologies, while IT companies produce more specific justifications that 
promote the acquisition of particular proprietary products or services. The 
public sector consumers of technology products are kept in a state of constant 
instability, always being encouraged to find new ways to replace old 
technologies. They are enticed to reach for some ideal mode of operation that 
delivers greater efficiency or better oversight and control of internal and 
external environments, and which transcends the shortcomings of “legacy” 
technology. In many ways, this extends the dynamics of management fashion 
fads that constantly keep managers focussed on the next big breakthrough, 
even in the face of repeated disappointment with previous Next Big Things 
(Abrahamson 1996; Furusten 1999; Jackson 2001). More broadly it can be seen 
as a manifestation of the “creative destruction” tendencies of capitalism (Marx, 
Engels & Stedman Jones 2002, 226; Schumpeter 1976 [1942]), a tendency more 
recently celebrated, feared and promoted as disruption. 
An example of consultants’ focus on The Next Big Thing is Gartner’s annual 
lists of the Top 10 strategic technology trends for government, arguing that 
Technologies that enable new service models for digital government must be at 
the top of the list for government organizations as they prioritize technology 
investments … Gartner has identified the 10 most important technology trends for 
government in 2015 in order to help CIOs and IT leaders assess critical strategic 




For 2015, Gartner was pushing public sector executives to take on the “digital 
workplace” because, “The digital workplace is open, flat and democratic”; 
“digital government platforms” because “citizens should no longer have to 
navigate among various agencies and programs”; and “the Internet of things” 
which somehow “enables the digital transformation of service strategies” (op. 
cit.). While private sector players may not be identified in digital government 
policies, they vigorously publish papers aimed at “informing” public sector 
decision makers about the importance and urgency of adopting new 
technologies, products and services. This is in addition to the more direct 
sales-pitching and lobbying directed at bureaucrats and politicians, which 
remains undocumented. As an advisor to a government industry minister, I 
met with one or more large technology firms or their industry representative 
bodies every week. They also invited me to technology presentations for 
decision makers and to industry conferences. The larger firms had senior 
government relations specialists whose primary focus was to cultivate key 
contacts in government. 
As information technology is adopted by private and public organisations, 
management consulting firms are becoming more active in advising on 
matters technological. International consulting firms, such as KPMG, Ernst and 
Young (EY), Deloitte and McKinsey, also produce research papers and “white 
papers”. For instance, in 2015 KPMG produced a report titled The digital 
government ease of use index (Hiller & Muller 2015). This presents the results 
of a survey of users of Australian state government services to assess how easy 
they are to use. The “results, key findings and insights” provide broad advice 
on improving online services and produce a league table rating the states’ 
performance against each other. The presentation style is similar to that of the 
Western Australian Strategy—lots of colour, white space, infographics and 
images and small blocks of text—another hybrid of the factual and 
promotional styles. They even present a “dashboard” which shows at a glance 
how particular services fare. The social situation set up by this genre is to 
establish the consultant as expert in digital government and in the state-of-play 
in each jurisdiction, and to demonstrate to its audience of state government 
executives the consultants’ objectivity, knowledge and value as trusted 
advisers. Here is part of the opening pitch in the document: 
Australians are some of the most digitally savvy and connected people in the 
world, with over 80% of the population “online” and over 60% connected via a 
social media network. This willingness to use the digital sphere to connect, 
research, share, shop and conduct business is driving massive change, not least of 
which is a dramatic shift in citizens’ expectations of their interaction with all 
levels of government. 
Government also appreciates what other sectors such as banking and 
telecommunications have known for some years: high satisfaction levels with a 
digital service reduces the cost to service and drives efficiencies (Hiller & Muller 
2015, 2). 
The last comment is telling; customer satisfaction is the means to a more 
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primary goal of digital government: cost reduction and efficiency. It also 
reflects the way in which the consultant frames the purpose of digital 
government and what a firm like KPMG offers to government in pursuit of that 
purpose. The public document does not contain the full results—only the 
section on Western Australia is provided and certain data sets are mentioned 
but not provided. For full details, interested governments must contact KPMG 
directly. These reports complement the more general information on their web 
sites.53 
The IT industry also produces research papers and other documents to 
persuade public sector executives to adopt new technologies in general and 
their own products in particular. SAP SE, the German multinational whose 
products constitute a substantial proportion of the programmatic infrastructure 
of the Australian government’s larger programs54, promotes its data systems in 
this way: 
In today’s digital society, there is immense pressure on government agencies to 
deliver on their fundamental mandate: to provide services, to protect the society, 
and to enable economic prosperity. Governments on all levels are facing new 
pressures and challenges. Digitally experienced citizens demand the service level 
and customer experience they know from shopping, banking, and social 
media…Globalization puts businesses and governments under pressure (SAP SE 
2017). 
Here, SAP chooses to prioritise the demands of the most digitally proficient 
and well-resourced citizens as a justification, regardless of the validity or 
source of their expectations. Naturally, SAP’s products are presented as a 
solution to these threatening forces, even as SAP itself is a hyperactive vector 
of globalisation. 
A final component in this mutually supportive discursive network is academic 
digital government research, the dominant body of which is primarily 
instrumental in its orientation—geared to improving and encouraging the 
uptake of digital government (Heeks & Bailur 2007, 260; Joseph 2013, 438), if 
not outrightly promotional. In a 2007 survey of e-government literature, Heeks 
and Bailur observed that, “In roughly half of the papers analyzed, there was 
presentation and either explicit or implicit promotion of some artifact of which 
the author was creator: an e-government-related product, or services, or 
architecture, or model” (2007, 259). 
Much of the digital government discipline draws on the academic study of IT 
in private organisations, known generally as information systems (IS). Heeks 
and Bailur have detected 
a predominance of literature coming from information systems; particularly given 
 
53 For the current presentation of KPMG’s digital government consulting bona fides, see 
https://home.kpmg/au/en/home/industries/government-public-sector/state-territory.html 
54 The role of SAP and its products in the development of the Australian social services 
payments system is discussed in Chapter 6 and 7. 
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that at least some of the e-government literature cited is essentially an IS or e-
business idea modified in some small way to fit the public sector context (Heeks 
& Bailur 2007, 253). 
Information systems literature is aimed primarily at improving the performance 
of technology in the service of organisations (Cecez-Kecmanovic 2005, 21), 
overwhelmingly in the private sector. Debra Howcroft has observed that this 
work is produced under pressure of plummeting student numbers and the 
marginalised status of IT schools in universities, driving the discipline to 
become ever more relevant to the requirements of business (2009, 3–4). 
5.5  Conclusion—the ambitions and limits of a 
bureaucratically-driven agenda 
As mentioned previously, the e-government movement had its origins in the 
explosive days of the growth and commercialisation of the Internet, when 
there were widespread hopes for the liberating power of networks. In the 
intervening quarter century, the initial expectations about the speed and reach 
of the transformation have not been met (Kraemer & King 2017, 4; Lips 1998, 
337; 2012). While governments move fitfully along the path to digital 
“maturity”, and public connectivity is taken for granted, the original 
enthusiastic expectations of the first generation of documents have been 
dampened in the second generation. The task has shifted from empowerment 
to tackling specific projects. However, any sign of disappointment is not 
evident—the vision is renewed regardless, even as the agenda is becoming 
more practical as the previously unexamined challenges become more 
tangible. Kraemer and King (2017) argue that the future-focussed and 
normative nature of the digital government concept keeps alive the dream of 
IT-driven reform.  
After decades of fiscal restraint, digital government offers a magic bullet that 
will enable governments to “do more with less”. The bipartisan support for 
neo-liberal “reforms” provided by the main parties in liberal democracies 
(Saint-Martin 2004, 13–14) has created a policy environment that has 
encouraged bureaucrats to develop an apparently apolitical vision of 
transformation in which emerging technologies of government support the 
political rationality of neo-liberalism. Being developed by bureaucrats rather 
than elected officials or political parties, digital government policies are 
presented in a technocratic frame, which keeps them from the field of view of 
mainstream policy analysis and practice. As Dvora Yanow observes, 
… rendering the political technical has profound implications for democratic 
political ideals. This is something that policy scientists, other than those working 
within science and technology studies or perhaps environmental policy studies, 
have rarely engaged (Yanow 2011, 309).  
From this perspective, digital government policy is a continuation of the 
process described a century ago by Max Weber, in which power moves from 
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the political to the bureaucratic sphere (Hawkesworth 1988, 17). The political 
issues around delivering services are further subsumed into a technical 
domain—from the professional service delivery of front-line or “street-level” 
bureaucrats to the planning of backroom “system-level” bureaucrats (Bovens & 
Zouridis 2002). Being unquestioned and located outside the political realm 
makes the digital government movement all the more powerful, even as 
individual policy statements appear to have had little effect.  
However, there are institutional constraints to what public governance issues 
can be aired from within a bureaucratic milieu. Bureaucrats are not in a 
position to discuss some of the political implications of digital government that 
I will be expanding on in Chapters 8 and 9, such as surveillance, power and 
the potential for anti-democratic abuse of digital infrastructure by future 
governments. The genre’s limited and declining focus on e-democracy, 
accountability, corruption and community participation in government is not 
only testament to the bureaucratic origins of the digital government discourse, 
but also an indication of its limits. This observation is supported by a 
comparison of the government policies with the reports of the two non-
government advocates of digital government. These issues are discussed in the 
digital government reports of the United Nations and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, which, being non-government 
bodies, are able to freely discuss government beyond the public service. In 
contrast, the bureaucratically driven government policies barely mention 
elections, the legislature or the judiciary, despite their central roles in 
government. 
The use of the tool metaphor is reflective of a broader belief in the effective 
agency of government and management, namely that “decision makers” can 
conceive, select and implement actions that always have the planned effect, 
and only the planned effect. While the digital government policy documents 
present themselves, their authors, audiences and the public as rational actors, 
the world of digital government policy as experienced does not necessarily 
reflect that linear rationalist model of agency. It is important to recall that 
while digital government policies place great stock in theories of rational 
action, they do not necessarily directly cause their own audience to act. Nor is 
everything that happens in the digital government space the result of a formal 
central government policy. As will be seen in later chapters, the type of 
governance envisioned by digital government policies is not all that is 
emerging. There are other drivers behind the adoption of digital technologies 
by government, the opportunity to massively reduce the size, scope and cost 
of government being just one. There are also many unforeseen, unrecognised 
and unannounced consequences of implementing digital government. It 
therefore seems that the effect of these texts is to provide a top-down covering 
rationalisation (in both senses) for what is happening from a more bottom-up 
direction, as government departments develop digital capability in a more 
piecemeal and opportunistic way.  
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The central government origins of these strategies limit their effectiveness in 
two main respects—the abstraction of services and their conflict with the 
priorities and interests of individual “line” agencies and their ministers. The 
WA Strategy clearly manifested the dangers of abstracting services and people. 
There were very few references to specific sectors and the diversity of social 
relations in which the government is involved.55 Under the overarching 
category of citizen, the Strategy homogenised patients, carers, students, 
teachers, parents, suspects, criminals, prisoners, passengers and people with 
disabilities. In contrast to ideal market-based relations, the “service” settings 
can be state monopolies, regulatory, compulsory, custodial or involve physical 
force—mostly a far cry from the online retail paradigm envisaged by the 
digital government policies. While using this abstraction makes it easier to 
associate government services with online retail services, it made it difficult for 
people in some of those sectors to “see themselves” in the digital government 
vision.  
The tension between central agencies and line agencies is perennial. Central 
agencies see themselves in a hierarchical relation, while line agencies see the 
zenith of government at the ministerial or cabinet table at which their minister 
has a seat. As we have seen, central government dreams of joined-up services 
collided with these institutions of representative government. Individual 
agencies are aligned closely with their ministers in terms of priorities and 
funding, as well as being constrained by their own level of readiness, 
willingness and ability to incorporate online services into their activities. 
Yet, while the policies described in these last two chapters may not in 
themselves have driven the digitisation of the public sector, this is the 
discourse engaged in by bureaucrats as they digitise their relationship with the 
public. It is this discourse that reflects the worldview of the system builders I 
will discuss in the following chapter. 
Beyond the explicit discourse, an equally important feature of the genre is the 
range of issues it does not discuss. These will be assessed in Part 4 in the light 
of the next two chapters, which describe the experience of constructing the 
technologies intended to deliver the promise of digital government and the 
problems encountered along the way. This experience throws the omissions of 
the digital government discourse into high relief. 
  
 
55 Here it is worth noting what state governments in Australia actually do. As a rule of thumb, 
annual expenditure patterns can be said to reflect the broad distribution of government 
activities. In 2018-19 the broad distribution of the $30 billion expenditure by the WA 
government was: health 31%, education 18%, law and order 12%, transport infrastructure and 
services 10% and other expenditure 29% (Department of Treasury WA 2019). 
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PART 3  BUILDING DIGITAL GOVERNMENT 
CHAPTER 6  MAKING GOVERNMENT DIGITAL 
6.1  Introduction 
In the quarter century that digital government policies have been promising a 
new form of governance, much has been done by governments to put their 
services online, even if not as a direct consequence of those policies. The 
passage of time has given us the opportunity to observe what it would take to 
deliver the promise, as well as the unintended, unannounced and unforeseen 
consequences. Some initiatives are entering the final “transformation” stage 
promoted in the four-stage model of e-government evolution, and we are 
beginning to see what that involves. There are three parts to this: what it takes 
to deliver the dream as originally envisaged in the digital government policies, 
what else is being delivered that is ignored in the digital imaginary, and how 
that vision is being extended as bureaucrats and corporations imagine what 
else is possible as new technologies are promoted and new capability is 
exploited. 
What is apparent is that the transition has not been as easy or as swift as 
implied in the policies. Progress is confronted by recalcitrant established socio-
technological infrastructure, let alone the inherent scale and complexity of 
new infrastructure that might deliver the promised convenience. However, 
overarching those problems, the fundamental overhaul of systems to deliver 
the digital government vision is also the occasion for building-in functionality 
that satisfies the aspirations of bureaucrats, elected officials and public and 
private sector system builders. In the quest for greater certainty for themselves, 
these more influential players have embarked on the construction of an 
integrated assemblage that brings customers into clear view and under control. 
Behind an ambition that goes well beyond providing more convenient services 
is what Robert Castel describes as “a grandiose technocratic rationalizing 
dream of absolute control of the accidental, understood as the irruption of the 
unpredictable” (Castel 1991, 289). 
The focus of this part of the thesis moves to the Australian Government’s 
development of a new social welfare payments system—a program called the 
Welfare Payments Infrastructure Transformation, or WPIT, pronounced whip 
it.56 The organisation concerned is Services Australia, until its rebranding in 
2019 known as the Department of Human Services, and is hereafter referred to 
as the Department.  
 
56 “Whip it” was how it was transcribed in the proof draft of the Hansard for the Community 
Affairs Legislative Committee hearings on 11 February 2016, but it was later “corrected” to 
“WPIT” in the final Hansard, even though none of the participants spelled out the acronym. 
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The new social services payment system is a useful case study because it 
constitutes the largest body of interactions between the Australian Government 
and the Australian public. Also, notwithstanding the Department’s efforts to 
limit information about it, it has been exposed through scrutiny by third 
parties such as parliamentary inquiries, audits and in procurement documents. 
Several aspects of the transformation and previous attempts at reforming the 
welfare payments system have also attracted the attention of academic 
commentators, in particular Paul Henman and his colleagues (Henman 1999, 
2004, 2010a, 2017, 2018; Henman & Adler 2003; Henman & Marston 2008). 
Welfare payments fit what many people regard as a paradigmatic case of 
digital government—a more widely-understood scenario in which people 
apply for, and potentially receive, financial benefits. This is in contrast to the 
public sector functions that do not neatly fit into the online retail view of 
government, such as defence, schools, hospitals, policing and corrective 
services. 
6.2  Case study—a tale of ISIS and WPIT 
The story of the development of a new social payments system clearly 
illustrates how what is being built and how it is described to insiders deviates 
from the way digital government is justified in the digital government policy 
documents. It reveals that the technologies and discourses of the back rooms 
are at least as important as the experience offered to “customers” and 
represents a significant shift in power structures. 
The WPIT program and its documentation reveal some key movements in 
public governance: the intimate merging of apparatus and social 
arrangements—illustrated by a department thoroughly entangled with an old 
system; the intimate merging of public and private sectors into a virtual 
organisation that develops and operates a new system of welfare governance; 
and a two-way causal interaction between policy and “implementation” in the 
transformation of government services to a digital mode, contrasting with the 
one-way sequence portrayed by public administration discourse (Henman 
2010a, 8) and rational action theory (Brunsson 2006, 21–22). 
What are they doing? The consolidation of government services 
The history of the Department reflects an evolving trend of consolidating the 
organisational structures of service delivery for the social and health payment 
services of the Australian Government. The Department was established in 
2004 as a coordinating body for six other agencies57 involved in delivering 
social and health services. The largest of those agencies, Centrelink, was itself 
 
57 These were the Child Support Agency, CRS Australia (rehabilitation services), Centrelink, the 
Health Insurance Commission (later Medicare), Australian Hearing Services, and Health 
Services Australia Limited. 
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a substantial consolidation of service functions, “breaking down the ‘silos’ of 
bureaucratic government and presenting a single front to people who want 
access to national government information and services” (Henman 2010a, 51). 
Centrelink was a product of New Public Management purchaser-provider 
theory, by which Centrelink was set up in 1997 as a service provider, 
responsible to policy agencies which purchased its services (op. cit., 50). 
Constructing that gap between policy and services necessitated “performance 
indicators and targets, which are only realisable through detailed 
computerisation and informatisation of organisational processes” (op. cit., 51). 
At its inception, the Department’s role was to  
improve the delivery of social and health-related services to the Australian people 
… by leading and coordinating improvements to services, encouraging a strong 
customer focus and supporting it through better targeted communication and 
sensible use of new technologies (DHS 2005, 26). 
This transitional arrangement was a kind of mediation between policy and 
service delivery, with the job of working “directly with policy departments and 
our six agencies to improve policy design by focusing on better service 
delivery” (DHS 2005, 13). 
The next stage in this consolidation occurred in 2009 when a different 
government introduced the Service Delivery Reform initiative, which saw the 
consolidation of the individual service agencies into a single organisation, as 
well as the consolidation of shop-fronts, phone services and websites (Bowen 
2009; DHS 2010, 19).  
These reforms, although providing some customer-facing technology 
integrations, largely left the underlying legacy IT infrastructure untouched. 
This infrastructure was inherited from each of the original agencies, and, as 
will be discussed later, was originally developed in the 1980s when there were 
only face-to-face and mail services. On completion of the Service Delivery 
Reform, the overhaul of these systems became the paramount reform priority, 
starting with the Child Support Payments System in 2013 (Deloitte 2019, 4), the 
failed attempt to outsource the Medicare Payments System in 2015–16 (Hendry 
2018a) and the Welfare Payments Infrastructure Transformation in 2015, which 
I will discuss in detail below.  
The most recent stage of the Australian Government’s service consolidation 
was the May 2019 announcement of the creation of a new department called 
Services Australia58 which would primarily comprise the Department of Human 
 
58 The setup of this ‘new’ entity provided yet another opportunity for consultants. The 
Australian Government engaged McKinsey for a six-week project costing $868,000 to advise 
on the transformation. The consultants were to provide “strategic advice” to the taskforce 
established to design Services Australia … The [Australian Financial Review newspaper] 
reported that ‘McKinsey had pitched for the project offering a discounted rate with hopes it 




Services and also the Digital Transformation Agency, the government’s central 
digital government policy organisation, which was previously located in the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. This consolidation signals the 
government’s intention to centralise (online) service delivery but 
institutionalises the alignment of “digital government” with the front-end user 
interface, and further formalises the schism between policy and 
“implementation” or service delivery. 
As the largest Australian Government agency in terms of its staff count (APSC 
2018, 142–45), and as “one of the biggest business operations in Australia” 
(Yeend & Klapdor 2012), the Department’s operating budget has been a target 
for cost reductions over its 15 years’ existence. Throughout these stages of 
consolidation, reduced cost was always a subtle sub-theme beneath the 
surface gloss of customer convenience. There was talk of “value for money” in 
2004 (DHS 2005, 12), “savings for government” in 2009, saving money on 
back-end corporate services in 2012 (Yeend & Klapdor 2012) and “efficiency” 
in 2015 (DHS 2016a). 
The Department claims to serve “almost every Australian” through “Medicare, 
social welfare, aged care, child support and crisis recovery programs” primarily 
by distributing $184 billion in payments (Services Australia 2019)— a figure 
that has since ballooned with the addition of programs to support people 
affected by the coronavirus outbreak of 2020. The following listing of the 
Department’s services highlights the variety of functions that have been 
consolidated so far: 
• Centrelink payments and services for seniors, job seekers, families, carers, 
parents, students, people with disability, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people, people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, people 
living overseas, and people who need support at times of major change, 
including following natural disasters 
• aged care payments to services funded under the Aged Care Act 1997, 
including residential care, home care and flexible care services 
• health payments and services such as Medicare, the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme, digital health information, the Private Health Insurance Rebate, the 
Australian Immunisation Register, the National Bowel Cancer Screening 
Register, the Australian Organ Donor Register, and related services for 
veterans and their spouses and dependants 
• Child Support services for separated parents to provide financial support for 
their children (DHS 2018a, 7) 
In 2019, services for veterans and their families were being added to this list 
(DHS 2018a, 147); and further additions were foreshadowed with the creation 
of Services Australia, but have yet to be announced.59 
The Department delivers its services through four main types of mediation: 
face-to-face services through 346 service centres, with 70,000 service centre 
 
59 This is the situation as at August 2020. 
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visits per day, or around 17 million per year, with an average wait time of 
around 15 minutes; by phone, via call centres handling 48 million calls in 
2017–18, with an average wait time less than 16 minutes, but excludes 
dropped calls and hang-ups; online via the MyGov web portal (which the 
Department also operates on behalf of several other Australian Government 
online services); and mobile apps—including Express Plus, with 2.6 million 
downloads in 2017–18, and 13.3 million total downloads since it was 
introduced (DHS 2018a). 
Face-to-face and phone interactions are estimated to cost a lot more than 
online interactions. Deloitte Access Economics estimated the relative average 
channel costs in 2015 for Australian governments’ transactions as60: 
 





Source: (Deloitte Access Economics 2015, 24) 
Face-to-face and phone interactions are relatively costly because they engage a 
front-line staff member for their duration and present a target for cost-savings 
in the largest Australian Government agency. Employment costs constitute 
almost 60 percent of the Department’s operating budget (ANAO 2020), which 
means that serious operating cost savings can only come through staff 
reductions. While the Department cites a strong public expectation of 
receiving services online, the cost differential between channels clearly 
encourages an equally strong supply-side push for digital. Added to this 
pressure, there are waiting times of at least 15 minutes for both face-to-face 
and phone calls, which routinely attract the attention of Parliament in Senate 
estimates hearings.61  
Having made substantial changes to its organisational structure and 
consolidation of its shop-fronts, call centres and websites, the Department has 
turned its sights on the daunting problem of its aged computing infrastructure 
 
60 One of my interviewees believed this to be the most reliable publicly available estimate and 
that it is the estimate most likely being used by government and industry to make the case for 
going digital (interview with OC, 10 December 2018). 
61 On the basis of discussions I had with senior departmental executives while working in the 
office of the Minister for Human Services in 2012, it seems that over many years, governments 
have applied staffing level restrictions on the Department that have prevented any significant 
reduction in waiting times, at least partly in order to drive people to online service delivery. 
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that underpins all these forms of transaction, arguing that, 
While the department’s current business model and supporting system have 
served the needs of successive Governments and Customers since their inception 
in the early 1980s, Customers now expect easy access to services based on their 
preferences. Current business models need to evolve as they constrain the 
department’s ability to further transform … (DHS 2016a, s. 7). 
Like the digital government policies, the department is happy to accede to 
these alleged wants of the public as the primary driver of digital government. 
However, as we shall see, the infrastructure that delivers this convenience also 
serves other more influential interests. 
Why are they doing it? The problems with the status quo 
When I was an advisor to the Minister for Human Services for a brief period in 
2012, I was struck by the trepidation with which the Department’s senior 
executives talked about the prospect of replacing their ageing IT infrastructure. 
This was a year or two before they finally received funding from the guardians 
of the public purse to replace the Child Support Payments System. I recall 
being told that this system was in such bad shape it would be almost 
impossible to unpack its data, processes and calculation rules into a new 
system with a robust system architecture. On the other hand, the prospect of 
keeping it running was almost as alarming. An independent review had 
advised that the old system “would reach the end of its useful life by the end 
of 2012, requiring an ever increasing cost to maintain and support beyond this 
point” (Deloitte 2019, 8). Having been involved in similar projects, I both 
understood and empathised with their plight, and their fears turned out to be 
well-founded; eight years later, it has still not been possible to unravel the old 
child support system sufficiently to transfer its core calculation function to a 
new system (Deloitte 2019) and by 2020 there was still no end date in sight—
the hope being that emerging WPIT functionality will save the day in due 
course (CALC 2019a, 123). 
While the public justification for change focused on improving customer 
experience, these transitional problems are the kind of issues, along with 
realising efficiencies through automation, that keep government officials 
awake at night. Similar issues face the replacement of the Department’s other 
systems. The prospect of spending billions of dollars in high-risk multi-year 
projects would be daunting for the guardians in government—principally 
cabinet ministers and treasury and finance officials—who must approve 
special funding for such large projects. It is likely their reluctance to fund such 
back-room “overheads” or “fixed costs” (OECD 2001) is what got them to this 
point. So, one can only surmise that the Department had been able to 
persuade those “influencers”62 that a crunch was coming that couldn’t be 
 
62 This is the term applied by the Department in the request for tender documentation to key 
bureaucratic players with some control over the WPIT program (DHS 2016a, s. 18.9). 
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avoided by inaction. A close reading of the tender documents for the WPIT 
program (DHS 2016a, 2018b) reveals that, apart from this internal crisis 
argument, there has been a parallel ever-expanding vision of what a 
transformation could deliver for government. 
ISIS—the agency of a legacy system 
The current Integrated Social Infrastructure System (ISIS) for distributing 
Centrelink benefits is over 30 times larger than the Child Support System, 
which assesses $3.6 billion in debts and redistributes $1.6 billion of those 
between the parents of separated families (DHS 2018a, 88). By contrast, the 
system for paying social security and welfare payments handles $112 billion 
per year, for 32 types of payment (DHS 2018a, 36–37), and runs on an even 
older system. One of the striking omissions from the digital government 
narrative is the problem of linking existing internal computing infrastructure to 
a public transactional interface. Much of the initial digital government narrative 
implied a clean slate in relation to digital technology—even to the point of 
assuming that existing transactions are all, or mostly, non-IT mediated. For 
instance, in 2001 the OECD stressed the need to “move service delivery to the 
World Wide Web” (OECD 2001, 1). 
While the Australian Government’s 2018 digital strategy promises a “digital 
transformation”, a large proportion, if not a majority, of all its transactions with 
people are conducted through the Department, supported by its ISIS 
mainframe, which, at 30-years-old is also reaching the end of its useful life 
(CALC 2014a, 32). Thus, if the government is to meet its overall targets for the 
proportion of its transactions conducted online, WPIT will need to succeed. 
However, the very scale, age and complexity of ISIS makes a transition to a 
new system extraordinarily difficult.63  
The existence of an established, comprehensive payments system is more of a 
burden than a head-start. The need to move away from the old system is as 
much a motivation as the dream of seamless digital relationships with citizen-
customers. When services were consolidated into the Department, they came 
with their systems, all of which began life completely independent of each 
other. When ISIS was developed in the 1980s, the then Department of Social 
Security consisted of isolated state offices and each office and each payment 
type had a different database (DHS 2016a, s. 7.1). ISIS was built when the 
primary way for the public to interact with the Department was face-to-face, 
and records were paper-based (DHS 2016a, s. 10). Call centres only emerged 
from the late 1980s (Henman 2010a, 51). In those days, ISIS required skilled 
staff to operate the system via a command-line, “green screen” interface. In 
 
63 The full extent of the complexity was not revealed even in the request for tender, but was 
made available to registered commercial organisations in a ‘data room’ which contained 
sensitive and detailed information required by bidders to be able to make realistic and well-
informed commercial bids (DHS 2016b). 
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essence, staff engaged with the system, recording their transactions with 
“clients” (as they were called in those pre-New Public Management days), or 
reviewing client data in order to make a decision. Computation was not real-
time but required the running of batches at set times. Originally one batch was 
run each night to update the data changes logged by staff that day. To get this 
system running the way most systems work these days has involved the 
development of hundreds of applications and connectors that link the 
fragmented databases and allow staff to get information close to real time. In 
2014, the Department’s Chief Information Officer testified “ISIS is best 
described as 3,000 functions, 250 work processes and 500 combination screens 
that require 17,000 batch runs every night to maintain the integrity of the 
system” (CALC 2014b, 131). Some of the data is duplicated into more 
contemporary systems, but it means the old and the new have to be 
synchronised.  
Even with its limited ability to gather data from third parties and online 
interactions, ISIS is already a massive repository of personal information. All 
the data collected over the last 30 years has been retained (DHS 2016a, s. 
15.1), “is still available within the system today” (DHS 2016a, s. 15.2) and is 
expected to be migrated to the new system. ISIS “holds approximately 32.2 
million Customer records, and the average Customer record contains 
approximately 32,000 data values” (DHS 2016a, s. 15.6, emphasis added).  
The limitations of ISIS cause a number of serious problems: people need to re-
submit the same information to the Department multiple times; it is really 
difficult to get the system to work online for direct access by the public—
although there are some mobile apps and online services running now (albeit 
connected to ISIS via contemporary add-ons); it provides “limited capacity for 
automation” (DHS 2016a, s. 7.4), an essential requirement for going all-digital; 
getting ISIS to support new policy settings is costly, time consuming, error-
prone and sometimes impossible (DHS 2016a, s. 7.2); it is difficult to integrate 
the system with other data sources inside and outside the Department (DHS 
2016a, s. 7.3); there are limited opportunities for innovation in service delivery, 
such as “more targeted and effective interventions, and sharing Real-Time and 
accurate data with Delivery Partners” (DHS 2016a, s. 7.3); and service delivery 
is inefficient and incurs high operating costs (DHS 2016a, s. 7.4). 
The Department has tried a number of system improvements over the last few 
years that demonstrate how difficult it is to withdraw from old systems. The 
most spectacular was the $64 million Edge project, which aimed to develop an 
expert system for determining eligibility for family allowances. Development 
commenced in 2000 and was abandoned in 2003. The reasons were manifold, 
but included problems of parallel operation of old and new systems, cleanly 
separating-out functionality from one system to another, the complex and 
changing nature of legislation and policy, and the ever-expanding vision for 
what the welfare system could do (ANAO 2005, 24; Henman 2010a, 53–61). 
Many of the organisational, ideological and technological elements that 
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bedevilled the Edge project are still present today, as the Department tackles 
the even more challenging complete replacement for ISIS.  
The Department describes the current situation in the following terms: 
A significant portion of current effort within the department is handling 
interactions via phone, face-to-face or via correspondence. The complex nature of 
many policy stipulations, the range of Customer Circumstances and queries from 
Customers that requires human intervention, and the lack of ICT technology are 
significant drivers for the workload performed by the department staff and 
constrain the adoption of increased straight-through processing. With more than 
56.8 million phone calls in 2014-15 across the whole department, there is a 
significant volume of work required to support and facilitate Payments that are 
“automatically” processed through the system (DHS 2016a, s. 11.1). 
ISIS is a clear exemplar of what Bruno Latour describes as the agency of 
things, by which artefacts can resist or guide people because of their 
materiality or design (1992). ISIS has defied the determined efforts of highly 
rationalised management and project teams over the decades to pull bits off it, 
but instead they have to add to it to get it to work with new interfaces, other 
systems and with customers over the Internet (DHS 2016a, s. 14.4). From a 
historical perspective, we could say that ISIS has been an agent for a multitude 
of policymakers, managers, programmers, but most of them are long-gone and 
nobody fully understands it. In 2016, the then Secretary of the Department 
lamented that “we are already sometimes limiting policy options because of 
the nature of the IT system” (CALC 2016, 168) and that it  
lacks the ability to adapt to change and that has been the case for some years 
now. It means that changes take some time and, often, a change will be made in 
one part of the system which leads to adverse outcomes in another part of the 
system—sometimes that occurs unexpectedly (CALC 2014b, 131).  
ISIS amply demonstrates the ways in which software can entrap organisations, 
illustrating Hodder’s observations about the “sticky entrapment” of the 
entanglement between humans and things (Hodder 2012, 94). In many ways, 
ISIS is therefore its own agent, as it no longer follows the interests of any of its 
long-gone original designers; nor does it strictly follow the desires of its more 
recent aspiring masters (Kallinikos, Hasselbladh & Marton 2013, 402). In 
Latour’s terms, it is useful to see ISIS as an actor-network that includes its 
superseded operating system, programming language and application logic, 
but also the organisation that makes and supports it, the US firm Rocket 
Software, and a largely internal, but dwindling group of specialist operators 
and maintainers, for whom there is no future career on a platform that is no 
longer being developed or sold by the company that produced it (DHS 2016a, 
s. 13.2).64  
 
64 The Department is one of only two organisations in the world still using it, the other being 
the US Department of Defense (CALC 2015, 87). In both cases, the system provides critical 
functionality to an organisation that is completely dependent on it and, so far, unable to move 
away from it. 
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ISIS can be seen as an early exemplar of an attempt to manage risk that has 
created greater risks as the system designers have attempted to incorporate 
more and more complexity into the system (Beck 1992 [1986]; Henman 2010a, 
207). Somehow, the designers of WPIT believe they can create a new system 
incorporating even more complexity that will not sooner or later suffer the 
same fate. 
The shortcomings of the ISIS system as a panopticon are very frustrating for 
the Department. It falls far short of the conceptual ideal described by Foucault 
in Discipline and punish (1977, 200–09). In particular, it is difficult to isolate 
and get a clear view of individuals; there are multiple disconnected 
observation towers; it is impossible to conduct experiments; and it is danger of 
collapse. In short, it is far from delivering the “house of certainty” (Foucault 
1977, 202) that the Department yearns to be. 
What is being built? 
Simply replacing the old system with a new system would seem to be costly 
and risky enough, but the Department wants much more. In tender 
documents, the Department acknowledges the limitations of the existing 
system, including customer inconvenience, but gives at least equal emphasis 
to three other motivating rationales: the inefficiency of manual processes, 
customer non-compliance, and policy inflexibility. Even then, the Department 
doesn’t just want to replace a complicated old system with an efficient, flexible 
and orderly new one, but to substantially expand the scope of programs it 
supports, for multiple levels of government; as well as increasing the extent to 
which it can “‘understand’ Customer preferences or how Customers want to 
engage with the department” (DHS 2016a, s. 10), prevent user “errors” in real 
time, and anticipate customer needs and behaviours (DHS 2016a, s. 20.6). At 
one level, if the Department’s ambitions for transformation are to be taken 
seriously, WPIT is about building a whole new department.65 In its 2018 
annual report, the Department stated: “This is a whole-of-department 
venture—it is about much more than information and communications 
technology (ICT) or payments reform” (DHS 2018a, 4). To its prospective 
business partners, the Department declared: 
To achieve the WPIT Programme Outcomes the department recognises the need 
to truly transform its business and change the way it interacts, collaborates and 
co-designs an end-to-end welfare Ecosystem across a broad stakeholder group. 
This includes whole-of-Government, business and Delivery Partners, digital 
providers and state jurisdictions and non-Government organisations (DHS 2016a, 
s. 17). 
Going digital is the key to this transformation, starting with “a Circumstance-
driven digital service offering and improvements that support Customers and 
departmental staff to transition to digital self-service” (DHS 2016a, s. 3). 
 
65 This imaginary is described further in Chapter 9. 
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As flagged in the quote above, the Department’s vision extends beyond its 
own functions. It is getting into the business of delivering a platform66 for 
other organisations. In its full flowering, WPIT will become a “national 
infrastructure asset that can be leveraged by other agencies for Payments and 
services (DHS 2016a, s. 8.1), including state government agencies and non-
government organisations (DHS 2016a, ss. 18.2 & 22.1).  
This kind of transformative ambition carries high risks. It played a role in the 
failure of the Edge system and, more recently the Child Support System 
replacement. A review of the Child Support System identified an issue of 
expanding requirements that also applies to the larger WPIT program. One of 
the main contributing problems was that 
the business drivers for change have continued to evolve over the last 5 years, 
with greater demands for online services, service delivery efficiencies and an 
increasing drive for Government agility. As a result, there is a need to not simply 
replace Cuba with a like for like solution, but for a broader transformation of 
how services are delivered (Deloitte 2019, 4). 
In promising to meet the public’s needs and expectations, the implication of 
these commitments and predictions was that the interests, as well as the needs, 
of the public would be the greatest priority. Yet for every feature that has 
been put forward to improve customer convenience, there is an accompanying 
equal or greater benefit for government. Unlike digital government policies, 
the Request for Tender provided an opportunity to spell out the benefits of a 
digital government program for government generally67:  
8.1 What it will mean for Government 
a) Faster, less costly implementation of policy; 
b) Better data to support decision making, policy modelling, analysis and 
programme outcomes; 
c) A national infrastructure asset that can be leveraged by other agencies for 
Payments and services; 
d) End-to-end digital services and whole-of-Government connectivity; 
e) Greater opportunity for innovation in the delivery of services; 
f) Early prevention of fraud and non-compliance; and 
g) Transforming the future of social welfare services (DHS 2016a, s. 8.1, original 
emphases). 
Elsewhere in the Request for Tender, government is broken down into several 
players, including “policy partners”, which are also referred to as “clients”—
continuing the New Public Management purchaser-provider language—which 
means that the Department has both customers and clients to serve. The 
documents also identify influencers, the most important of which I have 
 
66 I describe platforms and platform capitalism in more detail in Chapter 8. 
67 The Request for Tender also spelt out the benefits for other participants involved in building 
WPIT. These are detailed in the next chapter. 
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previously referred to as “the guardians”, in the following terms: 
Influencers will inform whole-of-Government agenda and standards. The TBM 
[target business model] enables collaborative partnerships by extending 
participation in policy planning and welfare delivery to include service planners 
and business planners across different levels of Government, business and 
community. Influencers include but are not limited to the Department of Finance, 
Attorney-General’s Department and the DTO68 (DHS 2016a, s. 18.9). 
The following sections discuss the systemic implications of providing all the 
conveniences of digital government, as well as the other less proclaimed 
agendas served by automation, artificial intelligence, data sharing and other 
affordances of digital technology, which allow other interests to thrive 
alongside customer convenience. 
Customer centricity—a double-edged sword 
As described in the previous chapter, customer service has been a vital part of 
the working vocabulary of the New Public Management movement. In the 
public sector, however, the concept is poorly developed, ambiguous and is 
“an idea that attracts little or no opposition from the mass public or political 
elites” (Fountain 2001b, 55–56). Digital government has promised improved 
customer satisfaction whilst reducing the cost of providing services. While 
bureaucrats acknowledge that meeting public expectations of convenience as 
a worthy goal in itself, it is also used as a narrative for cutting costs by 
digitising government services.  
The digital government policies depict the pre-digital status quo as a confusing 
fragmentation of services across agencies and levels of government (OeG 
2004, 32). For instance, the same information, such as change of address, has 
to be provided to “the government” multiple times and people don’t know 
where to look for services or information. The digital government policy 
makers see a way out of this apparent confusion by reorienting system to be 
“customer-centric”. But customer-centricity has two sides. I was once involved 
in a project aimed at resolving such fragmentation with the licensing of 
drivers, vehicles, boats and firearms in Western Australia. Originally it was a 
licence-centric system, in which each type of licence had its own database; 
that is, there were several databases of licences, where a person’s name, age, 
address and other details were characteristics of a licence. For the holders of 
multiple licences, their personal details were recorded separately for each 
licence. This meant that people with multiple licences had to notify the 
relevant department multiple times of a change of address. There was as a 
result a high level of inconsistency across the databases. The solution to this 
problem was to create a client-centric system—a single, unified database of 
people, where multiple licenses and personal data are characteristics of the 
 
68 The Digital Transformation Office (DTO), the predecessor of the Digital Transformation 
Agency, then in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, now part of Services Australia. 
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person. This makes the overall experience for people far more convenient and 
consistent. But it does something else as well—it makes the person far more 
visible to the state. Now if the police or others need to find out about a 
suspect licensee they no longer have to search across three, possibly 
inconsistent, databases; they only need to search one, in which all that 
person’s information is gathered in one convenient entry. 
With this new foundation of possibilities, my colleagues began to fantasise 
about possible extensions of the system. One dream was linking the driver 
and car data to public transport ticketing and travel data, by which one could 
track citizens and, for instance, charge them higher road tolls if they normally 
travelled by train. While this was rather impractical at the time, it illustrates 
how a person-centric model opens up possibilities for linking information 
about a person in order to surveil them and modify their behaviour. There are 
two aspects to this: first, the person-centric model makes it easier to imagine 
schemes of observation and control. In this regard, the licence-centric system 
was a dead-end; a person-centric system organised around a real-world agent 
is infinitely extendable through sharing data across multiple organisations. 
Second, it provides a data matching key for linking to other person-centric 
databases. Once a name has been linked to a date of birth and an address, the 
combination provides a reliable unique identifier—facilitating data matching 
with other systems with the same combination (Culnane, Rubinstein & Teague 
2017). 
The Department’s ISIS system suffers the same fundamental problem, which 
has so far been mitigated by a myriad of add-ons to make the fragmented 
databases work like an integrated one. The following quote from the 
Australian Government 2015 budget papers indicates the inconvenience of the 
current system but also how the government (a.k.a “the taxpayer”) benefits 
from such measures: 
The new welfare payment system will save customers time and effort by offering 
smarter and easier online end-to-end services. It will also reduce the costs of 
administering welfare payments and save taxpayers money in the long run. 
For example, currently it can take parents over an hour to fill out 60 pages of 
paperwork to apply for Family Tax Benefit. If they need to call DHS for 
assistance, they would have to wait on average 16 minutes. Once their claim has 
been submitted, they may have to wait several weeks for the claim to be 
processed. (2015, 14)  
However, at the same time, the regime proposed by the Department in its 
Request for Tender brings each individual under a high resolution gaze, each 
with thousands of data points gleaned over decades (DHS 2016a, s. 15.6), 
including their family, financial and employment relationships, and across 
multiple government programs.69 This exemplifies a disciplinary government of 
 
69 A comprehensive, but not exhaustive, list of personal data collected by the Department can 
be found at https://www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/organisations/about-us/publications-and-
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“each and all” (Foucault 1991, 92), where individuals are rendered visible to 
the state in fine detail and the population can be sliced and diced according to 
life “circumstances” or current and future risk to the state (Castel 1991, 288)—
constituting “a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of a head of 
a family over his household and his goods” (Foucault 1991, 92). 
Convenience 
Knowingly or unknowingly, what the public receives for that level of scrutiny 
is convenience, which I use as an umbrella term for ease-of-use, speed, 
simplicity, accessibility and availability anywhere and anytime. Government 
processes are notorious for their complexity, despite years of effort to improve 
the layout of forms, reduce requested information and duplication, simplify 
procedures and reduce waiting times for face-to-face and telephone services. 
Yet, the digital government policy documents cite high public expectations 
that government services should, and will be, as easy to use as private sector 
services. When the minister responsible for digital transformation cites high 
community and customer expectations (DTA 2018, 4), he is also encouraging 
that public expectation, regardless of how hard it may be to achieve, given the 
difficulties described in this chapter. Subject to complex legislation and rules 
of conduct, the public sector is not able to dictate the terms of its engagement 
with the public in the same way as the private sector (Fountain 2001a, 6; 
2001b, 61). 
Of the six key outcomes for WPIT, only one is directly aimed at customer 
convenience (DHS 2016a, s. 16). Even then, that commitment to reducing the 
“red tape” faced by customers also yields greater departmental efficiency. 
There are repeated claims that releasing staff from routine processing will give 
them more time to deal with complex cases, but never a mention of reducing 
staff levels, which is the only way of significantly reducing the cost of 
delivering the program. 
A single identity 
To provide customer centricity, the Department proposes to establish for each 
customer a single identity across multiple levels of governments and non-
government organisations. A customer-centric future 
… necessitates a change in focus from the current Welfare Payment System and 
technology-driven approach, to a Customer-centric approach in which the 
department provides services as part of a broader Ecosystem of Government and 
non-Government organisations, including federal and state agencies, financial 
institutions, educational institutions, child care centres, aged care centres, 
employers and Jobactive providers (DHS 2016a, s. 15.8). 





“single view of customer profiles and history” (DHS 2016a, s. 18.2), and 
“captures Customer’s complexity and level of financial risk” (DHS 2016a, s. 
20.1). 
A “connected Customer experience across all of Government” (DHS 2016a, s. 
20.7) requires not just connecting systems, but also constructing standard 
language, categories and characteristics for individuals across sectors, 
jurisdictions and domains (DHS 2016a, s. 15.6). But first there must be a 
standard identifier by means of which a customer’s data can be linked. While 
this could be achieved through multiple bi-lateral links between the 
Department and each of its partners, a single identifier would serve 
relationships not necessarily involving the Department. That is, if WPIT is to 
be a truly common platform, it must support relationships between citizen-
customers and third parties, such as other government departments and 
commercial or not-for-profit service providers. 
This mechanism will satisfy a strong long-standing appetite within the 
bureaucracy for a single unique identifier for each recipient of government 
services, if not every citizen. The single view of a customer resurrects a 
capability attempted twice by Australian Government bureaucrats in the last 30 
years: the Australia Card and the Access Card schemes. In 1985, bureaucrats 
planned a “a compulsory, comprehensive, multi-purpose identification 
scheme” under the innocuous label of the “Australia Card”. Although 
supported by the Labor Government of the time, the Bill was twice rejected by 
Parliament (Clarke 1988, 7–8). In 2006, this time under a Liberal government, 
welfare and health bureaucrats championed the introduction of a single 
Human Services Access Card (Henman 2010a, 52) for recipients of government 
services. The project was cancelled by the incoming Labor government in 
2007, after a widespread “public debate over concerns about privacy, fears 
about the identity card creating a surveillance state, cost overruns and poor 
administrative processes” (loc. cit.). Since then, these high-profile rejections by 
the public and parliament have made bureaucrats and politicians wary of 
trying a national ID scheme again. But developments in networking, data 
management, legislation and other “technologies of government” have all but 
eliminated the need for a single unique identifier in order to match personal 
data to identify individuals across departments and governments. The 
proposed WPIT program effectively replaces the need for an identity card. 
Comprehensive identity verification schemes currently under development 
based on facial recognition (discussed in Chapter 9) link identities across 
federal and state jurisdictions even more than envisaged under the Australia 
Card. 
Thus, the cost to the public of highly secure systems can be the loss of control 
over personal information by the provision of key identifying data that can be 
used to link their data in various systems, both government and non-
government. Later, we will see the extent to which this linking is being used 
and how government plans to extend it, all in the name of speed and 
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convenience. We will also see how this can occur without the knowledge or 
explicit consent of individuals. 
Governments talk about trust being built into their systems (DTA 2018), and 
the Department wants to ensure “that Customers trust their information is 
secure” (DHS 2016a, s. 20.5). But such assurances are usually made in the 
context of protecting personal data from external threats, rather than what 
bureaucrats might do lawfully with their data. The Australian Government’s 
“Robo-debt” and My Health Record projects both resulted in a loss of public 
trust in government because bureaucrats put more stock in accessing and 
using data for compliance testing than in fostering trust, not just in the system 
but the bureaucrats themselves.70 This distrust became manifest and 
problematic for the Australian Government in 2020 when it encountered 
resistance when it attempted to obtain wide adoption of its COVIDSafe mobile 
app for tracking viral infections (Greenleaf & Kemp 2020). Despite attempts by 
enforcement agencies, the government was forced by public distrust to 
exclude from the legislation all the usual exemptions that would have given 
bureaucrats access to the system’s personal information (Karp 2020).  
Compliance and enforcement 
Questions of eligibility, compliance and enforcement were almost absent from 
the digital government policy discourse. When services constitute some kind 
of benefit that is conditional upon meeting certain criteria, these issues come 
into play. The processes around establishing eligibility and determining and 
enforcing compliance add a dimension that does not fit within the online retail 
model of government. 
In the case of an organisation such as the Department, which distributes a 
large number of benefits according to complex rules, these processes can be 
complicated and vexing to all involved. The Request for Tender put a great 
deal of emphasis on the development of this aspect of delivering welfare 
services. It declared boldly that “Payment integrity is core to the department’s 
strategic priorities” (DHS 2016a, s. 16.6, emphasis added). Indeed, this integrity 
appears to be central to many of the other elements such as data sharing, the 
“entitlement calculation engine” at the heart of the new system, cost savings 
and policy simplification. The department justifies the need for tighter 
compliance as “system integrity” which appears in the documentation as a 
driving force, at times overtly trumping customer convenience when they are 
brought into conflict. In one of its early attempts at tightening compliance 
using an all-digital end-to-end process and third party data, the Robo-debt 
initiative, the Department defended the revenue-raising ability of the program 
despite the unnecessary distress it was causing many people (FPARC 2018b, 
38).71 
 
70 The Robo-debt initiative is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
71 Officially, this initiative was called the Online Compliance Intervention. The way this 
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Much of WPIT’s new functionality involves building a detailed profile of both 
individuals and their circumstances from a variety of third party sources in 
order to anticipate risky behaviour by targeted groups, to pre-fill online forms 
with more reliable and convenient data and to prevent form-filling errors in 
real time (DHS 2016a, s. 7.1). 
The department has been developing the capability to intervene earlier in the 
cycle of non-compliance, including the ability to ‘risk rate’ transactions as they 
occur. New light touch interventions that prompt early self-correction are 
increasingly being influenced and informed by the department’s research into 
Customer behaviour (DHS 2016a, s. 16.6). 
This development gives some insight into the Department’s aspiration to 
monitor, predict and steer behaviour in real time, based on the risk profiles of 
specific cohorts and individuals. It clearly demonstrates the rationalist appetite 
for more information in the quest for perfect decisions and the elimination of 
uncertainty. Under the heading Greater technical integrity and compliance, the 
Department describes how the new system will extend its surveillance and 
control of its customers: 
[The system will] reduce manual Customer and department staff effort to provide 
greater integrity in Eligibility and Entitlement processes. The WPIT Programme 
will significantly reduce the volume of data provided directly by Customers, 
enabling real-time connections with Third Parties to populate Customer Profiles. 
Multi-sourced validation of the data held on Customers’ Profiles limits scope for 
Customer fraud or error. Live data feeds will also enable the Department to 
rapidly respond to Customer life events or changes in circumstance that impact 
their eligibility or entitlement. The WPIT Programme will also deliver the 
capability to automate the processing of the majority of claims. A real-time 
integrity monitoring capability will be used to detect high-risk Customers or 
irregular claims, and stream the Customer to a staff assisted channel as 
appropriate (DHS 2016a, s. 16.6 e, emphasis added). 
A key concept in the Department’s new approach is what they call a 
“Circumstance based approach to managing Customers” (DHS 2016a, s. 18.1, 
emphasis added), which, as indicated above, relies on obtaining third party 
data to cross-check it with customer data in real time. In contrast to relatively 
static characteristics, such as name and birth date, circumstances refer to 
changes in customers’ characteristics, relationships, status or situations over 
time. The Department is keen to know when these changes occur as they 
happen, and this means tracking events through the systems of other 
organisations. The Department suggests benefits for customers, such as 
simpler form-filling, detecting overpayments early to reduce the need for 
frequent updates by customers, as well as subsequent stress of debt recovery 
through reduced benefits. But, as with all these customer benefits, there are 
accompanying government benefits, in this case the reduced costs of manual 
handling and debt recovery. The Request for Tender documents reveal the 
 
program was deployed reflected many of the aims of the WPIT set out in the Request for 
Tender documents and will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
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Department’s faith in “better data and analytics” that will allow digital channels 
to deliver greater compliance than manual assessments of eligibility (DHS 
2016a, s. 16.1). But a by-product of this is a refinement of customer 
centricity—knowledge of a person at any point in time, and over time—
because all the data are retained.72 
The Department’s interest is not confined to the past and the present. 
Predicting behaviour and circumstances goes further to anticipate the need of 
customers, but also to reduce uncertainty for the Department. Two of the main 
corporate partners in the WPIT program, SAP and Accenture, are heavily 
promoting the increased use of artificial intelligence and the “big data” 
available to the Department to predict customer needs and behaviour (Binder, 
Pellegrini & Gujral 2017). An Accenture executive explains,  
Performing multi-factor segmentation in real-time can provide the deep insight to 
assist in predicting behavioural responses as circumstances change which in turns 
informs the selection of the service response or policy intervention (Lee-Archer 
2017). 
With recent developments in big data, artificial intelligence and machine 
learning, advocates of digital government are beginning to promote the idea of 
“anticipatory governance”. The UN 2016 survey of e-government claimed that 
New technologies like Big Data and the Internet of Things, combined with 
advanced use of geospatial information systems and predictive analytics … are 
powerful tools for anticipatory governance, which is a way to deal with complex 
changes by providing tools to anticipate various possible future scenarios. 
Predictive analytics “is the practice of extracting information from existing data 
sets in order to determine patterns and predict future outcomes and trends …” 
(UN 2016, 34). 
In a promotional pitch to government, Accenture goes further, claiming the 
needs and preferences of customers can be anticipated and addressed, thereby 
leading to an era of empowerment for customers using customer 
(circumstance) analytics (Binder, Pellegrini & Gujral 2017, 8). An Accenture 
executive goes on to explain: 
AI opens a whole new set of possibilities and opportunities for the delivery of 
human services. With AI, agencies can co-create with ecosystem partners to 
explore larger and more valuable applications, draw on wider data-sets and 
increase inter-agency collaboration and uncover new insights. With increased 
collaboration and deeper insight service delivery can be improved and greater 
outcomes for people realised (Binder, Pellegrini & Gujral 2017, 9). 
In Chapter 9, I describe some government initiatives that indicate how 
bureaucrats are just as willing to use such capacities to predict high risk 
behaviours and to identify potential high-risk customers. The Department has 
suggested that this capability enables it to offer services to customers as new 
circumstances permit, but this is effectively a licence to monitor customers 
who are not even currently receiving benefits. In association with a 
 
72 I discuss the circumstance-based approach further in Chapter 9. 
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circumstance-based approach, the Department has cited improved targeting 
and profiling techniques as major tools for identifying potential high risk 
individuals and groups, arguing that, “detailed risk profiling and customer 
segmentation, tailoring service offers to achieve better outcomes for both 
government and customers … [and] to lower the risk for fraud and compliance 
control” (DHS 2016a, s. 16.5). Robert Castel observes that such preventive 
techniques “promote a new mode of surveillance: that of systematic 
predetection” (Castel 1991, 288), that can “dissolve the notion of a subject or a 
concrete individual, and put in its place a combinatory of factors, the factors 
of risk” (op. cit., 281, original emphasis). The consequence of this is that, 
‘Prevention’ in effect promotes suspicion to the dignified scientific rank of a 
calculus of probabilities. To be suspected, it is no longer necessary to manifest 
symptoms of dangerousness or abnormality, it is enough to display whatever 
characteristics the specialists responsible for the definition of preventive policy 
have constituted as risk factors (Castel 1991, 288).  
Notwithstanding the limitations of ISIS, the Department has been engaged in 
targeting some classes of welfare recipients for decades. Paul Henman has 
pointed out the dynamic interconnection between a targeted approach to 
services and the affordances provided by information technology. It enables 
targeting through increasing the surveillance of customer behaviour, while for 
policy makers and system designers it makes “such thought and actions 
thinkable and achievable” (Henman 2004, 187). 
A particular point of convergence between a policy trend and technology here 
is the availability of tools developed for targeted marketing in the private 
sector that can be applied to identifying and managing ever more tightly 
defined welfare beneficiaries. As Henman explains: 
One significant emerging development in welfare administration is the shift from 
universal service delivery to a more targeted approach, thereby reflecting 
developments in the private sector, such as customer relationship management 
and customer segmentation through the use of data-mining technologies … While 
many welfare services have previously been distributed on a universal basis, the 
development of data-mining and data-profiling technologies are expected to 
greatly increase the use of such differentiated and targeted forms of public policy 
and service delivery (Henman 2010a, 69–70).  
For the Department, this capability is largely derived from SAP’s customer 
relationship management (CRM) systems originally developed for private 
corporations to maximise and target selling opportunities to customers. The 
Department is already using an advanced SAP customer relationship 
management (CRM) system to manage certain aspects of its customer data. 
This system will handle circumstance data management capabilities (SAP SE 
2020) and is entirely capable of supporting some of the most sophisticated 
customer behaviour analytics on the market today. SAP advertises the ability of 
its software to 
Transform all types of structured and unstructured attributes into rich, unified 
customer profiles and streamline your business by governing and orchestrating all 
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customer data from a single location. 
Gain deeper customer insights 
Understand your audience and drive pinpoint-accurate segmentation at scale with 
integration into leading analytics providers to deliver meaningful customer 
engagements and optimise your marketing and ad spend (SAP SE 2019). 
With WPIT, the Department will be able to apply this computing power to the 
30 years of customer history at its disposal. But in the process of exploiting 
large amounts of personal data, statutory privacy protections will not be an 
impediment. While the Department states that it will, “in line with the Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth) and Government policy, use advanced and real-time analytics 
to support risk-based processing and monitoring, with Real-time detection and 
interventions to improve assurance over outlay integrity” (DHS 2016a, s. 16.6), 
the reference to the Privacy Act is little more than a fig leaf. This is because 
the fraud prevention function of the Department’s data collection provides a 
wide loophole whereby it can demand, collect and integrate data from third 
parties. The Social Security (Administration) Act gives the Department73 explicit 
powers to collect information from individuals and organisations. The Privacy 
Act is subservient to other legislation, such as this, which permits the 
collection and use of personal information (Privacy Act 1998, s. 3). 
Furthermore, the Privacy Act also generally permits an entity such as the 
Department to use personal information or identifiers if:  
(a) the entity has reason to suspect that unlawful activity, or misconduct of a 
serious nature, that relates to the entity’s functions or activities has been, is being 
or may be engaged in; and 
(b) the entity reasonably believes that the collection, use or disclosure is necessary 
in order for the entity to take appropriate action in relation to the matter (Privacy 
Act 1998, s. 16A, emphasis added). 
The Multi-Agency Data Integration Project operated by the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS), to be discussed below, is a graphic example of how a 
massive data integration project can take place within the bounds of privacy 
legislation. In this case a considerable proportion of “customer” data held by 
the Department was provided to ABS to link with other government data sets 
for longitudinal research, but without a prior privacy impact assessment or 
notice to individuals (Galexia, Connolly & Van Dijk 2018). 
Automation  
The discussion of improved compliance points to another of the ideals for 
digital government—full automation of all stages of the process from 
application to payment of benefits. The promise to the public offered by 
automation is instantaneous responsiveness, simplicity of transactions and ease 
of form-filling. Full automation is what is referred to by the term end-to-end in 
 
73 In the Act, these powers are assigned to the Secretary of the Department of Social Services, 
who delegates them to the Department. 
 
120 
relation to the digital delivery of service. It is an essential requirement placed 
upon the system integrators to develop for WPIT (DHS 2018b, 55), although 
there are no guarantees that it is possible to do so, due to the complexity of 
welfare legislation.  
Another direct and declared implication of such a capacity is that digital 
service becomes self-service, all in the name of empowering customers. “A key 
aim of the department is to deliver digital services that support individuals, 
families and communities to be self-sufficient and manage their own affairs” 
(DHS 2018a, 166). If the WPIT program is successful, “Customers will self-
manage their end-to-end service experience using digital channels. Customers 
who require staff interaction will be primarily appointment based (DHS 2016a, 
s. 20.6, emphasis added), presumably all but eliminating walk-in service. With 
the Department, thus appearing to withdraw from the relationship, the notion 
of self-service will significantly advance the neo-liberal agenda of the 
responsibility of the individual in a marketised society (Foucault & Senellart 
2008, 225–26). 
Until now, the old ISIS system has not been amenable to automation (DHS 
2016a, s. 10), which has reduced the Department’s capacity to monitor, 
analyse and predict the actions of the system and its internal and external 
users. The Department explains that “the current system was originally built to 
facilitate transactions being processed by departmental staff, which is not 
aligned to the current business model of delivering end-to-end services for 
Customers” (DHS 2016a, s. 13.3).  
As Zuboff has pointed out, apart from performing a task, automation can 
generate a “text”, which can be used to observe the process and those 
involved (Zuboff 1988, 9), whether staff or public. In its privacy policy, the 
Department states that: 
We may also collect information about how you use our online services and 
applications, such as: 
• pages you visit 
• online forms you fill in 
• your interactions 
• your chats with our virtual assistants 
• your language preferences 
• searches you make (DHS 2019a). 
The big question is who gets to read and act on that text. The Department is 
planning to exploit the capacity of the new system to gain “insights” into its 
programs and their beneficiaries. As Zuboff points out: “An emphasis on the 
informating capacity of intelligent technology can provide a point of origin for 
new conceptions of work and power” (Zuboff 1988, 11). When customers 
engage directly with the system, they will leave a trace that can be added to 
the customer’s record, while enabling real-time error correction and also for 
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monitoring the system to assess and refine its performance.  
The Department argues that automation is craved by customers and is also a 
great benefit for them. For instance: “Today Customers, businesses, and other 
Government agencies both demand and perform more self-service 
transactions, with a significant number of transactions being processed via 
mobile, web and telephony interfaces” (DHS 2016a, s. 13.3). But, as ever, the 
advantages of automation could be even greater for the Department’s bottom 
line. While 80 percent of Centrelink applications are currently submitted 
online, almost 100 percent require some manual intervention (CALC 2016, 
197). As the Department explains: 
Current business processes rely heavily on manual work arising from checking 
eligibility for payments, managing ongoing payments or managing customer 
compliance. A significant amount of staff effort is spent preparing and checking 
paper and digital forms prior to claims being assessed. Similarly, significant staff 
effort is involved in the ongoing management of a customer including customer 
compliance activities (DHS 2016a, s. 16.2). 
The Department argues that its current multi-channel approach is one of the 
factors leading to higher costs than a “digital by default” approach:  
A ‘no wrong door’ policy allows Customers to choose the access channel of their 
choice regardless of the cost and the time it takes staff to process individual 
requests. 
With Customers continuing to use channels outside of the digital offering, and 
limited end-to-end digital offerings, there is still, in some instances, the 
requirement to complete lengthy forms and submit copies of many documents, 
sometimes multiple times, to get things done (DHS 2016a, s. 16.2). 
The Robo-debt project discussed below illustrates the extent to which the 
Department wants to delegate decision making to automated process based on 
the translation of legislation, regulation, guidelines and policy in to machine-
readable rules. In s. 6A of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999, the 
Government has already authorised this in legislation that allows the Secretary 
of the Department of Social Services to delegate decision making responsibility 
to a computer system and for decisions thus made to be regarded as decisions 
of the Secretary.74 As I will show below, with further automation and data 
sharing, the form this will take will be a highly-integrated web of surveillance 
in which customers are rendered as high-resolution avatars, over which they 
will have little control. 
Seamless government through data integration 
The Department foresees a day when “Service delivery is supported by Real-
Time data exchange with third parties such as state Government, educational 
 
74 Most of the legislated powers given to the Secretary of the Department of Social Security 




institutions, financial institutions, child care centres, aged care centres and job 
service providers” (DHS 2016a, s. 20.6). Both in Senate estimates hearings and 
in its Request for Tender documentation, the Department touts the reduction 
in “red tape” for customers by using data from third parties to “pre-populate” 
fields in online forms. This means that customers do not need to find the 
information or enter it, removing the risk of error (at least on the part of 
customers). The Department’s Executive Director, Welfare Payment 
Infrastructure Transformation Program testified: 
You will have customers in your offices telling you how much running around 
they have to do to collect information to give multiple times to fulfil other 
requirements of applying for one of our payments. In many circumstances they 
will be able to do that online. We will be able to help them by providing things 
like real-time, live links to agencies like the ATO [the Australian Tax Office]. So 
you will be able to have, in real time, your income information transmitted from 
the ATO to us. That cuts out millions and millions of people having to every 
week tell us what their income is every fortnight, every month or whenever they 
are paid. So there is a large lowering of compliance for the customer (CALC 2015, 
59–60). 
This capability goes some way to fulfilling New Public Management 
aspirations for “joined-up government.” But, like customer-centrism, it opens 
up opportunities for bureaucrats to extend their gaze, as much as it makes life 
easier for customers. The Department already collects, stores and analyses data 
from an impressive range and number of sources.75 A lot of this data concerns 
income and assets, and the Department uses its data-gathering powers to elicit 
data from organisations such as eBay and state lands departments to detect 
extra income from the sale or acquisition of property. One of my interviewees 
told me that the Department would apply considerable pressure to senior 
officials of state jurisdictions to supply personal data from their systems.76 
The aspiration to have real-time validation of information and error correction 
as customers are filling in forms will, the Department claims, make form-filling 
an easier, less stressful process for the public. But it will also make it difficult 
for people to contradict, explain or nuance third-party data about them. It also 
means that the Department, with its greater capacity for storing and analysis, 
will have many more frequent data points than those available through current 
processes, in which third-party data may only be updated through periodic 
batches. The Department also wants this “multi-sourced” real-time data, 
presumably in the aggregate, to be visible to their “policy partners”, primarily 
in the Department of Social Services, so that policy makers can have “an 
intuitive, accessible real-time data portal” (DHS 2016a, s. 16.6), in order to 
monitor trends more closely. This heightened policy oversight is just one of a 
number of ways in which the Department is seeking to remove the restrictions 
 
75 A comprehensive list of the type of personal information collected from customers and third 
parties can be found at https://www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/organisations/about-
us/publications-and-resources/privacy-policy#a1 
76 Interview with HV on 16 Jul 2018. 
 
123 
that the current system places on policy making. 
Policy flexibility 
Policy “flexibility” is one of the major themes for reform of the welfare 
payments system. The Department does not provide specific examples of how 
the old ISIS system has blocked or slowed new policies, as the immediate 
policy relationship between the bureaucracy and government is veiled behind 
cabinet confidentiality. But the Request for Tender documents provide some 
insights into the problems that the existing system provides for a government 
wishing to exert greater control over a government program and its 
beneficiaries. The Department summarises the existing constraints on 
implementing new policy: 
Today, it can be costly to implement new policies or make simple changes to 
existing welfare policies. Business processes and rules are hard-coded into 
current systems that have been added incrementally over time, creating silos, 
additional workloads for staff, unnecessary duplication and inconsistencies. The 
design of new policy and Payments is highly customised and fragmented … (DHS 
2016a, s. 16.1). 
This brings us to the riskiest element of the transition and the most telling 
critique of the limitations of a view of government that exalts policy as the 
sole well-spring of agency. The current ISIS mainframe handles the following 
complexities arising from the legislation, policies and procedures that apply to 
welfare payments: first, 30 years of policy changes are hard-coded into the old 
system—data, calculation processes and business rules are all mixed together 
in the computer code (DHS 2018b, Sch. 3, s. 8.2); second, there is “an average 
of 5,000 business rules per Customer cohort type (e.g. Students, Jobseekers) of 
which entitlement calculation rules are a subset” (DHS 2018b, Sch. 3, s. 2.10); 
third, “Entitlement Calculation rules are derived from legislation. The old ISIS 
system currently translates approximately 3,000 pages of legislation” (DHS 
2018b, Sch. 3, s. 2.12); fourth, “layering of rules from legislation, policy and 
operations means that individual Eligibility criteria can be supported by 
upwards of 100 business rules.” (DHS 2016a, s. 12.11); and fifth, 
grandfathering, where “existing Customers may continue to have old rules 
applied to their cases while new Customers will have different rules applied to 
their cases” (DHS 2018b, Sch. 3, s. 2.3).  
Grandfathering is a consequence of governments introducing new policies that 
don’t disadvantage existing beneficiaries. This provides a clue to the political 
bargaining that results in such rules, and there is no reason to think that this 
will change in the future. Nevertheless, the Department is expecting that in the 
future the political process will generate simple rules that precisely target 
social groups and circumstances, yet are free of the ambiguities that enable 
compromises to get through political and parliamentary decision making 
processes. 
The most far-reaching consequence of these limitations was identified by the 
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Reference Group on Welfare Reform, which, in its comprehensive review of 
welfare policy in 2015, made it clear that: “The fundamental reform of the 
income support system proposed by the Reference Group will not be able to 
be implemented without a replacement IT system” (2015, 105-06, emphasis 
added). Thus, the ethereal world of policy is inextricably linked to the 
materiality of apparatus. Even the radically simplified policy proposed by the 
Reference Group would require a more flexible system than the old ISIS 
mainframe. The reluctance to reform policy and systems in parallel may be 
well-merited. The UK is attempting a simultaneous policy simplification and 
system replacement through its Universal Credit program, which, as of 2018, 
was running seven years over time and had spent £1.9 billion, with six years 
remaining (National Audit Office 2018). 
In its quest for “More agile, responsive and transparent policy implementation” 
(DHS 2016a, s. 16.1), the Department has proposed to make policy more 
amenable to automation through 
a standardised template based approach to implementing policy, supported by 
changes in the way the Department collaborates and interacts with policy 
agencies. The Department will work with policy agencies to inform how specific 
requirements could be implemented in line with standard templates and patterns, 
providing policy agencies and Government with options and projected costs for 
addressing the necessary requirements. (DHS 2016a, s. 16.1) 
But, for the seven-year development period, simpler policies will not be 
available to those building the entitlements calculation engine or the overall 
WPIT system. The show-stopping complexities that prevented the replacement 
of old systems in the Edge and Child Support system projects are still there. 
For now, the Department’s proposed “template” approach to policy making is 
a long-term option for the future, as it will not address the existing policy 
complexity that must be embodied in the new system before its completion in 
2022. The Department acknowledges that “Determining Eligibility and 
calculating Entitlements is one of the most complex and high-risk aspects of 
the department’s delivery of health and welfare payments to Customers.” (DHS 
2018b, s. 2.3). As we saw earlier, replacing the Child Support Payments 
System, where Accenture, one of the system integrators for WPIT, was the 
systems integrator, and which began a year before the WPIT program, is still 
not complete and there is no clear indication when that might happen.  
The direction of welfare policy in recent decades suggests the type of policy 
approaches the system needs to be flexible about: 
The major theme of welfare reform in the two decades since the mid-1980s has 
been a reconfiguration of the welfare system from a so-called ‘passive’ system – 
whereby recipients received benefits as a right with limited strings attached, to an 
‘active’ system – whereby recipients’ receipt of benefits is conditional on 
undertaking various activities. (Henman 2010a, 48–49). 
The Department recognises that the resultant targeting of social groups and 
circumstances necessarily leads to complexity, referring to “an inherent 
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necessary complexity required to support Australia’s highly targeted welfare 
system” (DHS 2016a, s. 12.11). The targeting, circumstance management and 
mutual obligation discussed above largely drive the Department’s need for 
flexibility. And it is clear throughout the tender documentation that the 
Department is generally looking to have a level of control over its system that 
it doesn’t have at the moment. 
Henman and Dean argue that there is a mutually reinforcing dynamic between 
neo-liberal-inspired targeting and computerisation—each one encourages the 
other (Henman & Dean 2010, 86–88). At the core of this dynamic is the 
adoption of customer relationship management concepts and software, along 
with its promotion by corporations eager to sell it to government as the key to 
targeting and profiling high-risk groups, all under the guise of personalisation 
(Taylor & Lips 2008, 149). The complicating consequences of this must be 
ameliorated by standardisation (Henman & Dean 2010, 86–88) to reduce the 
number of classes of people, circumstances, processes and, ultimately, to 
simplify policy and the mode of governance. There is a fundamental multi-
way interdependency between policy and “service delivery” and the systems 
on which they depend. Policy needs a new system and the system needs new 
policy. Comprehensive policy reform is impossible without a new system, but 
the systems may be impossible to implement without radically rationalised 
policy.  
Among the enthusiasts for digitally mediated government, there is a growing 
advocacy, called regtech, for the reformulation of policies to make them 
machine readable. Perhaps the most extreme expression of the desire to adapt 
policy to systems was made not by an IT practitioner but by the Australian 
Prime Minister when talking to a congregation of senior bureaucrats about the 
need for a stronger focus on customer service:  
… we will see, I hope, within the next decade—if not sooner— legislation 
written in code … I mean in computer code. Because when it is written in code 
then that makes for its very rapid implementation and application to the various 
practices it is seeking to regulate … (Morrison 2019b). 
In effect, the Prime Minister was calling for policies that could be interpreted 
by computers in fully automated, end-to-end transactions.77 In the following 
chapter I will illustrate what the proposed discussions with policy agencies 
could look like in the hands of system builders intent on adapting government 
to a system. 
6.3  Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated how system builders have prioritised their own 
requirements while outwardly promoting customer convenience. The tendency 
to prioritise the needs of managers, internal IT people, IT suppliers and 
 
77 I discuss the implications of regtech in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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consultants has been documented and theorised in critical IT studies and other 
disciplines since the 1970s. The power structures of system development have 
been observed by authors mainly writing about these phenomena within 
organisations. In 1979, Kraemer and Dutton observed that “computer-based 
systems tend to follow and reinforce the existing pattern of power 
relationships” (Kraemer & Dutton 1979, 101). Zuboff documented the 
organisational dynamics by which “Building the smart machine preserves the 
boundaries between those who command and those who obey” (Zuboff 1988, 
245). Similar observations have been made about the public sector, reflecting 
both the New Public Management movement’s adoption of private sector 
modes of discourse and practice, but also the underlying institutionalising 
tendencies of “managerial rationalism”, whereby  
interventions of the steering actor will become more rationalized and thus more 
effective if the steering actor has not only more but also more systematized 
information at its disposal. The gathering of information and the use of ICTs have 
been influenced by a bias of rationalism (Bekkers 1998, 355).  
Kraemer and King argue that within public organisations, information 
technology has not been an instrument for “a more responsive administrative 
structure, greater rationality and efficiency, or better service delivery to 
citizens”, but “rather, it has been used to reinforce existing administrative and 
political arrangements” (Kraemer & King 2006, 1). Extending the functionality 
of corporate systems out to the self-servicing citizen-customers is adding a 
broader and even less powerful user base to be subject to the power plays of 
system builders and major stakeholders. When considering organisations 
whose systems are used by multitudes of unskilled people outside the 
organisation, the power imbalance becomes even more palpable. Henman and 
Adler argue that instead of improving the lot of the public, “the use of 
computers by welfare delivery organizations has tended to reinforce the 
knowledge barriers between the organization and the claimant” (Henman & 
Adler 2003, 148–49). In a comparative study of the aims of digital government 
initiatives in several jurisdictions, they observed that “using computers to 
control staff was regarded as the domain to which computerization was most 
often directed … This was closely followed by ‘controlling claimants’ … The 
use of computers to empower staff or claimants was given less priority overall” 
(Henman & Adler 2003, 151, emphasis added). 
However, power shifts and consolidations are not just occurring between 
governments, senior bureaucrats, their staff and the public. So far, this analysis 
has focussed on what the Department is building, with the underlying 
impression that it involves a bilateral relation between the Department and the 
customer. However, the “system builder” in this case is a composite of several 
organisations in a relationship that is largely ignored in the digital government 
policy discourse. We now turn to the who—the network of organisations 
required to build such systems, their roles and relationships and the 
governance structure they are becoming.  
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CHAPTER 7  ENTANGLEMENT WITH 
TECHNOLOGY/INDUSTRY 
7.1  Introduction 
The Department has relied on computer systems since the 1960s (Henman & 
Adler 2003, 147). In that time, computing has emerged from deep within the 
back rooms of the Department, out into the Internet and now into the hands 
of “customers” in the form of mobile apps. In that time the Department’s 
dependence on computer systems has deepened. The batch processes of the 
1960s could conceivably have been replaced by the paper processes that 
preceded them. But such a substitution today is inconceivable; indeed, the 
Department is now inconceivable without its computer systems. Moreover, the 
growing complexity of social welfare policy in the intervening years would not 
be possible without more complex computing capability (Henman & Adler 
2003, 148). Accompanying that functional expansion has been a major change 
in how these systems are developed and who is involved. Since the 1960s 
there has been a transition from in-house to externally developed systems 
(Dunleavy et al. 2006, 1). By the second decade of the 21st century, the scale 
and complexity of system development has been accompanied by a similar 
expansion in the roles and scale of corporate involvement. For the $1.5 billion 
WPIT program, the design, development and implementation of the system 
and the “transformed” Department itself is inconceivable without the deep 
engagement of private corporations. WPIT represents an attempt by the 
Department to disentangle itself completely from ISIS and the causes of its 
complexity in one giant step. It is doing this with a strategy that combines 
commercial off-the-shelf software, systems integrators and agile methodologies, 
which are designed to tackle the growing complexities of computation, 
organisations and large-scale transitions respectively. 
This chapter starts with a case study of systems integration based on 
interviews with two people who have been involved in systems integration 
processes from several angles. Their experience demonstrates the extent to 
which the type of technology being used by the Department involves a mutual 
accommodation of software and organisation and the deep intervention of 
external parties. Here we can see the personal dynamics of client organisations 
and systems integrators that result in organisational accommodation to 
commercial software and the firms that design and implement them within 
client organisations. I also draw on my own experience with systems 
integrators and my involvement with the interviewees at the time of the the 
case study. 
In the section after that, I return to the Department’s procurement documents 
to understand the type of relationship the Department is seeking to have with 
systems integrators and software vendors. This is in stark contrast to the usual 
depiction of public/private relationships, procurement processes and service 
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contracts. I also discuss the attempts by the Department to hide its relationship 
with system integrators, its current problems with ISIS, its intended future 
modus operandi and the transition from ISIS to WPIT. 
Before going further, it is important to clarify the main groups of commercial 
players involved in the implementation of digital government. First, within the 
Department, permanent staff and career public servants are augmented by 
contract staff provided by recruitment firms (which we called “body shops”) 
that provide technical specialists. In many cases, such specialists are difficult to 
engage as employees because of the salary limitations of government or 
because working on new projects is more attractive than working on “business 
as usual” activities within government departments (Dunleavy et al. 2006, 37–
38). There are also high-level imports from the private sector working in 
senior public service roles in charge of the digital transformation. For instance, 
the previous and current chief information officers and the current deputy 
secretary in charge of the Department’s digital transformation are all senior 
executives who had similar roles with large banks that have recently 
undergone similar transformations.78 
Second are the multinational software vendors, such as SAP, that design and 
sell commercial off-the-shelf systems. These systems can be industry-specific 
modules, such as SAP’s Social Protection “solution”, or general-purpose 
modules, such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) or customer relationship 
management (CRM). These general-purpose systems were originally 
developed by and for private corporations, but they are increasingly being 
adopted by the public sector.79 They are also integral to the WPIT architecture. 
Third, and most critical, are the systems integrators, a distinct field of 
consulting and services (Hobday, Prencipe & Davies 2005, 1), which, over the 
last 25 years, has emerged in the space between IT suppliers and management 
consultants and has expanded outwards in both directions, taking over much 
of the work previously undertaken by the others. Integrators plan, coordinate 
and develop large complex computerisation projects in the private and public 
sectors. Not only does this involve getting all the layers of new and existing 
technological components working together, but also integrating them with 
the people, policies and processes of the client organisation. While the client 
organisation may have a degree of hierarchical primacy as the setter of 
requirements and source of funds, in many ways the system integrator plays a 
central coordinating role linking all the other key players in the development 
project. Depending on the project, the boundaries of the integrator’s work 
may extend into organisational change management on one side, or system 
 
78 As I will discuss later in this chapter, similar involvement in such private sector 
transformations is also a criterion for selecting systems integrators. 
79 For instance, SAP has been selected by the Australian Government as the standard 
enterprise resource management software for the Government’s shared corporate service 
centres, one of which is operated by the Department in support of several other agencies. 
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design and programming on the other. Hobday, Prencipe and Davies describe 
systems integration as,  
An Emerging Model of Industrial Organization … a strategic task, which pervades 
business management not only at the engineering level but also in senior 
management decision-making … whereby firms and groups of firms join together 
different types of knowledge, skill, and activity, as well as hardware, software, 
and human resources to produce new products for the marketplace. (Hobday, 
Prencipe & Davies 2005, 1) 
In theory, the systems integrator role can be carried out by the software 
vendor, the client organisation itself or a separate organisation. There are 
companies such as Accenture, for which this kind of work is its major line of 
business, but large consulting firms (such as KPMG, EY, PwC & Deloitte) do it 
as well; and there are many smaller firms that do it on a smaller scale with 
smaller client organisations and projects. According to Dunleavy et al, a few 
large system integrators have dominated the field of implementing large 
corporate systems, observing that 
Systems integrators often aimed to develop expertise in a wider range of their 
clients’ activities than merely information systems, since information systems 
intertwined closely with other service functions. Some of the contracts were seen 
as real partnership arrangements with an element of risk-sharing, a new 
outsourcing model involving “a vertical cut of business process rather than the 
horizontal cut of information technology” (partner of Andersen Consulting80 in the 
Financial Times 21 October 1992) (Dunleavy et al. 2006, 55–56).  
Fourth, management consultants still have a deep role to play within public 
sector organisations. For the WPIT program they were involved in preparing 
the business case that was put to government and in the preparation of the 
requests for tender that were used to engage the software vendor and systems 
integrators (DHS 2016b, s. 75, Addendum 21). 
The following section takes us inside the relationship between the systems 
integrators, a software vendor and a client organisation. 
7.2  Case study—system integration at Ataco 
Scene 4: Paris, Sunday, 25 September 2005.  
It was a mild Autumn day and I was sitting outside at a typical Parisian street 
cafe with Ivan, my boss at Ataco81 and Terry, who also reported to Ivan.82 Ivan 
 
80 Andersen Consulting became Accenture in 2001. 
81 I have changed the name of the organisation and my two interviewees. 
82 I worked with Ivan and Terry at Ataco Australia for five years. I was part of the IT executive 
team that was responsible for coordinating the overall operations of Ataco Australia’s IT 
systems and internal services. My presence in Paris with Ivan and Terry was coincidental. I 
was in Paris at the same time for an unrelated meeting about a different type of system. I 
wasn’t directly involved with SAP at that time, but later a system for which I was responsible 
had to link to SAP to perform some fundamental functions. 
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and Terry were in Paris to meet with SAP83 the next day. Over the next two 
days, SAP was going to persuade Ivan and Terry to upgrade Ataco Australia’s 
SAP enterprise resource management system to SAP’s new version. Normally, 
this pitch would take part on the client’s turf, but this event was to involve some 
of SAP’s most senior executives and a large supporting cast of specialists, so 
Ivan agreed that it might be easier for him and Terry to go to Paris. The onus 
would be on SAP to make the case for Ataco Australia to spend a million dollars 
or so on the upgrade. Usually such an upgrade would be a lot of work for 
minimal short-term gain and this was a decision that could be easily deferred 
for a year or two. So, there was no pressure—they could have a relaxing 
afternoon watching Paris go by. However, there were some longer-term issues in 
the wind that would benefit Ataco Australia and provide Ivan and Terry an 
opportunity to engage in some really interesting projects. Over the previous 
decade they had successfully implemented a major SAP system in Australia 
after a dramatic initial failure. Now things had settled down and new horizons 
beckoned in the form of introducing their system into another Ataco firm in 
Asia, and maybe beyond. 
Systems integration at Ataco 
Ivan and Terry are senior executives experienced in establishing and 
maintaining a strategic relationship with SAP SE, the main provider of the 
Department’s new software platform. For 10 years Ivan and Terry led the IT 
division at Ataco Australia, the Australian arm of a global professional services 
firm that was a strategic client of SAP’s. Through interviews with them I was 
able to explore the nature of the personal, material, systemic and 
organisational relationships that constitute the entanglement between a client 
organisation, a system integrator and a corporate software vendor. There are 
important differences between their firm and Services Australia and their 
respective projects. However, their relationships with SAP and systems 
integrators share many features that reliably illustrate the intimacy of the 
engagement between client, vendor and integrator; as well as the extent to 
which the organisations become entangled with, and through, software as a 
quasi-material medium. The Department’s WPIT system will be based in part 
on several components implemented by Ataco, in particular enterprise 
resource planning and customer relationship management. 
Ivan was Ataco Australia’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) for over a decade 
and is now retired. He is a chartered accountant, somewhat irascible, 
sometimes abrasive, with a sly sense of humour. At Ataco, he built up a 
substantial in-house technology capability that relied less on external skills 
 
83 SAP, known only by its acronym, is a large German-based multinational software company. 
It is a dominant supplier in the market for many of the core software systems used by the 
Department, such as enterprise resource management, customer relationship management, 
enterprise resource planning (financial and human resource management) and “social 
protection” (health and welfare payments). 
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than many equivalent firms. Terry was Ivan’s deputy for most of Ivan’s time at 
the helm of Ataco’s IT operations. Terry was also an accountant who moved 
into IT after commencing with Ataco. Terry is personable, engaging and 
outgoing. Because of this, Ivan often delegated the more involved liaison with 
the business to Terry in order to maintain good relations with the other 
divisions.84 Both Ivan and Terry felt that coming to IT from a non-IT 
professional background was a significant factor in their ability to develop 
systems that worked for their firm. Ivan and Terry implemented a major SAP 
enterprise resource planning system at Ataco Australia, initially using an 
external integrator and then, after the initial failure of the project, doing 
subsequent integration work themselves. They also took on the system 
integrator role when Ataco Australia’s SAP enterprise resource planning model 
was adopted by another Ataco national firm in Asia. Ultimately Ataco’s global 
parent created its own SAP enterprise resource planning model based on 
Australia’s implementation and established a development and support team, 
engaging Ivan to guide the leadership of other Ataco firms through the 
implementation process. He was thus a key advisor to Ataco firms’ senior 
leadership on both business and technical aspects of a major transition in their 
core infrastructure. In this role, he was an integrator and an advocate of that 
global model, with the authority of someone who had successfully led the 
transition in another Ataco firm. Several Australian staff also moved to the 
global team, based on their experience.85 Soon after Ivan went global, Terry 
moved on to become the chief operating officer with two smaller Australian 
firms where he also implemented enterprise resource planning systems using 
SAP and other vendors, and is now a senior executive for a medium-size 
systems integrator. 
From SAP’s perspective, Ataco, as a leading professional services firm, is an 
important potential client in terms of its global status in the field of financial 
management. When one of Ataco’s larger national firms such as Australia 
adopted a new enterprise resource planning system, they would be a major 
catch for any enterprise resource planning vendor, and the Australian firm was 
more advanced in implementing SAP’s products than other Ataco member 
firms. SAP realised that Ataco Australia’s implementation of its software could 
be a model for Ataco national firms around the world, making Australia a 
strategic client from a global perspective. 
Ivan and Terry thus became key targets for SAP’s growth plans, and when the 
Australian model attracted the interest of other Ataco firms, the two Australians 
became critical to getting SAP systems adopted globally. At the time, Ataco 
Australia was Ataco’s 10th largest national firm, with 5,000 employees, out of 
the global total of 140,000, so SAP was willing to make significant concessions 
 
84 Interview with Ivan 26 Jul 2018. 
85 As did I, but for a different project that went global. However, I ended up in the same 
global group that was involved in rolling out global programs to member firms and was thus 
able to observe the SAP globalisation program. 
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on price and support to ensure broader acceptance of their systems in the 
wider Ataco world. 
[Terry:] SAP recognised that the way for them to be successful engaging with 
Ataco and potentially getting the world was not to concentrate on Germany 
[SAP’s home country] because [Ataco Germany was] trying to hold everyone back 
to what they were. [SAP] recognised that Australia had the value, and so [a senior 
SAP executive] came out and lived in Australia for six months. So, he came here 
because he wanted to learn about us. He wanted to learn what we were doing. 
He wanted to lead the way from here because this is where the value would 
come. 
One of the main themes in the interviews with Ivan and Terry was that 
corporate software is not simply dropped into an organisation. At the 
organisation level, there is a tension to be negotiated. There is never a perfect 
fit between the client organisation and the software. This can be experienced 
at a conceptual or linguistic level or in terms of conflicting processes. It can 
occur particularly when wrong judgements have been made about defining 
the need or problem, or in selecting the right product, or even the right class 
of product. Even at the best of times, there is a mismatch between the client 
organisation’s rules and processes and those embedded in the commercial 
software (Alvarez 2008, 220).  
The two typical approaches to resolving this problem are modifying the 
software to completely match the organisation or modifying the organisation 
to conform to the software, with all the shades in between. Sticking to existing 
organisation rules and processes can involve substantial writing of new 
software, a process called customisation. Developing new code or adding new 
code to a system is expensive up-front and incurs further expense whenever 
subsequent changes occur in the business or the computing environment. As 
we have seen in the previous chapter, the 30 year-old ISIS system that runs 
the Department’s welfare payments is the paragon of a customised system and 
all the problems it can entail. Modern commercial off-the-shelf systems attempt 
to deliver a degree of flexibility by providing a vast array of optional settings 
within standard ready-made rules and processes. Working within this 
framework is called configuration. The Department is working hard to stick to 
this approach, a point driven firmly by its previous Secretary in Senate 
hearings, reflecting the Department’s desperation to avoid repeating the 
consequences of past customisation with ISIS (CALC 2015, 88). Resolving the 
tension between software and organisation and the design of the configuration 
are key functions of systems integration. 
I asked Ivan and Terry about the nature of their relationship with SAP at an 
individual level to understand the grounds of the interdependency between a 
software company and a key client. Interviewed separately, they were both 
adamantly in favour of adapting organisational practices to the software’s 
approach through configuration and, in the role of systems integrator, they 




[Ivan:] … once you’ve customised those things you’re in trouble because of your 
maintenance and licensing and stuff like that, then cost to support, because it’s 
bespoke. And so, you’re always trying to do configure. And so, … your good 
consultants would find a way to use configuration. And in the end … we sort of 
made that platform mostly configurable … 
[DLB:] Did that involve SAP changing any of their base code? 
[Ivan:] “No, no, no … because it was being used multiple times [in multiple Ataco 
firms] we were able to do some of that, but mostly … if you discuss something 
enough and get the business to change what it wants to do a bit … it’s all to do 
with the design workshop and the skill of the people running the design 
workshop. If you walk in and say, “SAP will do anything you want,” [the client 
will] then take their system that exists … and make you develop that inside SAP. 
Whereas if you go in and say, “This is how SAP works, how are you going to 
[change]” … so, the change management is two-way. The biggest part of it is 
changing their business process to align to how SAP, or whatever your enterprise 
system you’re using, does things. I go in assuming there is nothing that a business 
is doing that can’t be done by configuration. It mightn’t be the same as you’re 
doing it now, but it can be configured. 
[DLB:] So you wouldn’t agree with a proposition that that’s the tail wagging the 
dog? 
[Ivan:] No. 
[DLB:] Because it’s not that much of a cost to the organisation at the end of the 
day to take a different process? 
[Ivan:] Correct … the tail becomes a massive growth when you add in the 
ongoing support. And every time you want to change something, every time you 
do an upgrade, you’ve got to go and do another IS development, to develop your 
development. And so, you look at the long-term cost of that.  
As Ivan argues, sticking to configuration means that an organisation’s existing 
rules and processes need to be modified to fit the software. Compared to the 
Department’s WPIT program, Terry and Ivan could easily justify this approach 
with Ataco’s enterprise resource planning because they were dealing with 
internal processes such as financial management, human resource 
management, and customer relationship management functions.86 Ivan and 
Terry were adamant that internal rules could and should be modified to fit the 
software’s built-in “best industry practice”. For one thing, such rules were 
within the control of the organisation; second, they did not touch Ataco’s 
external clients. Finally, they argued that existing practice was not necessarily 
the best option anyway, or at least served no advantage over the processes 
embedded in the software.  
As it is, enterprise resource planning system vendors occasionally incorporate 
clients’ previously customised functionality and flexibility into the core 
standard system, if that functionality might be useful for other clients. 
Otherwise, if an organisation sticks to configuration, and standardises its 
 
86 This was because, unlike the Department’s plans for customer relationship management, 
Ataco’s system at the time was not being used for managing customer transactions. It was 
simply recording customer details. 
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business processes to the vendor’s model, the more process design can be 
delegated to the vendor and effectively outsourced. 
[Terry:] … it’s basically all the way that the new systems work because they’re 
becoming more sophisticated in their generic offering, so they’re no longer just 
an empty vessel that you can program. They all come with their industry 
programming … So, they basically already have 80 percent of what you need 
done … Upgrades have always been a problem in the past, but they’re becoming 
less now because they’re all now the subscription-based things. It just basically 
happens automatically. [In the past] there’d be so much bespoke stuff in there 
that, yes, you buy into a product set and then just can’t keep up with it. They roll 
out their releases every three or six or nine months and … When we would do 
an upgrade … it was virtually as big as an implementation. Like I said, we would 
spend a million dollars just upgrading … I mean, that’s a lot of money for the 
potential benefit … 
This reflects the situation faced by the Department, which will rely on SAP and 
the system integrators to deliver a sociotechnical assemblage that serves 
Australia’s welfare payments regime, based on the “industry” knowledge of 
SAP and the integrator as embedded in SAP’s “Social Protection solution” 
developed originally for other countries, and as adapted by the integrator. 
Furthermore, once an organisation has achieved a level of integration with one 
vendor’s software platform, it is more economical to extend that platform to 
other functions, rather than buying into a whole additional platform and all 
the other dependencies that it entails. As Terry explains “we did a business 
case at Ataco that if we move, rather than going for best of breed but went for 
integrated, we worked out that we would save $15 million over three years 
just on maintenance and support costs”.87 
Ivan and Terry also talked about the role that individuals play in mediating the 
relationship between organisations. Terry identified two key roles in the client 
organisation: the influencer and the decision maker. For Terry, the influencer 
is a person in a position to select a product that he or she thinks right for the 
organisation and who can effectively pitch it to the decision maker. The 
influencer is the key initial target for the vendor. It is often the influencer who 
is involved in the first contact. This person is both sufficiently senior to 
negotiate externally and knowledgeable enough about the organisation and 
the product options to imagine the connection between the two. As Terry 
says, the vendor or integrator has to 
… make sure they’ve got someone [receptive inside the prospective client 
organisation]. You’ve got to have someone, like me or my role, who wants the 
product. It’s virtually impossible if you’ve just got someone that goes, “I don’t 
care. Show me.” You’ve got to have someone that says, “I want this [project] to be 
successful using your product.” That’s when you get huge value. So that’s when 
SAP and them are so good … that was a real partner. And with SAP it was a 
 
87 This is what has happened with the Department, which has been using SAP for some time 




phenomenally trusting, partnering thing there which I don’t have with any other 
organisation and I haven’t had it since then. We were just lucky I think because 
our worlds aligned. They saw the goal at the end. They saw that we were the 
ones to help them get it, so they were prepared to do it, but you need that. I 
mean, even the smallest organisation can’t work without having someone inside 
who is trying to get the vendor’s product selected. You can’t go into a cold client 
and just push it through. You’ve got to have the CFO, or the CIO, or a board 
member, or someone championing you to get it through. 
For Ataco’s systems, Terry said “I was, I suppose, the influencer, because if I 
went to Ivan [the decision maker] and said, ‘We should be doing this’, it would 
go through.” And given the importance of the intangibles involved, “it really is 
an emotional thing because you are going into bed with the devil.” In turn, 
the role of decision maker did not so much reflect the ultimate authority in the 
organisation, but rather to whom the decision making role concerning 
technology was delegated. In Ataco Australia, Ivan had that delegated power 
as a result of a trusted relationship with the chief executive officer (CEO). 
[Terry:] Ivan was the decision maker because he really had been given the 
imprimatur from [the CEO] to do it. So, he really didn’t have to go back anymore. 
He had to define budget and he … kept [the CEO] informed so that [the CEO] 
was informed, not because [the CEO] had to approve what he was doing. 
… we both did strategy but he was very much leading the strategy going 
through. And then he left the delivery, I think, through to me and … others… 
According to Terry, once the vendors have found the key person in the client 
firm,  
They work well with it, once they know who it is they’ve got to deal with. Then 
they have huge resources behind them...they will very quickly identify who is the 
primary decision maker and who is the primary influencer in the organisation. 
And their account exec—and they will always have the account exec—will be 
trying to be with the primary decision maker and the primary influencer. That’s 
where they want to deal. But then behind them, they now have—these people 
have just such sophisticated support groups behind them where that account 
exec really is just a gofer. It’s just someone who brings in the right people. 
These personal connections are critical to the ongoing relations between 
organisations. Above and beyond the strategic and contractual bonds, there 
has to be trust. As Terry said, “You need to have that partnership because you 
can’t just have a … it’s not a transactional thing. You’ve got to … trust each 
other.”  
As we shall see in the next chapter, while the Department is much larger than 
Ataco, WPIT is much larger than Ataco’s enterprise resource management 
system, and public sector procurement rules require an open tender, this 
question of trust is both relevant and critical to the relationship. Crucially both 
players have more on the table than a contractual arrangement would entail. 
The relationship is part of a larger strategic trajectory for both organisations—
failure cuts off future opportunities as well as cruelling the project at hand. 
This aspect of the relationship also illustrates the extent to which the people in 
the organisations know each other before and beyond the procurement 
 
136 
process. This too is a major element in the relationships around WPIT that I 
describe in the next section. 
As Terry mentioned above, given the finite range of options and the 
influencer’s knowledge of the field, the influencer probably already has an 
idea of the products they want. In the rare exception when the buyer is 
genuinely looking around for a product, he or she will focus closely on the 
vendor’s grasp of the client organisation and the industry. For Terry, the 
vendor’s knowledge of the client’s industry can be more important than price. 
At another client firm, Terry described the decision thus:  
… we really were prepared to pick the product, not because of what the sales 
people did, not because of the price, but because those two consultants we knew 
understood best practice in our business and would be able to make sure that we 
stayed on the straight and narrow. 
[At the start they] just had their sales team. We said, “Sorry, we can’t make a 
decision, because you’re just telling us sales gumpf. We need to talk to someone 
who knows.” So, then the [vendor’s] finance guy [an ex-chief finance officer] 
came in, and he just went through and just started talking the most boring crap 
about finance you can imagine. And we were like, “Thank God someone knows 
what a GL is.” And that was the thing, that you had someone that actually knew 
how you worked, and knew what was important to your business. And that is 
more important. Because any product can be made to work. You can have the 
best product, and you have a load of … naff bloody developers, then you don’t 
get anything. 
Above all, the decision to pick one software product over another binds an 
organisation to that product and its maker. Terry talked about that decision in 
terms of “sleeping with the devil” and Ivan described it in terms of selecting 
“your favourite cocaine dealer”— once you are committed, you are then 
locked in. Once engaged, the costs of pulling out or switching products can 
be prohibitive. This is particularly the case with large systems such as SAP’s, 
which can serve as platforms to which further functions can be added.  
For such a strategic deal, both Terry and Ivan described the concessions that 
suppliers are willing to make with the initial purchase price to hook the client. 
[Ivan:] I used to liken being on SAP as having a bit of a favourite cocaine dealer 
[laughter]. Because once you’re on the cocaine … once you’re in, they’ve got you 
hooked. Look. If you’re in that big end of town, Oracle, or SAP, or... It’s a … bit 
like Microsoft though. When you’re on Microsoft … would you say, “Well, bugger 
you, I’m going to walk away?” … you’re going to be paying about 17 percent to 
20 percent per item [per annum] for maintenance based on their contract price. 
You’ve got to accept that it’s a big organisation, that they have a lot of 
maintenance, and they have a lot of big product to support. What’s your 
alternative? Go and develop it yourself and then really understand what it costs to 
support something? Can you imagine the Department [of Human Services] if they 
say, “Alright, we’re going to go and develop this from core code?” You’d have 
another billion dollars sitting there every year with massive risk around it. 
… that’s the way SAP … sort of give you your first hit. I mean, when we did that 
[Ataco Asia] project … we [Ataco Australia, as systems integrators] wanted to be 
paid … a fee [by the Asian firm] for the product. And the [Asian] firm said, “No, 
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we’ll just go and do our own with Oracle.” We were pretty desperate to do it, 
and SAP were desperate to get them on because they know once they got them 
on, they could then start to pick off all the other countries. This is pre the global 
agreement. And SAP ended up giving them the licences … And [Australia] had to 
do a big upgrade of licences here, and to incentivise us to not take a fee, they 
gave us all of their licences for the next three years for nothing. So, it’s not the 
licence income. It’s not licence price that’s the issue for SAP …  
[DLB:] What is SAP’s motivation if it’s not licenses? 
[Ivan:] Ongoing maintenance. Every five years they get … ongoing income. 
Because if they gave you the license of $100, every five years you’re getting 
another $100 … So, it’s getting you onto the habit. That’s what they’re in for. 
But with the reliance on ongoing maintenance costs and the move to 
subscription-based relationships, the vendor is locked in as well, because 
share markets are looking at their ongoing income stream as the main measure 
of future profitability. 
[Terry:] … bearing in mind that the market that values subscription-based 
organizations like SAP’s becoming, like SalesForce, like NetSuite they’re all based 
on multiples. They’re all based on their retention of customers. That’s the really 
biggest one. So, it’s a case of what’s your annuity income? So okay, what’s your 
customer retention? Because that lets them know if they’ve got a customer 
retention of 98 percent, they can then bank on that going forward. If it gets down 
below 95, they go, “Oh shit.” They’re losing, so therefore they’ve got to already 
get 5 percent growth a year just to stay level … They spend all this money just to 
get a million back so they can stay where they are. Well, that’s part of the 
reason—that’s one of the things you can really bleed into … if they think you’re 
going to leave that’s far worse than not winning a new client … But … they have 
you by the short and curlies. 
And I can tell you if SalesForce was to lose a major customer … it would directly 
impact their share price because it would get up there and go, “Shit. If they left it, 
who else will.” And it just loses the confidence. 
SAP was quite aware that in selling a platform to Ataco Australia, it was 
sealing a commitment and gaining a long-term advantage should Ataco ever 
wish to buy new software modules to add to the SAP platform. A lot of the 
effort that SAP put into Ivan and Terry’s project at Ataco provided the 
opportunity to (appear to) incorporate Ataco practice into the core SAP 
software, obviating the need for other Ataco firms to customise or look 
elsewhere for that capability. It also gave SAP a deep insight into Ataco’s 
people, workings and internal politics, both within Australia and among 
Ataco’s other national firms and the global headquarters. Such information 
gave SAP an overwhelming advantage over competitors. As Terry mentioned,  
… the vendor must know your business. 
[DLB:] So where did SAP get that knowledge from? 
[Terry:] They got that just through time. 
[DLB:] So working with you? 
[Terry:] So working with us. So, they knew the industry well when they came in, 
and they got specific Ataco knowledge by being with us for, some of them, 12, 
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18 months, two years. Almost like secondees, they were that crucial. 
By the time the WPIT program came along, the Department of Human 
Services had already committed to SAP for several modern “solutions” to 
augment the core ISIS mainframe. Selecting one of SAP’s competitors for the 
core social welfare system would have exercised the concerns Terry 
mentioned. The same applies to the future of WPIT. Given the ambition of the 
Department to expand WPIT into a broad government service platform, the 
same strategic considerations that motivated Ataco apply to the WPIT program, 
the Department, SAP and the systems integrators (DHS 2016a, 8.4).  
Whether an enterprise resource planning system, customer relationship 
management system or welfare payment systems, these are large investments 
in terms of cost, organisational disruption and risk. I asked Terry what makes 
organisations embark on such a course. He explained that it was usually a 
large “step change” in the organisation rather than a desire for new software—
something significant enough to justify the expense and the effort of 
organisational change.  
… where a business is requiring a step change. Where there’s a transformation … 
naturally if you’re a very small business, 0-20 people, you can do it all in Excel. 
You can do it all on MYOB. But at some point you’re going to say, “Well, we 
need to be able to support the next growth spurt, the next product set we’re 
rolling out, the next industry we’re going into.” And that requires a step change… 
The resolution of the tension between adapting the software or the 
organisation is critical to understanding how the organisation and large 
multipurpose systems become intertwined. This is where the role of the 
systems integrator makes its mark. At Ataco, Ivan moved from the role of SAP 
client to the role of system integrator, in which he worked with SAP and other 
Ataco national firms to integrate their activities with Ataco Global’s version of 
SAP’s software. For the system implementation to be successful, there is a lot 
of work involved in determining strategy and the resulting software 
development and organisational change. Given his strong commitment to 
adapting the organisation to the software within the limits of configuration, 
Ivan described the full extent to which integrators must influence the range of 
people involved in the client organisation: 
… the technology won’t fail. More or less, you will be able to get a result. What 
you mess up is lack of leadership and lack of change management. Now, if you’d 
asked me 20 years ago, when I started down this path, about change 
management, I would’ve said, “Just tell them what we’re doing. That’s change 
management”. 
… I think of all the years I was doing this stuff, the change management thing 
was the thing that was my biggest revelation; understanding the importance of 
the technique, getting a right balance between communication, training, and 
education, and that sort of stuff. Understanding that by saying to somebody this is 
happening to you, most people will get their hackles up because they’ve been 
used to doing some things the same way year after year after year after year … I 
think we push back on it...over the 20 years I was doing those SAP 
implementations … the importance of the change management thing was the 
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biggest learning for me. 
… if you go back to change management 101, it’s saying, “What’s in it for me?” 
So, in the end you’re trying to say to these people, “What’s in it for them?” And 
maybe that’s why these projects don’t succeed because they can’t see what’s in it 
for them. And I always used to sell what’s in it for the management? What’s in it 
for the staff? What’s in it for the finance guy? … Find out what’s in it for them and 
they’ll buy into it much more easily. Because then they can see why they are 
going through the angst that you’re about to put them through. 
Thus, the work of the change agent is clearly one of persuasion rather than 
simply education. Ivan made it clear that the integrator has to assertively push 
the business to accept the software’s approach: 
You’ve got to be subservient to them, but forceful. And yeah, I mean, I used to 
have to hose down a revved-up CFO or a revved-up COO because his people or 
her people had come out of the workshop and they said we said they couldn’t 
[do things their way] and we’d say, “Well, we didn’t say that. What we’re saying is 
the cost of that development would be … $600,000. Your entire project budget is 
$500,000. Do you really want to spend that? Now, can we now work with you on 
how might you do that differently?”  
In the context of public acceptance of digital initiatives such as WPIT, the 
answer to the question of “what’s in it for me?” is provided in the digital 
government policies.  
What does the case study show us about WPIT? 
Most immediately, Ivan and Terry’s testimony demonstrates the interpersonal 
dynamics and alliances between the individuals who mediate the commercial 
relationships involved in developing large systems. From this we can see how 
those individuals’ ways of framing identities, situations and relationships 
influence the choice of technology, vendors, integrators and change strategies. 
This can form the basis of the co-dependency of the organisations on the 
commercial relationship and how future market choices are constrained by the 
entanglement; once a commitment has been entered, in a sense the market is 
closed off for the indefinite future. Moreover, such a partnership establishes a 
mutual responsibility based on interpersonal trust and which, at least in part, 
excludes accountability to third parties. In the case of government, these third 
parties can include parliament and the public. 
As with the Ataco, avoiding the cost of customising software to suit the 
organisation dominates the Department’s approach to system development 
(CALC 2015, 88). Short- and long-term costs were Ivan and Terry’s primary 
stated drivers, but it is worth noting that both Ataco and the Department 
experienced failures in earlier developments, which also motivate them to rely 
on prefabricated modules, which are perceived as less risky than bespoke 
customisation. However, while configuration is preferable, the consequences 
of avoiding customised systems are profound. The Ataco example 
demonstrates how far organisational processes become intertwined with a 
standard global model of “best industry practice” embedded in commercial 
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modular software, the ongoing trajectory of which is largely out of the hands 
of the client organisations. Although Ivan’s role as a systems integrator was not 
strictly as an outsider, his approach illustrates how an external agent mediates 
the intimate connection between an organisation and its software. It also 
illustrates the dependence of the organisation on the system integrator’s 
expertise in both the organisation’s practice and the software. 
Finally, we see the extent to which both sides of a particular relationship can 
be driven by long-term strategic considerations beyond the immediate 
concerns of the project itself, let alone the narrow transactional assumptions 
behind government procurement rules. We will see in the next section what 
can happen in another partnership in which both parties see the current 
project as a stepping-stone to future ambitions. As with Ataco, the main parties 
have interlocking long-term ambitions: WPIT is a stepping-stone for the 
Department to extend its (online) service delivery into other government 
arenas, and for SAP it is the opportunity for further penetration into the 
Australian Government and into global social payments system markets. With 
each new service the Department delivers, SAP gets a slice of the pie. The 
aspirations for both the client, the vendor and the systems integrator have the 
effect of building a trust-based partnership that goes well beyond the 
contractual bonds of a single project. This is demonstrated more clearly in the 
following chapter, where we see how far the Department is willing to go to 
build a special relationship with the systems integrators and SAP. 
However, there are important distinctions between the case study and WPIT. 
As it is, even for an internal management system, Ataco and SAP formed a 
tight, interlocking coexistence that substantially draws into question the idea 
of distinct organisational boundaries (Brunsson 2006, 23). WPIT involves far 
more than the limited case of an internal enterprise resource planning system 
described here. One has to ask, “where does the governance of Ataco take 
place?” It is certainly not just within the walls of Ataco by Ataco employees. 
Ataco decided it could not afford to make up its own rules of conduct from 
scratch. It had to buy a package of rules, some of which fitted Ataco’s way of 
working and some to which Ataco had to yield. WPIT extends even further 
beyond traditionally conceived organisation boundaries, scouring third parties 
for data about customers, and into the spaces and personal devices of 
customers themselves. Its timescale, functional scope and sheer size, as well as 
the political consequences of success and failure are substantial. All these are 
different, but in many ways they make the systems integrator/client 
relationship even deeper and longer than evidenced by this case study. 
7.3  Systems integration at the Department 
To undertake its systems integration work for WPIT, the Department opted to 
go for external systems integrators—not just one but several. The Department’s 
request for tender sought a panel of up to six integrators from which they 
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could draw for various projects through the seven-year lifetime of the WPIT 
program. A multinational systems integrator called Accenture was selected as 
the integrator for the initial stages. The other panel members, Capgemini, DXC 
(previously Hewlett-Packard Enterprise) and IBM are also multinational 
integrators. The integration component of WPIT was estimated to be $100 
million, which was ultimately split between DXC, which was a allocated $63.6 
million, Accenture ($25.2 million) and Capgemini ($13.1 million) (Hendry 
2018b). In late 2019, another multinational integrator, Infosys, won a contract 
for $18.4 million to develop a decision making system that the Department 
calls an “entitlement calculation engine”, to replace the most complex aspect 
of the old ISIS system, which proved to be such a problem in earlier attempts 
at replacing parts of ISIS. 
As mentioned previously, the Department’s ambitions for WIPIT extend way 
beyond simply replacing the ISIS mainframe system. The Department is 
putting itself through what Terry called a “step change”, a major increase in 
the scale and scope of its activities. Undertaking “a once-in-a-generation 
business transformation” (DHS 2016a, s.1) involving a seven-year transition 
from ISIS will include: keeping ISIS going for another seven years, 
incorporating new policy changes made by government during the project, 
along with modifying all the associated systems that have been built around 
ISIS; configuring the core SAP welfare payments software; redesigning the 
Department’s processes to conform to the new software; developing and 
implementing the change strategies to persuade and educate the Department’s 
people into the new regime; linking the welfare payments system to the SAP 
financial systems (enterprise resource planning) and the customer relationship 
management systems to keep track of “customers”; integrating the old and 
new software systems with the Department’s existing and new hardware 
infrastructure, such as data storage, networks and telephony; linking the new 
conglomeration to external systems, such as the Reserve Bank, which makes 
actual payments to beneficiaries, as well as linking to the sources of external 
data to support improved compliance; and providing for future expansion into 
delivering other Australian governments’ (online) services through the WPIT 
infrastructure. 
The WPIT program will involve the integration of a broad range of 
technologies, both in the narrow sense and as technologies of government. In 
the narrow sense, the core software is a benefits management system 
produced by SAP. This so-called “Social Protection solution” can handle 
application processing, benefits decision processing, and case management and 
links into other systems, such as enterprise resource planning for handling the 
financial transactions, customer relationship management for keeping track of 
customers and their circumstances (“circumstance data management”) and 
other stakeholders, and analytics software for reporting and data analysis. SAP 
makes all of these modules and the Department already uses them as bolt-ons 
to the existing ISIS system. As the key new entanglement, the commercial off-
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the-shelf Social Protection solution has been developed in and for social 
service payment programs in other jurisdictions. It applies a standard 
framework for social payments services and policies, albeit adjustable to local 
conditions, but only to a point.  
Moreover, the software most likely comes with institutional biases that reflect 
the interests and perspectives of system builders in SAP’s previous clients—
embedded in the “industry best practice” to which Terry referred. Rosio 
Alvarez has demonstrated how the best practices embedded in such 
prefabricated software “can be imbued with institutional interests”, primarily 
those of the players who select the solution and steer its configuration (2008, 
220). 
To work out how to balance all these issues, as well as transforming all the 
data, organisational structures, business rules, processes and policies into a 
new rationalised system, the Department set out in search of a systems 
integrator, to work closely with, and within, the Department. 
7.4  The search for the ideal partner 
Rather than the buyer–seller relationship portrayed in the traditional 
government procurement discourse, industry and government agencies like to 
frame large projects as partnerships, in which conventional role boundaries 
are somewhat blurred (Linder 1999, 36). Partnerships have been a common 
phenomenon among private sector firms for roughly 30 years (Linder 1999, 
35), and, for the adherents of New Public Management, public-private 
partnerships have been a preferred mode for ostensibly sharing costs and risks 
for two decades (Henman 2010a, 62). They can also be seen as a tangible 
vehicle for the corporate state and a new mode of “governance” (Brown 2015, 
123–5). Beyond the public gaze, the Department’s procurement documents for 
WPIT spell out the type of relationship that it expects will deliver a successful 
program. 
The Department’s Request for Tender for WPIT systems integrators88 sought a 
particularly intimate relationship with the systems integrators, expressed in the 
following managerialist terms:  
Fundamental to the way the department needs to reframe its relationships is the 
cultural constructs that will drive the department’s approach to the transformation 
programme … focussing upon the development of new, long lasting relationships 
that are founded upon a partnering and collaborative model of engagement that 
is itself built upon the contractual relationships that define the commercial 
structure and core expectations between the department and its Policy and 
Delivery Partners. 
We are committed to investing in our Partnerships and to aligning mutual 
expectations and outcomes. As such, the department will place emphasis on the 
 
88 The key document in this Request for Tender was Attachment H: programme overview (DHS 
2016a), which will be discussed below. 
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need to build, early in the WPIT Programme, joint team development of mutual 
trust models and the foundations of how we will manage the governance of our 
integrated team relationships throughout the WPIT Programme (DHS 2016a, s.9, 
emphasis added). 
With so much of the final form of this massive transformation still up in the 
air, the Department envisaged a very special and flexible marriage, “with joint 
responsibilities for outcomes, co-innovation and a long-term and sustainable 
Partnership.” (DHS 2016b, s. 6.1). Although it does not use the term, the 
Department is proposing the establishment of what we might call a virtual 
organisation to undertake the technological and organisational transformation, 
in which 
• Participants [i.e. the core software vendor and systems integrators] should be 
fully integrated into WPIT Programme planning …  
• Participant teams and executives should be inducted into the WPIT 
Programme to align “ways of working” to the department’s culture …  
• … members of the partners’ management to maintain collaborative 
engagement … [and] 
• risk management is a shared responsibility of all parties … (DHS 2016b, s. 
6.3) 
The relationship between the Department, the system integrator and the “core 
software vendor” (SAP) does not fit the conventional view of the procurement 
and contract management for advisory services. The standard procurement 
model assumes that the purchaser sets out their requirements completely and 
unambiguously, leaving no contractual loose ends that might end in litigation. 
The Department argues that, because of all the unknowns facing WPIT, 
something newer and deeper than a narrowly contractual relationship is 
required:  
The department’s business transformation will not be easy due to the scale, 
scope, complexity and timeframe of the WPIT Programme. The department has 
recognised the need to engage and collaborate with industry to form strategic 
relationships … Although the department has commenced designing a [target 
business model],89 the Partnership with the [core software vendor] and [systems 
integrator] will inform the refinement of the [target business model], its design 
principles and individual components. (DHS 2016a, s. 18.1, emphasis added) 
And so, 
The department recognises that it must move away from a traditional 
customer/vendor model and partner with the [core software vendor] and [systems 
integrators] to achieve the WPIT Programme Outcomes … (DHS 2016a, s. 3) 
This assertion raises some serious questions about whether existing 
procurement mechanisms adequately account for the scale, complexity, 
flexibility, longevity and depth of entanglement of the kind of relationship 
 
89 By “target business model,” the Department is referring to “the way the department delivers 




sought by the Department. 
In approaching the market for system integrators, the Department developed a 
list of criteria that were so demanding that only a handful of multinational 
suppliers could meet them. To get the gig, the successful candidates had to 
have delivered the same kind of “transformation” to a similarly large 
organisation in the same way, with the same SAP software and through the 
same type of intimate partnership described here (DHS 2016b, s. 75). It is 
likely that the criteria were so tight that the initial panel of four systems 
integrators included nearly every eligible firm operating in Australia. It is most 
likely that the Department had engaged all of these firms at one time or 
another; and it is likely that the Department had to develop criteria that were 
tight enough to exclude all but the most experienced suppliers, but not so 
tight that they excluded everybody. This requires a strong knowledge of the 
industry. In this, the Department had help from eleven consulting firms in the 
initial strategy development phase for WPIT and preparing the Request for 
Tender. These advisors included some major consulting firms, such as KPMG, 
the Boston Consulting Group, PwC and Ernst and Young and several smaller 
specialists in technology/organisational transformations (DHS 2016b, s. 75, 
Addendum 21). 
Having selected a panel of system integrators, the Department was then in a 
position to pick which ones they could draw upon over the next seven years 
without going back to the market openly. An exception to this was when the 
Department sought expressions of interest to develop an “entitlement 
calculation engine solution” in 2018. Thereafter opportunities to examine the 
program are even less than the meagre public view afforded by the 
procurement process.90 
Thus, all the parties involved in WPIT know each other well. The knowledge 
these firms have of the inner workings of the Department goes way beyond 
what is observable by parliament or the public. It is not the sort of arms-length 
relationship that is assumed by the procurement process.  
The courtship in this situation was not one-way. The Department had to sell 
the project to potential suppliers to ensure they got competitive tenders from 
the best firms. So, in the request for tender, the Department promoted the 
following advantages to aspiring systems integrators who might work with 
them on WPIT: 
a) Development of strategic partnerships; 
b) Co-development of industry valuable functionality; 
c) Engagement in the development and execution of the WPIT Programme; 
d) Development of welfare industry knowledge and presence; 
 




e) Recognition of building an industry standard platform and capability; and 
f) Long-term business relationship and commitment. (DHS 2016a, 8.4) 
And there would be advantages to the systems integrators when they are 
involved in 
… establishing a joint operational relationship between the [systems integrator], 
[core software vendor], the department, and the department’s other strategic 
partners to drive global and local business transformation knowledge, capability 
and functionality in the welfare sector; (DHS 2016a, s. 3) 
This pitch provides some insight into the governance network that is created 
through the global move to digital government. If their involvement is 
successful, participation in WPIT further extends those firms’ capacity to 
“participate” in similar development in other markets. By way of translation, 
this is what the Department is offering to service providers: establishing or 
reinforcing long-term relationships with the Department and the other 
corporations involved in WPIT; increasing providers’ expertise in the 
development of welfare systems that can be marketed to other jurisdictions; 
enhancing providers’ commercial reputations by being involved in the 
development of a comprehensive national welfare system; enhancing SAP’s 
and the integrators’ global welfare services models and development 
methodology frameworks to make them more competitive in international 
markets, and perhaps to become the definitive global model for welfare 
programs; increasing providers’ knowledge of the welfare “industry” including 
insight into the internal operations of the Department, the policy departments, 
third party data sources and service providers in Australia; an increased 
capacity to penetrate government programs in Australia and other jurisdictions; 
and a competitive edge over competitors in the market for social welfare 
systems globally.  
To attract the major vendors and integrators to the long-term strategic benefits 
of WPIT, the Department offers its global established reputation as an 
advanced player in computerising welfare payments (Henman 2010a, 50), and 
the ambitious scope of its reform program. The Department’s hope would be 
that such non-financial benefits might ameliorate short-term profit 
considerations in the tender process and/or during the program, should work 
variations put pressure on profit margins.  
The WPIT program and the marriage between the Department and the 
integrators will be put under a lot of strain during the seven-year life of the 
program. In a nutshell, the central challenges arise from the combination of 
antiquated technology and the tangled accumulation of piecemeal policy 
changes over 30 years described in the previous chapter. There is a significant 
prospect of failure due to the complexity of the old system and in running old 
and new in parallel. In addition to keeping the old system going for another 
seven years—a challenge in its own right— Government policy changes made 
annually through the budget process have to be incorporated into both 
 
146 
systems. The new system will only take over a function when it can accurately 
and reliably replicate the results of the old system, which is itself a moving 
target during the seven-year transition period. 
As with marriage, the partnership metaphor entails the participants prioritising 
a commitment to each other, to the exclusion of others. Should the technology 
and/or policy complexities prove intractable, one or both of the parties will 
have to make sacrifices to preserve the relationship. Such a commitment begs 
the question, where do parties outside the partnership, such as “the 
government”, including ministers, cabinet, central agencies, and parliament, fit 
in? 
7.5  The sociability of systems 
A major consequence of the public/private sector divide embodied in 
conventional public administration discourse is to obscure the intimacy and 
continuity of the relationship between government agencies and technology 
consultants and vendors. Back in 2003, Centrelink claimed that “system 
integrator relationships were strategically critical” to the organisation 
(Dunleavy et al. 2006, 179). In 2016 the Department went even further: 
The department’s business transformation will not be easy due to the scale, 
scope, complexity and timeframe of the WPIT Programme. The department has 
recognised the need to engage and collaborate with industry to form strategic 
relationships … the department will need to work collaboratively with industry 
partners to create the future way of working (DHS 2016a, s. 18.1). 
In a market such as the Australian Government, there has been a limited 
number of purchasers and providers for some time (Dunleavy et al. 2006, 2). 
Over the course of engagements over many years, the players develop a rich 
knowledge of each other. When one considers the intimacy of such 
relationship described earlier in this chapter, the full richness of this familiarity 
can be appreciated. We should recall as well the involvement of consultants in 
developing the WPIT strategy and preparing the Request for Tender, and the 
familiarity of those consultants with the potential integrators and the language 
of transformation. Finally, the relationship between integrators and software 
companies like SAP is also intense. Integrators must be expert in configuring 
SAP’s software and also describe themselves as partners (Accenture 2019). 
Accenture presents the relationship this way:  
Accenture and SAP have a longstanding relationship that extends more than 40 
years. As a leading business partner, we work with SAP end-to-end from product 
innovation, to development and delivery. Together, we are revolutionizing the 
future of business (Accenture 2019).  
The large system integrators and software vendors do not sit back waiting for 
requests for tender from government. As mentioned previously, the industry 
pushes out a rosy view of technology through a “voluminous ICT‐utopianist 
literature” (Dunleavy 2009, 404). This literature continues the rhetoric of 
customer empowerment, while appealing to government’s desire to tighten 
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compliance. An Accenture promotional document titled Making the personal 
possible envisages a transition to “an era of empowerment” but expresses that 
empowerment as a “real-time … 360° view of the citizen” (Accenture 2017). 
All the corporations mentioned in this chapter publish documents exhorting 
governments to transform themselves through digital technologies. Moreover, 
the global IT industry encourages large, complex IT projects in preference to 
incremental improvements. 
The last thing that major IT corporations and system integrators have wanted is 
for governments to do well-planned policy changes attainable via genuinely 
simpler or more modular forms of IT, for then where would be the need for their 
highly specialized and expensive services? (Dunleavy et al. 2006, 28) 
The neo-liberal underpinnings of the industry’s view of government come to 
the surface when they make public submissions to inquiries about reducing 
the size of government. In 2013 the incoming conservative government 
established a National Commission of Audit to review “the size and scope of 
government” (National Commission of Audit 2014, cover letter). No doubt in 
anticipation of big changes to the national welfare benefits payment system, 
Accenture proposed to the Commission that 
The provision of public services through permanently state employed, public 
servants in large bureaucracies may need to be replaced or supplemented by 
more flexible privately owned organisations91 oriented towards the unique 
demands of individual clients, as is common in market driven environments … 
The productive efficiency of the delivery of public services has not kept pace 
with the productivity growth of the private sector of the economy at least partly 
because it has not taken full advantage of the technological innovations in IT 
(Accenture 2013). 
After its initial approval in the 2013–14 Budget, the WPIT program began 
formally in 2015. Because of their ongoing relationship with the Department, 
SAP and the big integrators, such as Accenture, were acutely aware over the 
preceding years that the department would be embarking on a major overhaul 
of its system.92 Those firms and their competitors would have been preparing 
for that day well in advance of the tenders being issued. By the time WPIT 
started, Accenture had already been working on the replacement of a related 
Department system, the Child Support payments system, for over a year. Its 
staff would have been working alongside Department staff on that project, 
also based on SAP software, as the WPIT program and the request for tender 
were being developed (CALC 2018, 132). Through the Child Support System 
and projects before that, Accenture and the other integrators would know the 
department from the inside. 
 
91 Note that Accenture avoids saying that private organisations should replace public 
organisations, but rather that private organisations should replace public servants. It is not 
targeting the organisations they need to work with, but their employees. 
92 Because of the scale of administering social transfers, the overhaul of the welfare payments 
system was a key concern of the National Commission of Audit, which acknowledged the 
necessity of replacing the system. 
 
148 
As we will see in the next section, the procurement process assumes that there 
is a level playing field of information, that purchaser and provider are more or 
less unaware of each other beyond the contents of tender documentation and 
that all the customer’s requirements are set out in the tender documents and 
the contract. 
7.6  Secrecy of the corporate state—the story of 
Attachment H 
The digital government literature lauded the potential for greater transparency 
afforded by digital technology (e.g., Baum & Di Maio 2000, 2). However, for a 
program that promises to transform the organisation delivering a large part of 
the Australian Government’s services to the public, remarkably little 
information is available. Almost none of detailed information about WPIT is 
published on the initiative of the Department. Their published information, 
such as their website (Services Australia 2020b) (150 words in 2020) and 
annual reports (416 glowing words (DHS 2018a, 142–43)), reveal nothing but 
succinct good news about the program. My main source of information has 
been a Request for Tender issued by the Department in 2016, which, although 
briefly published for the purposes of attracting tenders, the Department has 
since tried to keep secret. The relationship described earlier in this chapter 
takes place behind a veil of secrecy justified by cabinet and commercial 
confidentiality. 
In a Senate Estimates hearing on 11 Feb 2016 (CALC 2016, 197), senators were 
trying to learn details from department executives about the phasing of the 
WPIT program. The Department’s executives were being very coy about 
providing any details about cost, timing and functionality. After several 
thwarted requests for details, one of the Department’s executives suggested 
that senators could get them from a request for tender for system integrators 
that had been published on the Australian Government’s AusTender93 website 
(CALC 2016, 197). Specifically, the official mentioned a 100-page document 
that provided the information senators were seeking. By the time I looked for 
it on the AusTender website, it had been removed from the site, as per normal 
AusTender practice when a request for tender closes. So, I submitted an FOI 
request for the documents that had been previously published on AusTender, 
confident that previously published documents would be freely available.  
After charging me over $400 for search fees (which I subsequently negotiated 
down to half that amount), the Department refused access to all documents, 
including blank forms for tenderers to complete. The rationale for withholding 
 
93 AusTender is “the Australian Government’s procurement information system that provides 
centralised publication of Australian Government business opportunities, annual procurement 
plans, multi-use lists, standing offer notices, and awarded contracts, as well as access to 
approach to market documentation and addenda, and the Response lodgement functionality, 
accessible from: www.Tenders.gov.au” (DHS 2018b, 37). 
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the documents was that they 
...were available to the public for a certain period of time, which has now passed. 
A contract now exists between the department and the successful tenderers. This 
contract is ongoing, and arguably it would not benefit the public to disclose 
documents that may compromise the commercial interests of the successful 
tenderers. To do so may dissuade suppliers from submitting tender responses to 
the department in the future, an outcome that is not in the public interest 
(Correspondence from the Department of Human Services, 9 April 2018, 
emphasis added). 
Here we see an attempt to directly link the public interest with the commercial 
interest of a contractor. Also, this claim was made despite tenderers always 
being alerted to the possibility that tender documents may be subject to FOI 
requests (DHS 2016b, s. 63). On the upside, the refusal confirmed I was on the 
right track, because, “the documents you have requested would effectively 
disclose the department’s strategy for obtaining certain services to support the 
implementation of the WPIT programme” (loc. cit.). So, I appealed to the 
Department for a review. They refused again for the same reasons. In 
summary, the Department stated: 
• … disclosure of the documents would have a substantial adverse effect on the 
financial interests of the department, and is not in the public interest; and 
• parts of the documents … contain information concerning the business, 
commercial or financial affairs of one or more organisations, the disclosure of 
which would or could reasonably be expected to unreasonably affect that 
organisation in respect of its lawful business, commercial or financial affairs, 
and is not in the public interest (Correspondence from the Department of 
Human Services, 31 May 2018, 1, emphasis added). 
Subsequent scrutiny of the documents revealed no such details. The 
Department went further in explaining the significance of these documents 
and why I (or the public) should not have access material which would reveal: 
• detailed information and modelling about the structure and requirements of 
the department’s software systems at that particular point in time;  
• information and insights into the department’s business, strategic and 
commercial objectives, and operational environment;  
• tender assessment criteria which may be applied by the department in other 
procurement processes; and  
• (when the documents are read together) the department’s strategy for 
obtaining certain services to support the implementation of the WPIT 
programme. (Correspondence from the Department of Human Services, 17 
July 2018, 5, emphasis added)  
Here we are seeing a general argument for keeping secret the internal affairs 
of departments, even though, with such a large program with a big public 
impact, it might be of great interest to the public. I then appealed to the Office 
of the Australian Information Commissioner, which, after a few months, 
informed me they would take up my case with the Department. As soon as 
that Office informed the Department that they would be reviewing my request, 
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the Department dropped its opposition to my request and provided the 
documents in full.94  
Sophie Sturup has observed that deep partnerships between public agencies 
and their commercial partners can go beyond the merely contractual to 
protecting each other’s interests (2017, 296), and this may explain why the 
Department denied access to previously published tender documents. One of 
the factors the Department took into account was that disclosure “would, or 
could reasonably be expected to, unreasonably affect that person adversely in 
respect of his or her lawful business”. This was because “The documents 
within the scope of your request contain information regarding: certain 
commercial arrangements between the department and organisations; and 
certain product offerings or services of organisations” (Letter from the 
Department of Human Services, 31 May 2018). If such a defence was generally 
successful, it would put all public partnerships beyond the public gaze.95  
The 100-page document that the department recommended to senators was 
Attachment H: programme overview: RFT for the procurement of a systems 
integrator panel (DHS 2016a). It contains all the substantive information about 
WPIT contained in the Request for Tender. It goes way beyond information 
provided to parliament or the public in explaining the existing system, its 
problems, the future approach to delivering services, the requirements for the 
organisational capability sought from system integrators and how the 
department intends approaching the transformation. For contractual reasons 
and to encourage high quality tenders, departments have to open up to the 
market far more than in any other forum.  
Specifically, Attachment H sets out for prospective systems integrators the 
“scope and rationale for change”, the “current state” of the Department’s 
systems, the “target state” or the future vision for the Department, and the 
“transformation approach”. Throughout the document, the Department 
describes its relationship with the chosen integrators and the extent to which 
integrators will be involved in both setting the terms of the transformation and 
designing its course and end destination. In conjunction with a presentation to 
hopeful contractors and access to a confidential “data room” containing 
detailed information about current systems, Attachment H provides everything 
integrators need to know in order to prepare tenders to win the contract. 
 
94 The Department’s correspondence with me can be found at the Right to Know website at: 
https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/systems_integrator_panel_for_wpi 
Having been made available through a Freedom of Information request, the tender 
documentation can now also be obtained from Services Australia on request via its FOI web 
page: https://www.servicesaustralia.gov.au/organisations/about-us/access-
information/freedom-information/freedom-information-disclosure-log 
95 In the 1980s and 1990s, Australian Government agencies regarded the ability to keep 
commercial contracts confidential (even from Parliament) as a necessary part of the New 
Public Management reforms (Barton 2004, 9), until this practice was “substantially banned” by 
the Senate in 2001 (Barton 2009, 239). However, there is still a strong commitment to the idea, 
as my experience bears out. 
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I was able to intercept subsequent approaches to market for the WPIT 
program from the AusTender website as they were published. The most 
valuable of these was the Request for Information for development of an 
“entitlements calculation engine” (DHS 2018b), the most complex, risky and 
critical aspect of the WPIT program and a critical source of failure in previous 
Department projects, the Edge system (ANAO 2005, 24; Henman 2010a, 53–61) 
and the child support system (Deloitte 2019, 4). 
Overall, crucial information about large projects with private sector 
involvement is withheld from the public and parliament due to substantial 
exemptions in freedom of information legislation (de Maria 2001, 96). To 
illustrate the ease by which bureaucrats can sidestep even parliamentary 
exposure, the following exchange took place in 2015 as senators attempted to 
find out about WPIT in Estimates hearings. At that time, Senator Doug 
Cameron was the Shadow Minister for Human Services, Ms Kathryn Campbell 
was the Secretary of the Department of Human Services, and Senator Marise 
Payne was the Minister for Human Services. 
Senator CAMERON: I assume that you are familiar with the business plan?  
Ms Campbell: Yes.  
Senator CAMERON: I have called on the minister a few times to table or make 
the business plan public. Minister, can we see the business plan?  
Senator Payne: I think I have indicated in previous estimates that the business 
case is a cabinet document prepared for the express purpose of supporting 
cabinet to make the decision in relation to the future of the welfare payments ICT 
system, and as such, as a cabinet document, it is not able to be made available to 
the committee (CALC 2015, 66). 
Then, later that afternoon: 
Senator CAMERON: How does the Senate keep itself abreast of what is 
happening with this given that you claim commercial-in-confidence for the 
previous business plan? I assume you do not have a business plan ready for the 
main project commencing in two years’ time?  
Ms Campbell: We will go to the market and take those soundings about how 
much it is going to cost and how we will go about building this. The Senate will 
be informed, because before we can build it we need to be appropriated funds. 
Those appropriations will be documented in the portfolio budget statement and 
in the appropriation bills.  
Senator CAMERON: But there is a difference from appropriating funds and an 
understanding of what is happening.  
Senator Payne: We are able to ask questions about appropriations.  
Senator CAMERON: I am asking questions and you keep telling me it is a secret 
because it is commercial-in-confidence.  
Ms Campbell: I think we have articulated what the money that has currently 
been appropriated will be used for. When we go to the next phase and 
government hopefully agrees to that process and if we are appropriated funds 
then we will be able to outline what those funds are for (CALC 2015, 85). 
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This episode illustrates how easily bureaucrats can lay a blanket of secrecy 
over a program that has corporate involvement, even one that promises “a 
once-in-a-generation business transformation” (DHS 2016a, s.1) and an 
“opportunity to re-engineer the business of servicing Australians” (DHS 2016a, 
s. 3). The cover of cabinet confidence and other instances of “advice to 
government”, along with claims of commercial confidence ensure that no 
meaningful documentation of such a major program would see the light of 
day. 
7.7  Conclusion 
Chapter 6 illustrated how the system builders and their “stakeholders” were 
pursuing their own requirements under the banner of customer convenience. 
This chapter has described the emerging organisational arrangements within 
which this construction takes place. The ongoing and intimate relationships 
between a small number of large departments, vendors and integrators forms a 
tight community of system builders with an intimate alignment of worldview, 
discourse and practices. The Department’s “customers”, the parliament and the 
electorate are outsiders to this community. 
The Department’s tender documents reveal a deeply managerial way of 
thinking and talking. They also reveal the intimacy of the working relationship 
that bureaucrats expect to have with the integrators and the extent to which 
the integrators will participate in the planning and design of the organisation 
and the system that will mediate ever more of the Department’s relationship 
with the public. 
Traditional governance mechanisms and the public sector management 
discourse do not have the means by which to see these arrangements or to 
control them. A socio-technical system is being constructed that, if successful, 
will work by controlling its social environment as much as its own internal 
functions. The capacity of the system to observe and influence the 
Department’s customers, its intention to mould policy into a form amenable to 
automation and the extension of the Department’s service model to other 
government functions will serve to centralise this mode of power, its builders 
and its operators. 
The massive socio-technical complexity of the Department’s vision means that 
the program is a moving target and does not come with unambiguous and 
clearly defined requirements. The Department is quite up-front that “policy 
and/or the business requirements [evolve] over the life of the project” (DHS 
2016b, s. 75). This also means that the Department wants integrators to be on 
board throughout the process to help the Department navigate that 
complexity. Through Attachment H the Department was inviting systems 
integrators to help it work out what kind of organisation it should be, in effect 
re-engineering the requirements of the WPIT program even as they worked to 
fulfil them. It is a revealing demonstration of the snowballing risk endemic in 
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a risk society (Beck 2009). 
Bruce Kapferer describes how “the economic and the market” are shaping and 
becoming re-embedded in the social and the political to produce the 
assemblage of the corporate state (Kapferer 2010, 126–27). In this chapter, I 
have illustrated how the adoption of digital systems by government is a potent 
mechanism by which this shaping is advanced. With the fading of New Public 
Management as a driving ideology for new directions in public sector “reform”, 
one might say that digital transformation has picked up the mantle (Dunleavy 
et al. 2005). The rules, language and processes of the market are now 
embedded in the digitisation of government, being implemented by highly 
assertive corporations and public servants imbued with market-dominated 
New Public Management thinking. But this phase of the transformation is 
being conducted under the obfuscating cloak of technology ideology—
governments present this transition as merely installing new machines to 
enable the policy-determined work of delivering services—that all this is 
merely back-room administration. 
The construction of these new centres of power is such a far cry from digital 
government policies that it calls into question the sincerity of its continuing 
promotion. Partly because of the cover provided by the digital government 
narrative and partly because public sector institutions and discourse do not 
provide a conceptual basis for understanding and regulating this mode of 
governance, this activity is largely occurring under the radar of public scrutiny. 
Only occasionally, as in the case of Robo-debt or the overreach of new 
legislation (such as the expansion and integration of facial recognition 
programs) does this movement see the light of day. But these are largely 
regarded as isolated glitches rather than signs of a systemic shift in 
governance. 
In the light of the actual digitisation of government transactions, digital 
government is revealed as a bureaucratically-driven discourse that presents the 
happy face of digital government by emphasising the accessibility, ease-of-use 
and empowerment of the online interface, while framing-out and avoiding the 
downsides. In effect, the discourse presents one side of the Faustian bargain in 
which we willingly surrender personal power and autonomy for the irresistible 
attraction of convenience (Zuboff 2019, 11), but it does not reveal the price to 
be paid. 
The digital government narrative overlooks critical issues such as secrecy and 
surveillance, which are the building blocks of a greatly increased capacity for 
rational control in the hands of public officials and organisations. After 25 
years of online government, these pieces are just starting to come together to 
form a new mode of governance, but are obscured from view by a selective 
discourse and our collective inability to understand an unprecedented 
configuration of power. The digital government discourse carefully and 
comprehensively avoids spelling out what is actually involved in developing 
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systems that realise that pleasant vision, but also serve the conflicting agendas 
of cost-cutting, compliance, enforcement and extending the state’s capacity to 
“read” the public (Scott 1998, 5).  
But, more than anything, the absences in the digital government discourse 
protect the unscrutinised space within which the bureaucracy works and 
within which it can incorporate its commercial partners as they collectively 
construct a new mode of governance. The next chapter assesses that mode of 
governance as it becomes apparent from the system development practices of 
the corporate state behind the veil of digital government ideology. I examine 
several rationalising technologies for organising complexity that permeate this 
mode of government at a number of levels. Finally, I examine how such 
technologies constitute a steadily evolving corporate state, which reflexively 
provides a nurturing environment that encourages the technocratic ambitions 




PART 4  CONSEQUENCES 
CHAPTER 8  NEW STRUCTURES OF GOVERNANCE 
8.1  Introduction 
This final part of the thesis outlines an emerging mode of governance that is 
revealed by the construction of new systems and the concealments of the 
discourse. The challenge is to make sense of a political rationality that 
suggests convenience to the public but, in so doing, constructs the capacity for 
an unprecedented mode of control that is planned and operated by a hybrid 
public-private socio-technical assemblage.  
The elements of this mode of governance include the exploitation of new 
digital capabilities, the affordances for substantive organisational change 
offered by large IT projects, the accompanying methods of legitimation, the 
emergence of new subjectivities for people who are most entangled in this 
new regime, the rearrangement of government activities into horizontal 
modular structures, new public/private regimes of the corporate state and the 
effects of emerging forms of capitalism. These elements combine to constitute 
a power structure that lies beyond the sight and control of the political realm.  
This chapter and the next address two main questions. First, given the type of 
intimate inter-sector relations described in the previous chapter, what are the 
emerging forms of capitalist governance that the public sector is absorbing and 
facilitating; in particular, what emerging corporate trends are salient to the 
direction this fusion is taking? This question of structures is addressed in this 
chapter. Second, given the capability and the divergent interests that were 
described in the previous chapter, to what extent and in what ways is the state 
likely to use those capabilities? This question of motivation is addressed in the 
following chapter.  
In addressing these two questions, four perspectives are useful. First, it is 
crucial to look beyond the narrow view of technology by adopting Foucault’s 
concept of technologies of government and their role within an emerging 
governmentality and the formation of its subjects. Otherwise, to call the new 
regime digital government is to obscure many of the most important 
phenomena described in the previous part of this thesis. Indeed, it is to 
participate in the ideology and processes of production portrayed in Part 2. It 
is not simply conventional government delivered through a digital interface, 
but a new form of governance that involves far more than digitisation, which 
is better understood as a vehicle for introducing new forms of governance 
such as the partnerships described in the previous chapter. As Henman argues, 
digital government should not be “viewed as determining the nature of power 
operating within and by the apparatuses of the State. Rather, ICTs are 




Second, it is important to clarify the emerging capitalist innovations that are 
permeating the corporate state. Post-Fordist capitalism is not a static entity; it is 
undergoing change and many of the key players in that transition are 
transferring new techniques and technologies into government as they pursue 
new markets and generate an imperative for continuous change.  
Third, it is important to see the state as something other than monolithic, self-
contained and set apart from the market. Kapferer’s notion of the corporate 
state provides insight into the hybrid regime being constructed behind the 
curtain of digital government and the entanglement of its public/private 
players (Kapferer 2005a, 2010). As illustrated in the previous chapter, the 
practice of partnership provides a rich example of the fabric of the corporate 
state, in which corporations not only participate, but also leverage that 
participation into further entanglement with government. 
Finally, if we accept that such substantial shifts in social relations inevitably 
involve new power relations, we need to understand the subjectivities which 
are called forth by this new regime. In this chapter I suggest that these new 
subjectivities emerge in part through the direct implications of digital 
transactions with government, as well as through experience with parallel 
engagement with private sector interactions such as social media and online 
retail. In this latter respect, Zuboff (2019) from the perspective of surveillance 
capitalism provides a framework to interpret the emerging configuration of 
organisations, subjectivities, techniques, ideologies and apparatus which 
coalesce in an emerging form of market-inspired governmentality, which has a 
variety of implications for the state and the public. 
The changes being wrought under the banner of digital government extend 
beyond technology in the narrow sense. Through the lens of technologies of 
government (Rose & Miller 2010 [1992], 273), we expand our view of the 
forces of corporatisation in which digital technologies are deployed. In very 
broad terms, this restructuring results in horizontal formations that cut across 
the vertical formations imagined in conventional theories of government. The 
restructuring of the technologies of government occurring behind the mask of 
digital government is many-faceted, as the new mode of governance seeks to 
reshape its environment, including policy making, organisational structures, 
processes, apparatus, software, partnerships and working lives. 
The adoption of technologies is also an adoption of private sector “business 
models”, processes, values and language. Boltanski and Chiapello have made 
the case for understanding a “new spirit of capitalism” that has emerged in the 
last 30 to 40 years. The new corporate state reflects those changes in many 
ways, from modes of engaging staff to the outsourcing of policy and the 
“projectification” of work (Packendorff & Lindgren 2014). And as Zuboff has 
documented, major emerging developments in capitalism are not only 
unprecedented, but also incomprehensible through established ideas about 
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capitalism. But it is these emerging capitalist trends that are being pulled and 
pushed into government, making the contemporary public sector environment 
even more ineffable when viewed through conventional lenses.  
There are more indirect and pervasive ways in which emerging modes of 
capitalism are influencing the public sector, and so the discussion starts with a 
consideration of modularity as a principle and strategy for restructuring 
organisations and institutions. In Chapter 9, I examine the way that 
bureaucrats are using the apparatus, techniques and strategies described in this 
and the previous chapters. 
8.2  Modularity 
A pivotal way of understanding the dynamics of the restructuring of the 
technologies of government in the corporate state is through the lens of 
modularity. At one level, modularity is a pattern that can be observed in both 
technology and organisation as a response to managing complexity 
(Blanchette 2011, 1046; Langlois 2002). At another level it can be understood 
as a strategic socio-technical intervention to realign the distribution of work 
and to create and capture markets. For the corporate state, this is not just an 
incidental opportunity but has become a favoured technique for restructuring 
activities and outsourcing them to specialised organisations or systems, 
creating new products and services for new markets.  
Modularity has been theorised since at least 1962 by authors such as the 
highly influential Herbert Simon in his article The architecture of complexity 
(1962). Simon described modularity in the context of general systems theory. 
Richard Langlois summarises the concept this way: 
A decomposable system is one that is cut into pieces or ‘modularized’ in such a 
way that most interactions (which we can think of as flows of information) take 
place within the modules; interactions among modules are kept to a minimum 
and are regularized through formal ‘interfaces’. One of the prime benefits of 
decomposability, in Simon’s view, is that it allows for greater stability in the face 
of environmental uncertainty: a single piece can be altered, replaced or even 
destroyed without threatening the survival of the whole … Levinthal and March 
[(1993)] point out that decomposition entails (or at least allows) ‘loose coupling’ 
between organizational units, which effectively simplifies the information-
processing problem the organization faces. Each department can concentrate on 
the local consequences of the information it receives from the environment 
without having to contemplate the global implications (Langlois 2003, 355, 
original emphasis). 
However, as Massimo Paoli stresses, the points at which a system might be 
decomposed are not necessarily determined by inherent attributes of a system, 
“but rather as a function of the (subjective) conceptualization of the system” 
(2005, 163).  
At a higher level of modular organisation is layering, “a specific flavor of 
modularity where modules are organized in a series of client-server 
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relationships: each layer is a server to the layer above, and a client to the layer 
below” (Blanchette 2011, 163). This imagery comes from the world of 
software, in which user interfaces (such as web browsers) in the top layer are 
supported by applications in the middle layer, which in turn draw data from 
the data layer on the bottom. They are connected by standardised interfaces 
that allow modules in one layer to interchange data with modules in other 
layers. In this way, Services Australia is regarded as a service layer that 
supports “higher” policy functions of other departments—what the 
Department calls its “policy partners”.96 The ultimate end-point would be that 
Services Australia would present a single government (digital) interface to the 
public. 
The modularisation of activities and apparatus within an organisation lends 
itself to the idea of detaching them from the organisation altogether. For 
instance, organisations that are interested or persuaded to relieve themselves 
of the capital cost of buying and maintaining expensive but commodified data 
storage infrastructure can outsource this activity to companies via the Internet 
to “the cloud”, a function termed infrastructure as a service. This can be 
extended to hiving-off the mid-level of applications to the cloud as well, a 
function called platform as a service. Essentially this business model provides a 
supplier an ongoing stream of revenue and a degree of lock-in, with similar 
dynamics to the arrangement between software vendor and client described in 
Chapter 7. 
For computer-intensive functions, this hiving-off can include whole 
operational functions as well. In the example of shared corporate services, it 
has become a commonplace perception of government that since all 
departments undertake financial management and human resource 
management functions, it would be more efficient to combine these functions 
and their systems organisationally and technologically. With very mixed 
results, national and state governments in Australia and elsewhere have been 
developing shared corporate services centres and closing down those 
functions within agencies. Indeed, because of its extensive (SAP) computing 
infrastructure, Services Australia has become a supplier of corporate services 
processing for several other Australian Government agencies. 
Modularisation began as a strategy for manufacturing complex products from 
multiple complex components, but was then applied to associated 
organisational restructuring, often in the form of outsourcing (Dosi et al. 2005, 
98). It has been favoured for outsourcing corporate functions in the private 
sector—demonstrating the opportunistic dynamics of capitalism in identifying 
occasions for greater efficiency by outsourcing less profitable processes to 
organisations specialising in that function. This was accelerated in the 1980s 
 
96 This application of the vertical distribution metaphor of layering hits a snag if one has to 
place the public at the bottom of the stack, so it is no surprise that this logic is not vigorously 
pursued in the discourse. 
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by the shareholder value movement and the 1990s deregulation of US 
investment banks who vigorously engaged in advising firms to divest non-
profitable and “non-core” functions (Ho 2009). This approach has been 
vigorously pursued by system integrators to this day. In its submission to the 
National Commission of Audit, Accenture made a pitch to standardise systems 
across Australian states: 
… each state currently owns and operates its own systems for state taxes, vehicle 
and driver licences, business licences, fines and infringements. It would be 
possible to enable one of these systems as a standard solution across states while 
still maintaining state autonomy and interpretation of state laws. This would then 
enable a gradual move to harmonisation of state legislation and systems under-
pinned by a common national system and database (Accenture 2013, 11). 
While traditionalists may interpret this as an attack on state government 
sovereignty, this is an explicit suggestion to create a rhizomic structure across 
all Australian jurisdictions, with Accenture and a software vendor as critical 
nodes. Whether or not such schemes would succeed, the immediate 
beneficiaries of an attempt to do so would be the large software vendors and 
system integrators, such as Accenture, that would inevitably be engaged in 
establishing such large integrated systems. For decades, these organisations 
have been promoting large-scale systems and big-bang development projects, 
rather than incremental development (Dunleavy et al. 2006, 28). 
Here we come to a key aspect of modularisation as it relates to information 
technology—that once a particular activity has been abstracted into a module, 
it can be applied to what are categorised as similar situations and then, 
through configurable standardised connections, combined with other modules 
in order to build up larger systems. As we saw with the Department, software 
vendors developed modules to support the common business functions such 
as finance, human resources and customer relationship management. Systems 
integrators emerged to assemble standardised software modules, along with 
other technology and organisational systems into integrated wholes. In the 
process, they have become increasingly reflexive in their conscious strategies 
to identify opportunities for modularisation and to push them into new 
markets by persuading potential clients to see the advantages to configuring 
themselves to standard approaches. As mentioned above, the Department is 
engaging SAP modules to deliver internal management systems for other 
agencies and to deliver services to the public, thus resulting in a long-term, 
complex web of relationships between the Department, its client agencies, 
system integrators, SAP and other software vendors (Hobday, Prencipe & 
Davies 2005, 11). 
In this schema, state power is shared with the vendors who produce the 
modules, the integrators who identify, arrange and deploy them, and the 
organisations that set the standards and operate the interface infrastructures for 
communication between modules. The high-level complexity manifest in the 
old home-made ISIS payments system will have been largely delegated to 
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commercial modules and interfaces. 
The logic and marketising strategies of modularity also play out in the 
restructuring of work and working life through projects, now a common, 
taken-for-granted technology of government. Svetlana Cicmil, Monica Lindgren 
and Johann Packendorff document the rise of projects as yet another 
technique that has emerged from the field of IT: “Projects have emerged as a 
central aspect of organisational life in recent decades … supported by a well-
established set of Systems Theory-derived, ICT-mediated, managerial tools and 
well-organised professional communities” (2016, 58). There are two key issues 
here: first the role of projectification (Packendorff & Lindgren 2014) in 
breaking down work into packages that can be handed over to an internal 
project manager or outsourced to consultants and other service providers. 
Second is the subjectivity of the worker perpetually engaged in project work. 
The project is a means of modularising work, isolating it from the ongoing 
work of an organisation and, perhaps, even delegating it to another 
organisation. One of the most manifest instances of projectification is the role 
of consultants in policy and management strategy, the heartlands of rational 
choice theory in government. An independent review of the Australian Public 
Service echoed widespread concern about the “hollowing out of strategic 
policy skills … a core and enduring capability required of the APS” 
(Independent Review of the Australian Public Service 2019, 183). While the 
review treated this as a workforce management problem, management 
consulting has been a thoroughly entrenched part of contemporary public 
sector governance for decades, not coincidentally mostly in countries where 
enthusiasm for New Public Management runs high (Saint-Martin 1998). In 
effect, a significant body of policy and strategic management personnel and 
their skills and experience have transferred to the private sector and the 
bureaucracy has developed a habit of packaging change-related work into 
projects and farming it out to consultants (Saint-Martin 1998, 319).  
Beyond the projectification and outsourcing of policy and management work, 
projects have generally become what Chiapello and Fairclough have identified 
as a distinctive emergent “justificatory logic” of the New Spirit of Capitalism, 
“which emphasizes mobility [and] availability” (Chiapello & Fairclough 2002, 
191). One of the major aspects of this mode of capitalism that has to be 
justified is the extent to which 
a work-life framed as consisting of temporary assignments, temporary relations 
and recurrent performance evaluations may also be a work-life in which nothing 
is stable, nothing and no one is reliable, in which professional reputations, 
performances and senses of personal worthiness are repeatedly challenged and 
may be lost (Cicmil, Lindgren & Packendorff 2016, 59).  
Here, then, is a type of isolated, entrepreneurial subjectivity constructed by “a 
specific neoliberal notion of resilience, which entails project workers’ 
progressive subjugation to a permanent state of exception” (Cicmil, Lindgren & 
Packendorff 2016, 59–60). This state arises because every project is its own 
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drama in which the actors must demonstrate their capability by going above 
and beyond normal conditions of work. I once led a multi-million-dollar 
project with a fixed deadline and allowed my staff to be driven by a tyrannical 
project manager because I knew the pain would be over on a fixed date. 
Project workers are predominantly the people who construct programs such as 
WPIT. Their focus is on surviving the current project with reputation and 
employability intact, if not enhanced. Engaged by the system integrators, 
software companies, consultants, body shops and, sometimes, the Department, 
they are removed from the mainstream public sector culture. 
8.3  Platforms and platform capitalism 
At another level, the industrial structures with which digitising governments 
must engage are also evolving along a path of modularisation. One of the key 
trends has been described by Srnicek as platform capitalism (Srnicek 2017a, 
2017b). Srnicek defines platforms as follows: 
At the most general level, platforms are digital infrastructures that enable two or 
more groups to interact. They therefore position themselves as intermediaries that 
bring together different users: customers, advertisers, service providers, 
producers, suppliers, and even physical objects. More often than not, these 
platforms also come with a series of tools that enable their users to build their 
own products, services, and marketplaces (Srnicek 2017b, 42). 
The concept of platform is currently one of the IT industry flavours of the 
decade, heavily promoted by consultants and service providers (Finnerty 
2018). It provides a palette of mechanisms from the private sector that is 
inspiring public sector planners at many levels. The Department, for instance, 
regards the WPIT system as a platform for delivering government services 
more generally (Robert 2019). In accordance with Srnicek’s definition, WPIT 
becomes a platform for connecting third parties such as other departments and 
their own customers. The Department thus becomes a software service 
provider and integrator in its own right, further following in the footsteps of 
their commercial partners; and not without conferring upon itself the attendant 
powers of determining service models and system design. 
Benjamin Bratton extends this modular morphology more broadly and 
abstractly with the concept of the stack “a new architecture for how we divide 
up the world into sovereign spaces” (Bratton 2015, xviii). The stack is a 
technologically inspired pattern that allows us to, say, recognise SAP’s Social 
Protection software module as a layer designed and managed by SAP that 
extends globally across social service departments. There are other 
technological layers, such as the IBM hardware that constitutes the 
Department’s data centres. In that vein, the Department also aspires to be a 
layer in a government stack, capable of serving and being served by multiple 
modules in adjoining layers. Thus we see how this pattern makes it easier to 
recognise the ways governance extends across and through organisational 
boundaries (Bratton 2015, 7–8). 
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The connection with modularity is clear here. This approach parallels the 
technological logic of layered architecture (for instance, user interface, 
application and data layers) to an organisational level (Bratton 2015, 8), where 
such activities are not just separated at a functional level within an 
organisation, but can be outsourced to specialists who, in theory, can provide 
economies of scale and expertise in that function. Thus, at a material level, 
customers believing themselves to be transacting with a department are 
actually being mediated through commercially operated networks, data centres 
and applications, to say nothing of the personal devices and software in their 
own hands. In the light of the limitation of modularity discussed above, these 
mediations may comply with a department’s specifications, but the internal 
workings of the components must necessarily be delegated to the commercial 
provider, who must necessarily be optimising a standardised model that suits 
as many of their other clients as possible. In the Department’s procurement 
documents, we can also see the discourse and practices of modularity as a 
new generation of private sector thought entering the public sector. 
8.4  Centralisation of service delivery and the system-level 
bureaucrat 
In government, we can see the separation of policy and service delivery as an 
expression of modularity at the level of organisational structure. With the 
development of one-stop shops for customer service delivery and shared 
corporate services, the original vertically integrated department that combined 
policy making and service delivery, as well as its own internally operated 
corporate services, has seen both functions divested to organisations 
specialising in those activities. Services Australia is a site of both practices. On 
the customer service side, it is the result of several phases of service delivery 
consolidation that started in the 1990s.97 Also, given its size and its computing 
infrastructure, it is now a shared services “hub” for several other smaller 
Australian Government agencies. SAP enterprise resource planning modules 
operated by Services Australia are the platform for managing other agencies’ 
financial and human resource functions (DHS 2019b). 
Dunleavy and Margetts suggest some antipathy between New Public 
Management and what they call Digital Era Governance (Dunleavy & Margetts 
2015, 6–8), but these movements converge on the question of separating 
policy and service delivery. This hard division contrasts with the approach 
adopted by Lipsky, Bovens and Zouridis, Brodkin, Homburg and others, 
where policy is seen as being exercised traditionally in a continuum from 
high-level Cabinet decisions, down to “street level” decisions involving limited 
discretion concerning an individual citizen (Bovens & Zouridis 2002, 175–76; 
Brodkin 2007; Homburg 2009, 6). Michael Lipsky proposed that: 
 
97 I described this process in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-floor suites of 
high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it is actually made in the 
crowded offices and daily encounters of street- level workers” (1980, xii). 
From this perspective, it is the policy making power of street-level bureaucrats 
that is being systematically stripped away by digital government, thus 
addressing one of the major neo-liberal concerns about discretionary state 
power (Bovens & Zouridis 2002, 175). These authors document the rise of the 
system-level bureaucrat in charge of designing the systems that automate these 
once-discretionary face-to-face encounters with the public. Concerning the 
consequent shift in power, in 2002 Bovens asked, 
what about the discretionary power of these system-level bureaucrats? … It does 
not concern the application of general rules to individual cases, but the drafting 
and composing of the rules themselves … The information system is essentially 
political in nature, and the links between separate systems are politically relevant 
because, for example, political consequences may be ensuing from such a link 
(2002, 181–82). 
With the emergence of consolidated service delivery agencies such as Services 
Australia, the concentrated power of system-level bureaucrats becomes even 
more critical. And, as I have illustrated, it is not just bureaucrats in the narrow 
sense that are designing the systems. Some of the design comes pre-packaged 
in the global software modules, some comes in configurations constructed by 
systems integrators and written by consultants and contractors. And we have 
seen the necessity and priority given by the Department to simplifying and 
codifying legislation to make it operable in an automated environment. If the 
Department’s vision for its future came to pass it would become the hub for a 
broad range of federal, state and local government services. The range of 
services provided on-line by these levels of government would be expanded. 
The Department’s system-level bureaucrats, consultants, contractors and 
business partners would occupy a central node in a vast assemblage of data, 
organisations, apparatus, agreements, standards, legislation and policies. 
Formally disconnected from policy making, a consolidated service delivery 
function is free to operate on rationalist principles—efficiency, competitive 
choice of providers, customer satisfaction—rather than concern itself about 
social outcomes, such as equity and financial security. The separation of policy 
from what is variously called “service delivery”, “implementation” or 
“administration” is continuing the mission of the neo-liberal reinventing 
government movement, which has been so keen to separate “steering” from 
“rowing” (Osborne & Gaebler 1992). 
8.5  Restructuring policy in the image of the system 
Another recent development in private sector practice now reaching into 
government is the regtech (regulatory technology) movement. The 
Department’s procurement documents made repeated references to the need 
to standardise policy such that the rules of delivering welfare payments could 
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be simplified to facilitate automation (DHS 2016a, s. 16.1). Indeed, the dream 
of an all-online, automated future for welfare services is dependent upon the 
3,000 pages of legislation, regulation and policy undergoing a radical 
rationalisation. As mentioned previously, even the Australian Prime Minister is 
on board with regtech (Morrison 2019b), which seeks to convert policy into 
machine-readable algorithms. In this movement we see the early stages of a 
strategy on the part of the computational layer of governance to influence the 
policy making layer in its own image. This movement has disinterred the 
program of 17th century rationalists such as Leibniz, who argued that 
… if we simply succeed in devising an adequate artificial language, with all of 
our terms rigorously defined and all of the rules of inference clearly spelled out, 
there will be no more conflict, from small family squabbles to wars between 
empires. We will simply be able, whenever the first signs of conflict begin to 
appear, to declare, “Let us calculate!” (or, translated differently, “Let us compute!”) 
(Smith 2019, 31). 
The origins of regtech are in the financial services sector where companies 
needing to comply with complex financial regulations are seeking ways to 
encode those regulations to achieve real-time rigorous compliance. However, 
within government this has morphed into a concern to make regulations 
themselves more code-friendly. For instance, the Danish Government has been 
promoting “digital-ready legislation”, that “should strive towards using terms 
and concepts that have a clear definition across all legislative domains, and 
that rules should be designed for a whole or partial automation of the case 
processing involved” (Agency for Digitisation 2019). In Australia, this 
interpretation of regtech appears to be most developed in the NSW 
Government, which is encouraging its agencies to embark on a 
process of translating rules in legislation, regulation, policy into code so they can 
be consumed and interpreted by computers. Why code rules? Our society runs on 
rules set out in legislation, regulation and policy. However, these rules are often 
complicated, and difficult for people to understand. If we enable software and 
systems to understand those rules—by coding them—we can make government 
easier for people and businesses (digital.nsw 2019).  
In essence, this is an attempt to modularise policy. By expressing legislation in 
coded form, bureaucrats will be relying on coding’s intense use of modularity 
to control complexity through the re-use of “libraries” of standard terms and 
procedures. The irony of this push is that computerisation has enabled the 
creation of ever-more complex rules as, for instance, governments attempt to 
tighten eligibility criteria for government assistance to people in need 
(Henman 2010a, 193–96), a point that even the Department concedes (DHS 
2016a, s. 13.3). This raises the question of which dynamic will predominate—
the desire for more detailed conditionality or the drive of systems to rationalise 
their environment through simplicity and unambiguity? 
8.6  An evolving corporate state 
The story of welfare payments is repeated in the other process-intensive 
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“machine bureaucracies”, such as taxation and immigration; and its 
engagement with the corporate sector is following in the footsteps of the 
defence and intelligence sectors (Snowden 2019; Wills 2017). Dunleavy, 
Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler describe this general trend and its broader 
significance:  
The continuing development of government IT systems and the vast array of 
relationships between government agencies and global corporations in providing 
them constitute the reality of modernization and rationalization in the modern 
world. (Dunleavy et al. 2006, 216–17) 
Chapter 7 demonstrated the welcoming permeability of the contemporary 
public sector to the incursions of the private sector. But it is worth 
summarising the various ways that industry and its culture permeate the public 
sector. First are the more direct, if not visible, mechanisms by which neo-
liberal ideas have pushed and pulled the market into government. Generations 
of public servants have now been inculcated with New Public Management, in 
which the constitutive discourse of neo-liberalism has become pervasive at 
both administrative and political levels. In addition to this pull-factor of New 
Public Management, there is the push-factor of industry. Governments’ 
commercial partners come to the party with deep experience in working with 
other corporate and government partners, and with a strong interest in 
standardising their own forms of partnership across a landscape where 
government is just another industry segment to penetrate. Then there are the 
more obvious substitutions such as engaging personnel through individual 
contracts or contracting in bulk through body shops; using consultants for 
important strategy, policy and technical advice, planning, development and 
evaluation; or engaging in longer-term partnerships along the lines discussed 
in Chapter 7; not to mention the coarser strategies of outsourcing and 
privatisation. Finally, we have also observed an exchange of senior and 
technical personnel between the sectors; senior public servants join consulting 
firms or form their own boutique consultancies; and public agencies recruit 
senior and technical people from large corporations—a phenomenon known 
as “the revolving door” (Hodge & Bowman 2006, 120; Saint-Martin 2007, 686). 
It is also important to recognise the less direct interactions, many of which are 
mediated by the citizen-customers’ experience of digital services in the parallel 
world of digital commerce and surveillance capitalism, which shape public 
expectations and secure their acceptance of the industry’s tacit take-it-or-leave-
it rules of engagement with its products. 
These various levels of entanglement reflect Kapferer’s account of the diversity 
of routes by which the market is influencing and penetrating the state. While 
Kapferer conceded that “the particular contemporary rise of oligarchic-
corporate power might be better described as having state effects...rather than 
being the development of a relatively original state formation” (Kapferer 
2005b, 2–3, emphasis added), he also suggested that  
… there are developments in corporate control and organization that are taking 
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on a more firm state dimension. This is so in corporations’ appropriation of 
domains of public space and service, previously in control of states … increasing 
determination of state policies by corporations … the formation of transnational 
or transterritorial organizational structures in which corporate alliances (often 
involving governments) are beginning to have major force over populations 
(Kapferer 2005b, n. 1, 20). 
Further to this, I am suggesting that “digitisation” is a stalking horse that is at 
least as significant as any of these factors for opening up government to the 
market. Hiding behind the cloak of technological determinism, this mode of 
corporatisation is taking place beyond the gaze of the public, as well as 
oversight institutions such as parliament and the media. Digitisation represents 
a vigorous strategy of intermediation on the part of a wide range of consulting 
and IT-related industries, professions and advocates. It is just one field where 
innovative capitalists seek out and colonise new opportunities. Put simply, the 
aim of corporations is to insert themselves into the transactions of 
government—to monetise a (small) slice of each and every transaction, at all 
levels of governance, from policy and strategy to service delivery; and from 
data sharing to debt recovery; as well as all the layers in the technology stack, 
from telecommunications and computing infrastructure to mobile apps. This is 
now how an ever-increasing proportion of government money is spent 
(Department of Finance 2016). 
After 30 years, the constitutive discourse of New Public Management has 
brought about a thorough harmonisation of language between public and 
private sectors. Kapferer noted the broad spread of such discourse beyond the 
narrowly defined realms of commercial practice:  
The economic is the most inclusive discourse in the sense that its dynamics are 
vital across hitherto different or relatively distinct registers of human-related 
action. Economic and business-management metaphors are in a commanding 
position. Furthermore, they have been naturalized—that is, they have achieved a 
truth level more thoroughgoing than mere assumptions (Kapferer 2010, 145). 
At the level of discourse there is a strong degree of mutual identification and 
consonance of thinking about organisational arrangements. In texts such as 
Attachment H, public sector writers in this lingua franca demonstrate their 
managerial competence to players within and beyond government. This is 
how the Department described its future form when pitching the WPIT 
program to prospective systems integrators: 
… the changes proposed under the WPIT Programme to improve the way the 
department delivers Payments and services on behalf of Government to its 
Customers. This includes the department’s current thinking on the target state 
value chain, the Target Business Model (TBM), the Customer and channel 
strategies. This part also includes the business scenarios and Product Feature 
Categories as referred to in the Evaluation Criteria, Minimum Standards and 
Response Instructions. (DHS 2016a, s. 2, emphasis added)  
In the target business model, the account of the working arrangements 
between the government and non-government players demonstrates that these 
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relationships are not on the fringes of government. As Kapferer suggests, 
a feature of corporate states is that the rhizomic dynamic moves from a position 
that is more external or peripheral to state processes to one that is more at the 
heart of the state, as well as having more overt state-like ordering effects 
throughout national territories (Kapferer 2010, 129). 
Globalisation plays a formative role in Kapferer’s model of the corporate state. 
Along with the global language of managerialism and the digital government 
movement, the WPIT program provides examples of “new state formations 
that are emerging within globalizing processes and, indeed, are integral to it” 
(Kapferer 2005a, 287). The SAP software modules for “social protection” 
programs, customer relationship management and resource management 
represent a layer of standardised governance that cuts across jurisdictions. 
They are rhizomic at the material level of apparatus, along with the rules and 
other social arrangements required to select, design and operate them. The 
multinational systems integrators bring models of corporate management and 
change management to the process of adapting to global systems. 
As portrayed in the WPIT program, the organisational arrangements are also 
highly horizontal and stable through long-term partnerships. While neo-
liberalism may desire the outsourcing of government service delivery as 
envisaged by Accenture (2013), for now it may well be just as expedient for a 
corporation to inhabit a government body than replace its host in the eyes of 
the public—which is why rhizomic as a description of horizontal relationships 
works so well, especially in the light of the tight partnership proposed by the 
Department.  
While I am suggesting that the rhizomic network is eroding hierarchical 
government power structures, the distribution of power across the rhizome is 
another question, despite the belief of early Internet enthusiasts in the 
“flatness” of networks (Galloway & Thacker 2007, 13). The horizontal 
networks described here re-concentrate power in the development 
partnerships and consolidated service providers. The rhizomic perspective 
also entails a subterranean aspect. The obscurity of the transformation being 
undertaken by the partnerships reflects “a dimension of oligarchic-corporate 
structurings of power that seal off their domains of control and reduce the 
degree to which the general population can participate in their deliberations” 
(Kapferer 2005a, 296). 
The new spirit of capitalism in government 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s identification of a new spirit of capitalism emerging 
since the 1980s sheds further light on the current modes of corporatisation 
permeating the corporate state. The language, organisational arrangements and 
technological forms practiced and aspired to in the Department’s 
documentation (and in line with the literature churned out by consultants, 
software companies and integrators) are consistent with the specific features of 
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capitalism represented in Boltanski and Chiapello’s account.  
The distinguishing features of this post-Fordist mode include a “project-oriented 
justificatory regime”, a networked organisational environment, a high value on 
individual adaptability, flexibility in moving between projects, a focus on 
innovators and entrepreneurs as ideal subjects and reliance on organisational 
devices such as contracting and outsourcing (2006, 165–69). 
The particular value of Boltanski and Chiapello’s approach to the prevailing 
direction of capitalism is that it is based on a comparative analysis of 
management discourses of the 1960s and the 1990s (2018 [2005], 57–101). As 
discussed earlier, management discourse since the 1990s has had a profound 
impact on the ideology of New Public Management. In this literature, 
especially that produced by consultants, “the authors tried to provide an 
overall picture of the ‘new’ world in which we are living, as well as the 
characteristics of the new corporate hero, nowadays commonly called a 
‘manager’” (Boltanski & Chiapello 2006, 164). That discourse presented both a 
description and a eulogisation of distinctive features of a new form of 
capitalism (op. cit., 162). As we saw with the rhetorical tactics of the digital 
government discourse, such writing mashes-up descriptions of what is meant 
to be already happening with prescriptions for improving on the present. 
From this discourse,  
a new representation of the firm has emerged, featuring an organisation that is 
very flexible; organised by projects; works in a network; features few hierarchical 
levels; where a logic of transversal flows has replaced a more hierarchical one, 
etc. (Boltanski & Chiapello 2006, 165)  
Information technology-oriented industries and projects are at the vanguard of 
this movement. Since Boltanski and Chiapello identified this trend in the 
management literature of the 1990s, it has clearly blossomed in the intervening 
decades; accelerated by movements such as digital transformation, platform 
capitalism and surveillance capitalism. 
This spirit is deeply reflected in the Department’s pitch to systems integrators 
described in the previous chapter. It is particularly salient to the working 
arrangements of the people engaged on the $1.5 billion, seven-year WPIT 
program, as well as large projects in other departments. While some of those 
people are permanent government employees, most others involved in the 
program at all levels are working in the “gig economy”. Some will be engaged 
through individual contracts with the Department; some may be employees of 
SAP and the systems integrators, but others work on contract to those 
companies. Still others are contracted to body shops that supply “resources” 
(i.e. people) to the program. People from all these sources will work cheek-
by-jowl with each other inside the Department’s premises. Many of the varied 
specialists supplied to the program (whether, IT specialists, project managers, 
trainers, etc.) are more likely to move from project to project and across 
organisations, rather than up an organisational hierarchy. Many of the 
Department’s IT employees may have similar horizontal career trajectories.  
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As Boltanski and Chiapello point out, in the kind of “project-oriented 
justificatory regime” that prevails in this cross-sector environment, their 
primary assets and notions of self-worth are their availability, adaptability, 
flexibility and ability to communicate— 
What is relevant is to be always pursuing some sort of activity, never to be 
without a project, without ideas, to be always looking forward to, and preparing 
for, something along with other persons whose encounter is the result of being 
always driven by the impulse of activity (Boltanski & Chiapello 2006, 169). 
In this way, evolving forms of capitalism penetrate the state at an individual 
level, as well as organisational, technological and discursive levels. These 
relations manifest the ways in which neo-liberal ideology works to dissolve 
the distinction between public and private sectors and populates the hybrid 
environment with disconnected, responsibilised and entrepreneurial 
individuals. 
Parallels and links with surveillance capitalism 
Surveillance capitalism is another phase of capitalist mutation that is 
influencing the nature of government. Like the large data aggregations of the 
private sector, several major government initiatives, such as those in the fields 
of welfare payments, immigration, health and education, involve major 
restructuring of data gathering, storage, sharing and analytical capabilities. 
These initiatives have several things in common, the main one being that they 
are all person-centric; that is, the person is the key data element around which 
other elements and characteristics are oriented. As discussed in Chapter 6, this 
brings the person to the foreground and facilitates the linking of data through 
standardised identity conventions. In turn, this facilitates data sharing between 
policy domains and thence the creation of an increasingly consolidated 
rendition of each individual. Even when anonymised, linking information 
about individuals provides a wealth of data about their life trajectories across 
policy domains, and thus the ability to profile social groups in finer detail and 
then to precisely target programs and predict behaviour. This kind of capacity 
parallels the data gathering and use practiced by the exemplars of surveillance 
capitalism, Facebook and Google. While their business model does not require 
them to provide personal identification details to advertisers, they are able to 
finely target their clients’ advertisements to the platforms’ users. On the other 
hand, the enforcement powers and privacy exemptions available to major 
government departments, such as the Department and its “policy partners”, 
allows them to observe, track and predict the behaviour of identifiable 
individuals.  
As we saw in Chapter 6, the techniques that deliver personalised convenience 
can also enhance surveillance capability. Here we see a clear parallel with 
surveillance capitalism, which 
… offers solutions to individuals in the form of social connection, access to 
information, time-saving convenience, and, too often, the illusion of support. 
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These are the resources of the first text. More significantly, it offers solutions to 
institutions in the form of omniscience, control, and certainty. The idea here is 
not to heal instability—the corrosion of social trust and its broken bonds of 
reciprocity, dangerous extremes of inequality, regimes of exclusion—but rather to 
exploit the vulnerabilities produced by these conditions (Zuboff 2019, 383, 
emphasis added). 
This observation applies to digital government as it has played out in practice. 
As promised, it is providing convenience, but, as I have argued, that is 
secondary to the extent of work performed in the service of reducing 
uncertainty and ambiguity for those in power. The remediation of major social 
problems is a secondary concern to those who have designed and operated 
these systems. At best, these questions are left to the “policy partners” in other 
departments, ministers and parliament. As a specialist service organisation, 
Services Australia can focus on questions of efficiency, compliance and 
enforcement rather than broad social outcomes. In the next chapter, we also 
see the affordances of technology being exploited to manage the most 
vulnerable in the community. 
These processes reveal additional links to a neo-liberal political rationality and 
the emerging New Spirit of Capitalism, in which there are several interactions 
with surveillance capitalism as it is elucidated by Zuboff: (1) digital 
government is following a separate but parallel trajectory, as system builders 
find new ways of reducing uncertainty; (2) digital government uses the 
techniques and products developed by surveillance capitalism, such as 
customer relationship management; (3) digital government uses data collected 
by surveillance capitalism; (4) government adopts the language and worldview 
engendered by surveillance capitalism; and (5) the public adopts the 
subjectivity of surveillance capitalism. Overall, Zuboff’s analysis provides a 
framework for understanding a similarly unprecedented situation within 
government. 
The surveillance capability of government is already considerable. For 
instance, as mentioned earlier, the Department’s database of welfare recipients 
generated by the old ISIS technology “contains substantial volumes of data 
going back over thirty years” (DHS 2016a, s. 15.1) and “holds approximately 
32.2 million Customer records. The average Customer record contains 
approximately 32,000 data values” (DHS 2016a, s. 15.6). A summary of the 
personal data items collected by the Department runs to five pages.98 
While this detailed picture of individuals, their circumstances and their 
relationships provides the Department with immense oversight, it is not 
enough to satisfy the craving for certainty. The Department wants to improve 
its capacity to interrogate these data and to link them to other data sets to 
 





“enable the Department to undertake detailed risk profiling and customer 
segmentation, tailoring service offers to achieve better outcomes for both 
government and customers” (DHS 2016a, s.16.5). 
Moreover, governments are deploying the tools of surveillance capitalism for 
their own operations. When they purchase modules such as SAP’s customer 
relationship management, they acquire the surveillance functionality available 
to a typical contemporary corporation.99 Whether or not they deploy all of it, 
the capability is ready to hand if required and if system integrators see it as a 
useful function to activate. For a configured standardised system, as SAP adds 
new surveillance and analytical capabilities to the modules, they too become 
ready to hand for government. Unlike face-to-face and phone interactions, text 
and voice-activated assistants and chatbots create an information trail that can 
be added to the secondary text generated from each individual’s online 
interactions. 
8.7  Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the many ways that modularisation can be used 
to restructure and redistribute the technologies of government. As a 
technocratic strategy it both enables a deconstruction of activity to manage 
(and encourage) complexity, as well as obscuring the political consequences 
of the restructuring that follows. Modularity joins the other techniques of 
government that rationalise at many levels, from the management of physical 
infrastructure to restructuring the architecture of government. It is a way of 
thinking about re-organising things from many perspectives. Its consequences 
are generally the breakdown of vertically integrated organisations and 
activities in the construction of horizontally integrated organisations. This is 
not necessarily the much-lauded network, with its implications of openness 
and distributed power. Instead, the modular world constructs power that is 
vested in those organisations that perform functions for other client 
organisations. For profit-oriented client enterprises, this can reduce costs, but it 
creates dependencies on external organisations. For the public sector, its 
vertical constitutional accountabilities are compromised. The horizontal 
linkages are made from within the bureaucracy, the most closed compartment 
of the state, which is protected behind ministerial accountability100, cabinet 
secrecy and commercial confidentiality. 
Initially, the outsourcing of activities such as computer centres and 
telecommunications seems sensible. Getting governments out of a “business” 
with which they are unfamiliar, inexpert and uncomfortable seems almost the 
natural thing to do. But, when “technologies” targeted for outsourcing start to 
 
99 However, while SAP’s customer relationship management module is very powerful, it does 
not compare with the computing power of a specialist firm such as Facebook or Google. 




include those that embed rules of governance, then governance is being 
outsourced. The obfuscating effects of this strategy will work so long as the 
functions can be labelled “technology” rather than “government”. But 
modularity is now occurring at so many levels it is hard for governments to 
see who is, or should be, making these calculations. The strategy for the WPIT 
program, for instance, was developed by the Department and 11 consulting 
firms. The implementation is the product of a multi-way partnership.  
The individuals working for these organisations are themselves modularised – 
working on another gig in a string of gigs across government and private 
sector projects. To the extent that such free-floating agents commit to the 
current project and its value to their career, they are less committed to the 
social outcomes or values of a government program. Not only are citizen-
customers removed from “the government” by layers of technologies and 
organisations, but so are the individuals involved in building those systems. In 
a sense, the system developer is also a module within a layer—a complex 
component that can be re-used across multiple projects in multiple locations. 
The net product of these modularised deconstructions and reconstructions is a 
state permeated by private sector people, subjectivities, governance, methods 
and apparatus. Such a state is increasingly open to further cultural melding. 
Existing accountability mechanisms from the 19th Century, designed as 
safeguards against the nepotism and biases of pre-modern bureaucracy are 
unable to see or respond to these structures. 
The next chapter considers the innovations being contemplated and 
implemented by bureaucrats with the technologies now available to them—
allowing us to see where the will to certainty takes them when they have such 




CHAPTER 9  NEW MUTATIONS OF GOVERNMENTALITY 
9.1 Introduction 
The newly developed capabilities and social formations provide bureaucrats 
with significant potential scope for discretion and action, beyond the explicit 
powers set out in legislation. The question is, will bureaucrats use that 
potential and, if so, how; and what does that tell us about their aspirations for 
control and for future methods of reducing their uncertainty? This chapter 
explores some motivational dimensions of this emerging form of 
governmentality by examining several Australian Government projects that 
provide insight into what bureaucrats are doing with these expanded 
capabilities.  
Robert Castel wrote of a “mutation” of governmentality in which strategies for 
reducing uncertainty decompose the subject of government programs into risk 
factors, resulting in the distancing of the subject from government (Castel 
1991, 288). The Australian Government projects covered in this section each 
reflect this mutation. The first is a statement of the Department’s vision of its 
future, taken from Attachment H, which paints a picture of a government 
apparatus that could exert considerable control over its customers, staff and 
“policy partners”. I then discuss two data aggregation projects, led by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Department of Home Affairs 
respectively, that show the extent to which a government can lawfully 
construct enormous information systems about citizen-customers based on 
information originally provided by them, but re-used without their knowledge 
or consent. The next is a (non-WPIT-related) automation project of the 
Department that graphically illustrates how far bureaucrats will go in pursuit of 
a fully automated process in the name of compliance. I then describe several 
current initiatives of the Department that go beyond surveillance to attempting 
to control the behaviour of citizen-customers. Finally, I give an account of two 
“post-political” forms of engagement with citizens that illustrate the extent to 
which the original dreams of citizen engagement have shrunk back to 
methods of bureaucratic co-option. Following that, I examine the 
consequential subjectivity of the citizen-customer, a hybrid being that emerges 
within this governmentality. 
9.2  A new kind of public service 
The Department’s vision for the future expressed in Attachment H reveals 
what kind of organisation could be delivering the full online retail experience 
to the unsuspecting citizen-customer. In pursuit of such a program in 2016, the 
Department and its consulting partners summarised the vision for its future as 
a “target business model”, listing its components as: 
Target business model components 
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• Circumstance-based approach to managing customers … 
• Customer segmentation and risk profiling to target service delivery … 
• Self-managed experience for customers … 
• Whole-of-government approach … 
• Ease of servicing through the digital channel … 
• Automation of service and benefit processing … 
• Real-time debt prevention and compliance detection … 
• Standardised template based approach to payment and service design … 
(DHS 2016a, s. 18.1) 
Overall, these components reveal an attempt to rationalise the delivery of 
government services to remove the risks and ambiguities presented to the 
system by staff, customers and policy makers. Such a vision is neither new nor 
confined to welfare systems. With reference to health services, in 1991 Castel 
describes the desired endpoint of such a telos: 
The extreme image here would be one of a system of prevention perfect enough 
to dispense with both repression and assistance, thanks to its capability to 
forward-plan social trajectories from a ‘scientific’ evaluation of individual abilities 
(1991, 295–96). 
The Department’s imagined set of practices reveals several techniques and 
technologies of an evolving corporate state. Given that the WPIT program is 
being mooted as a model for delivering federal, state and local government 
programs, it is worth drawing out the significance of these features as 
technologies of an emerging governmentality that will be widely experienced 
across government.  
As mentioned in Chapter 6, a “circumstance-based approach” is based on the 
key concept of circumstances as 
events that have or will occur in a Customer’s life, as disclosed to the department 
by the Customer or authorised third party, for the purpose of determining 
Eligibility and Entitlement and then receiving benefits or services. This may 
include citizenship or residency, family relationships, earnings, income and assets, 
and many other aspects of the Customer’s life (DHS 2016a, s. 15.4). 
Thus, circumstances connect a customer to relationships, employment, 
education, other life events, social and legal categories, time and space.101 
From a Foucauldian perspective, Colin Gordon agued presciently in 1991 that, 
Computerization and administrative rationalization begin to make possible for the 
first time a ‘real’ government of population which, by co-ordinating appropriate 
forms of expertise and assessment, is capable of identifying all those individual 
members of society who can be deemed, by manifesting some combination of a 
 
101 Apart from references in the Department’s procurement documents, the only organisation I 
have seen refer to circumstance in this way is SAP, suggesting the Department may have 
picked up this concept from a software vendor, although I cannot verify this for sure. If so, it 
is an indication of how the language and methodology of a commercial entity can deeply 
influence how a government frames a fundamental aspect of its operations. 
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specified range of ‘factors’, to present a significant, albeit involuntary, risk to 
themselves or to the community (Gordon 1991, 45). 
As a benefit for the citizen-customer, the circumstance-based approach 
ostensibly offers them the prospect of being notified when they become 
eligible for a benefit, but, in doing so, also provides a licence for government 
to keep tracking customers’ circumstances via third party data sources (DHS 
2016a, 20.5), even after the original benefit is no longer provided. “Customer 
segmentation and risk profiling” provide the basis for managing individuals on 
the basis of their membership of a circumstance category defined by the 
system builders. As Robert Castel observes, what such  
preventive policies primarily address is no longer individuals but factors, statistical 
correlations of heterogeneous elements. They deconstruct the concrete subject of 
intervention, and reconstruct a combination of factors liable to produce risk 
(Castel 1991, 288).  
Circumstance management provides a formal framework for categorising these 
kinds of risk. Later in this chapter, I describe a data aggregation and sharing 
program (MADIP) that links individuals’ data held by the Department with 
those from other agencies, to support research and analysis aimed at better 
targeting government programs (ABS 2019a). 
The “self-managed experience for customers” exemplifies the construction of 
the self-actualising subject of neo-liberalism described by authors such as 
Henman (2010a, 216–17) and Rose (1996, 59–60). But, as Henman points out, 
multiple modes of rule can apply at one time (2010a, 214), and in this case the 
self-motivating subject is complemented by a proactive, circumstance-based 
mode of anticipatory supervision. More importantly, the idea of a self-
managed experience is a sleight of hand, by which the Department makes 
itself disappear. It is just as pertinent to see that customers are being 
“managed” at a distance (Latour 1987) through and behind an assemblage of 
rules, social arrangements and apparatus. As will be discussed later, people’s 
experience with online and mobile public and corporate systems has 
disciplined them in a variety of ways that encourage compliance with a 
system’s mode of action.  
In the next feature of the target business model, it is easy to miss the emphasis 
in the phrase “ease of servicing” as it refers to the ease with which the 
Department can provide a service (DHS 2016a, 16.6); not the ease of the 
customer’s experience. Along with automation, this component of the target 
business model emphasises the government’s desire to reduce its own costs, 
uncertainties and complexities in transactions with the public. Later in this 
chapter I will discuss how the strength of this desire drew the Department and 
the government into a legal and public relations quagmire (known as Robo-
debt) and demolished the bona fides of a customer-friendly ethos. 
As discussed later in this chapter, “real-time debt prevention and compliance 
detection” are presented as assistive techniques for the customer, but they also 
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come with benefits for the Department in the form of reduced costs and fewer 
overpayments. As with circumstance management, this capability depends on 
live connections with third party public and private data systems to “pre-fill” 
customer forms and check the accuracy of customer-provided data. In a 
government-wide implementation, one could also expect the Department’s 
data to be available to other enforcement organisations for similar purposes. 
To serve the Department’s desires effectively, the real-time aspect depends on 
instant access to external databases or for the Department to acquire the data 
and receive live updates from the source. Otherwise, lags produce errors, 
increase uncertainty and reduce confidence that the government’s data is 
superior to the customers’. 
Finally, a “standardised template based approach to payment and service 
design” calls for a common approach to imagining, structuring and delivering 
payments across programs, organisations and jurisdictions (DHS 2016a, s. 
16.1). The Department is already starting with a payment framework loosely 
constrained by rules pre-embedded in software and the design conventions 
and techniques of the software company (SAP) and the integrators. To this the 
Department will necessarily have to apply further constraints to achieve the 
kind of standardisation that is required for additional social service programs if 
they are to be less costly and easier to administer. 
9.3  Building a shadow text 
Given that the Department claims it “touches the lives of around 99 percent of 
Australians” (DHS 2018b), it therefore holds data on nearly all the population. 
But there is a seemingly insatiable appetite to further connect those data to 
even more government datasets that it does not hold itself. To this end, it is 
participating in a data linkage program that demonstrates the bureaucracy’s 
willingness and capacity to build surveillance infrastructure, without 
parliamentary or public oversight. Notwithstanding that this project is de-
identifying individuals, it is developing techniques for linking individual data 
across a wide range of social programs. These data can be used for purposes 
such as profiling and targeting the “high risk” population groups mentioned in 
the Department’s pitch to systems integrators. The experience in analysing de-
identified linked data will provide insights into future opportunities for linking 
directly to identifiable individuals in other government systems for 
enforcement purposes. More importantly it demonstrates the extent to which 
government can repurpose data originally collected in the process of 
providing services—and in large volumes neither envisaged or visible through 
the lens of privacy law.  
This initiative, the Multi-Agency Data Integration Project (MADIP), was 
commenced in 2015 and became fully operational in 2018. The project’s lead 
agency, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) glowingly states:  
Research from MADIP provides whole-of-life insights that can improve the lives 
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of all Australians. By bringing together a broad set of person-centred data from 
across government domains, MADIP facilitates the use and re-use of public data 
for research purposes (ABS 2019b). 
MADIP links “person-centred data” derived from collections concerning 
taxpayers and their wages, longitudinal census data, surveys of household 
income, primary and secondary school students, post-secondary trainees and 
apprentices, child care attendees, government-assisted higher education 
students, users of Medicare-funded services and government-subsidised 
pharmaceuticals, cancer patients, migrants, foreign and Australian overseas 
travellers, pensioners, welfare recipients, family allowance beneficiaries, 
people with disabilities and their carers (ABS 2019b, 55–64). The ABS and its 
partners are planning to add datasets concerning vaccinations, children in state 
care, “detailed Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander data”, and “business data 
to link employer characteristics, such as business size, to employee records” 
(ABS 2019b, 1) as well as detailed data from the State of NSW concerning 
school students, their families and teachers. The linked data includes 
information defined as “sensitive”, namely health, ethnicity and racial 
background, Indigenous status, religious affiliation, and sexuality (ABS 2019b, 
18). Many, if not most, of these datasets hold a great deal of detail about their 
subjects. 
MADIP is a major project under a larger government initiative, the Data 
Integration Partnership for Australia (DIPA), which is an “investment to 
maximise the use and value of the Government’s data assets … DIPA creates 
new insights into important and complex policy questions through data 
integration and analysis” (DPM&C 2019). This was a result of an inquiry by the 
Productivity Commission (2017), which argued for a “new paradigm” which 
included benefits that mirror the claims made for digital government, such as: 
• more informed decision making by consumers, businesses and government 
• improved public services arising from data-driven efficiencies and better 
targeting of government policies and programs 
• more open and transparent government, generating greater confidence and 
empowered citizens … 
• boosting Australia’s competitive advantage and business opportunities through 
innovation and a world-leading data environment 
• transformation of everyday life through personalised products and services, 
and a greater variety of choices (Productivity Commission 2017, 170, emphasis 
added). 
Aware of the sensitivities around the use of such vast quantities of personal 
information, ABS and its partners have implemented a range of protections, 
declaring that MADIP:  
… operates under a framework of legislation, governance, and information 
management protocols that ensures data are shared and used for public benefit, 
privacy is protected, and data remains secure (ABS 2019b, 1).  
Indeed, some MADIP datasets, such as census information, consist of only a 
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small sample of the total collection, so not all subjects can be linked to all 
their relevant datasets. There are elaborate procedures to isolate identifying 
keys that link individuals across datasets and to anonymise the subjects of the 
data.  
The ABS has twice reviewed the privacy implications of MADIP in accordance 
with the Australian Government Privacy Act (ABS 2019b; Galexia, Connolly & 
Van Dijk 2018). These reviews are the only source of public information about 
its weaknesses. In 2018 the ABS commissioned a privacy impact assessment 
(PIA) to assess MADIP’s compliance with privacy legislation. Until that time 
the project was claimed to be in an “evaluation phase”, but the assessment 
found that “in most areas relevant to privacy MADIP is operating as a fully 
functioning program” and that “all available data, including sensitive data, has 
been acquired, consolidated and integrated” (Galexia, Connolly & Van Dijk 
2018, 21). In waiting for three years before commissioning a review, and “prior 
to detailed consultation with stakeholders or the public”, the partnership 
completed a system that contained several significant flaws which were 
ultimately identified by the assessment. Apart from developing a fully 
functional system, neither the ABS nor the source agencies informed the 
public in any meaningful way that personal information was being collected 
for use through MADIP (Galexia, Connolly & Van Dijk 2018, 8). For instance, 
census privacy policies “contain one brief mention of data integration … an 
average reader is unlikely to be aware a of the scale and significance of data 
integration being conducted under MADIP” (Galexia, Connolly & Van Dijk 
2018, 24). Furthermore, these data were being retained for long periods; we 
have seen that Services Australia has kept welfare benefits data going back 30 
years to commencement of its current system (DHS 2016a, s. 15.1). 
A fundamental lesson from this exercise is that such a massive consolidation of 
personal information is possible by grace of exemptions in privacy legislation 
and that no specific authorisation is required for it to operate. The privacy 
impact assessment points out that “sharing with MADIP is allowed based on a 
combination of notice to consumers”, and exemptions to the Privacy Act, 
“complemented by further exceptions in the legislation that governs MADIP 
Partner Agencies” (Galexia, Connolly & Van Dijk 2018, 30).  
However, notice to consumers, while compliant with legislation, was found to 
be generally lacking: 
… these notices typically paint a picture that most data is collected from 
individuals, rather than third parties, and that any exceptions to this approach are 
minor. The forms also paint a picture that data is disclosed to a small number of 
other agencies for a range of very specific purposes. Research may be briefly 
mentioned as one of these purposes, but it is highly unlikely that a person 
reading the notice would understand that all of their data is automatically shared 
with MADIP and integrated with other data they have provided to other agencies 
(Galexia, Connolly & Van Dijk 2018, 36, emphases added). 
This very important observation highlights a commonly-held perception that 
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makes it hard to see the large-scale re-use and linkage of personal information 
by government, all made possible despite, or perhaps because of, privacy 
legislation. It explains the difference between the way most people, both 
inside and beyond government, perceive such exemptions and how far those 
exemptions permit large-scale sharing and re-use. It is what makes such a 
large shadow text invisible. 
The invisibility of such large-scale programs is further enhanced by the failure 
of government to notify individuals or the community of the re-use of their 
data. A follow-up internal privacy review of MADIP by the ABS a year later 
found that the ABS and its partner agencies had still not given sufficient notice 
to the public on the sharing and reuse of data through MADIP (ABS 2019b, 3–
7). To put it politely, the two reports indicate a general bureaucratic ennui 
about giving open and proactive notice to people about data sharing and re-
use programs such as MADIP. However, beyond this is the more general 
problem of the impenetrability of online privacy policies and notices. Even if 
agencies disclosed in full their involvement in MADIP, they could still rely on 
the widespread public apathy about such statements, whether for public or 
private service providers, such as Facebook or Google. Finally, even if they 
did read the policy, there is no way that a person rendering personal 
information to a source agency can withhold consent for its use through 
MADIP (Galexia, Connolly & Van Dijk 2018, 38–39). As with Facebook and 
Google, the take-it-or-leave-it option might be available if one is prepared to 
forego the convenience of the service; but with government “services”, such as 
taxation and law enforcement, even that option is not at hand. 
Perhaps an even graver concern here is the absence of attention shown by the 
MADIP program participants or the authors of the PIA about the risk of 
function creep by future governments. MADIP is a massive data “honeypot” 
that sits in wait as a “standing reserve” for future enforcement agencies with a 
plausible exceptional circumstance ready at hand. For instance, in lauding 
MADIP, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which runs the DIPA 
program, has cited improved “outcomes in sensitive areas such as hospital 
admissions, contact with the justice system, and child abuse and protection” as 
one of the benefits of data integration (DPM&C 2017). Consider how the 
combination of those particular data sets could be used to identify and track 
alleged or potential child abusers—a plausible exceptional circumstance that 
could easily be invoked to justify access to data about an individual. That 
access could be provided cheaply and quickly with a change in legislation. 
The expense, time and hard work of building the system is already complete; 
the system will exist indefinitely through political and social changes beyond 
the career-span of the system builders. When justifying further negative 
impacts on privacy, the universal defence deployed by public officials is its 
present lawfulness, even though, for instance, “MADIP involves a significant 
expansion of the use and disclosure of personal data” (Galexia, Connolly & 
Van Dijk 2018, 38) across multiple programs and involving millions of people.  
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Technologies of identification 
MADIP is hardly the only large-scale data aggregation being attempted by the 
Australian Government. Its Department of Home Affairs has led the 
development of an assemblage of laws, agreements, expertise and apparatus 
that links identifying information, including 
an individual’s name, current or former address, date of birth and gender … [an] 
individual’s facial image, and information contained in driver’s licences, other 
licences, documents provided to people who are not Australian citizens, and 
travel documents such as passports” (JCIS 2019, 40–41, emphasis added). 
In general, the initiative aims to establish “services” to “identify, recognise or 
verify a facial image” (JCIS 2019, 4). Echoing the catch cry of digital 
government, the stated purpose of this initiative was in large part to 
make it easier for documents containing facial images to be safely verified online, 
making access to government services more secure, accessible and convenient for 
citizens. This means that, over time, more and more services can be provided 
completely online, making life easier for everyday Australians (The Hon David 
Coleman MP, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and 
Multicultural Affairs, House of Representatives Hansard, 31 July 2019, p. 11 (cited 
in JCIS 2019, 1, emphasis added)). 
The program commenced on a limited scale in 2016, providing Federal Police 
access to passport data, an intra-jurisdictional Federal program. Then the 
system was expanded to include visa data for people travelling to Australia 
and drivers licence data from state governments (JCIS 2019, 13). The system 
has been built and partly populated with driver’s licence data from other 
governments, although inter-jurisdictional exchanges have not so far been 
activated (Barbaschow 2019). This is because the enabling legislation has been 
rejected by at least two Federal parliamentary oversight committees that 
inquired into it (JCIS 2019, 28–29). In a comprehensive bi-partisan report (JCIS 
2019), the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (JCIS) 
described a proposed regime based on a complex pastiche of legislation, 
intergovernmental and commercial partnership agreements, regulation (op. cit. 
46–47) and policy that obfuscates oversight by parliament, the public and civil 
society.  
The Government attempted to put the Bills through parliament before 
parliamentarians could see the supporting documentation that included much 
of the governance provisions for the overall regime. In many important 
respects, the Bill provided enabling powers while the supplementary 
documents contained the limitations on the enabled power, thus providing 
scope for their expansion without parliamentary oversight (JCIS 2019, 50). 
When challenged about broad powers available in the Bill, the Department of 
Home Affairs stated that it intended to use them only in a specific way (JCIS 
2019). This non-intention defence appeared in relation to at least three issues: 
whether the system could allow mass surveillance (JCIS 2019, 52 & 84), 
whether the Minister could provide access to additional agencies without 
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legislative approval (op. cit. 87) or whether system data could be used as the 
sole evidence of identity (op. cit. 89). 
Whether deliberately or carelessly, the Department was reserving for itself 
broad discretion concerning the type of data to be collected and how, and by 
whom it could be used. Like MADIP, there were also major shortcomings in 
notifying individuals about the new use of their information and obtaining 
their consent to do so (JCIS 2019, 61 & 78). Similarly, the proposed legislation 
proposed “to invoke an exception to the collection, use and disclosure of 
personal information” (JCIS 2019, 32). 
One of the purposes for which the identity matching would be used is “law 
enforcement activities” that include the prevention and detection of offences 
against the law. These provisions are similar to the exemptions provided 
under privacy laws and those governing other large data projects such as My 
Health Record (My Health Records Act 2012, s. 70). The Australian Human 
Rights Commission submitted that such use “appears to contemplate intrusive 
surveillance of persons (or, indeed, of the community at large) before any 
crime has been committed, and indeed potentially before there is any reason 
to believe that a particular crime will be committed” (JCIS 2019, 44). The 
Department of Home Affair’s defence against this argument was, in effect, that 
it was not illegal under privacy laws and that such activities were not at 
present practically “feasible” (JCIS 2019, 44–45), leaving the option open for 
the future, should new means make it feasible. 
As the Department of Home Affairs and its consortium sought to increase the 
visibility of their subjects, they also sought to protect themselves from public 
and parliamentary scrutiny. The parliamentary committee found that the 
Department, despite its arguments to the contrary, should be required to 
report annually on certain key aspects it wanted to keep secret: 
the names of private sector users of the Facial Verification Service, the accuracy 
rates of the biometric facial recognition algorithms used by the identity-matching 
services, any data breaches notified under the provisions in Part IIIC of the 
Privacy Act 1988, and any security incidents in relation to use of the identity-
matching services” (JCIS 2019, 91).  
Regular reporting to the Parliament on commercial use of the verification 
service was opposed by the Department of Home Affairs because of 
commercial confidence concerns. The Department also opposed the 
identification of commercial providers of the artificial intelligence algorithms 
used to support decision making processes involving identity data (JCIS 2019, 
71). Once again we see examples of government players in the corporate state 
protecting the interests of commercial partners and the providers of artificial 
intelligence facial recognition algorithms (JCIS 2019, 73), even when those 
partners would be identifiable by the community via other means (JCIS 2019, 




With MADIP we saw how far a massive data aggregation and linking project 
could get without specific authorising legislation or parliamentary oversight. 
The facial recognition project further illustrates the progress that can be made 
within the scope of existing law, but also the ways in which legislation can be 
put to work in the interests of bureaucratic surveillance. However, it also 
shows what parliamentary scrutiny can reveal and possibly remediate when 
such programs are brought into daylight. This kind of scrutiny goes beyond 
the bureaucrats’ appeals to lawfulness to questions of public interest and the 
long-term risks of creating massive honeypots of useful data. 
MADIP represents a major investment in the government’s ability to analyse 
the vast collection of human-related data it has already collected and which it 
will increasingly collect as it moves to informated online transactions and “self-
service”. As it develops new capabilities to understand and target ever-more 
specific social groups, the question arises whether this will be to improve the 
delivery of personalised services or more tightly confine eligibility for social 
programs and to encourage self-exclusion from social welfare programs. The 
following account of the Department’s Robo-debt project suggests the latter 
course may have priority in the minds of those in charge of crafting new 
systems. 
9.4  The lure of automation 
Once individual programs collect data from individuals, those data become 
available as input to other government initiatives. While MADIP may restrict 
itself to the anonymised aggregated patterns made by individually linked data, 
agencies with an enforcement function are empowered to connect data in 
order to check compliance. The previous chapter revealed the extent to which 
the Department saw this capacity as a crucial component of their “target 
business model” (DHS 2016a, s. 18.1). In 2016 the Department seized the 
opportunity to link taxation and welfare payments data and, through an 
automated process, to identify and recover alleged overpayments. The 
scheme’s official title was the Online Compliance Initiative or OCI. However, 
because of the consequences of its automation, it became widely known as 
Robo-debt.102 Ultimately this program turned out to be a technical and legal 
overreach (Duckett 2019). But in the process, it demonstrated the eagerness of 
officials to automate processes without considering the human, legal and 
reputational consequences. 
Robo-debt suggests an answer to the two questions I raised earlier: if the 
opportunity for surveillance and enforcement is there, will bureaucrats reach 
for it? Second, given that automation is a double-edged sword of customer 
 
102 The following very scant description of Robo-debt is based on more thorough accounts of 
the initiative and its shortcomings by the Commonwealth Ombudsman (Commonwealth 
Ombudsman 2017), the Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee (CARC 2017), 
Henman (2017) and Carney (2018a). 
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convenience and tighter compliance, which edge will predominate? As Zuboff 
has made clear, technologies do not determine a particular mode of 
surveillance (2019, 15). The future impact of the kind of functionality that the 
Department is seeking will depend not so much on the technology and advice 
they are acquiring so much as how it resolves the competing demands of 
efficiency, “system integrity”, customer convenience, natural justice and equity 
into a mode of governance. Involving many of the elements discussed above, 
Robo-debt and other recent initiatives provide some insight into how system-
level bureaucrats are likely to be predisposed to resolving these issues. The 
project was the Department’s first major foray into an automated compliance 
process using third party data, algorithm-based data matching and decision 
making, and customer profiling. As such it was a step into the future portrayed 
in Attachment H. Robo-debt was part of a government program to recover 
over $2 billion in estimated welfare overpayments over several years (CARC 
2017). One gets a sense from Senate Estimates hearings leading up to the 
commencement of Robo-debt that the Department was keen to demonstrate to 
the guardians of the public purse that new technologies and cost-recovery 
methods could retrieve enough funds that would more than off-set the entire 
cost of the WPIT program103 (CALC 2015, 67–84). So, there was pressure on 
the Department to use whatever means available, even if it caused 
unnecessary distress to thousands of customers. 
Attachment H made repeated references to the desirability of using third-party 
data to validate customer claims for benefits. The Department regarded these 
sources of data as superior in accuracy and timeliness to data provided by 
customers—as well as being more convenient for customers of course. The 
procurement documentation also envisaged a future in which transactions with 
customers would be fully automated, under the rubric of “end-to-end” digital 
processes (DHS 2016a, s. 18.5).  
The purpose of Robo-debt was to identify welfare benefit overpayments by 
matching income data from the Australian Tax Office against income data 
supplied to the Department by customers for the previous four years. The 
problem was that the Department compared people’s stated income for 
fortnightly welfare payments with an average of annual income that the 
Department obtained from the tax office. This meant that for people with a 
variable income, discrepancies would emerge, even if those people had been 
completely honest and accurate with the information they provided to the 
Department. Instead of triggering a check by humans, the Robo-debt program 
sent a letter to beneficiaries requiring them to disprove that an overpayment 
had occurred. If the Department identified a discrepancy, 
Customers are asked to confirm or update their income using the online system. 
 
103 In their testimony to the Senate hearings, DHS officials stated that the WPIT program and 
the cost recovery initiative were separate, but they were part of the same budget package for 
DHS in 2015–16. 
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If the customer does not engage with DHS either online or in person, or if there 
are gaps in the information provided by the customer, the system will fill the gaps 
with a fortnightly income figure derived from the ATO income data for the 
relevant employment period (‘averaged’ data) (Commonwealth Ombudsman 
2017, 1). 
If people did not respond or have the evidence to hand or could not 
otherwise account for an overpayment, the Department would raise a debt 
and automatically apply a 10 percent recovery fee. For many beneficiaries, the 
whole process was confronting and stressful and there were many reports of 
people paying up even if they did not have a debt because they felt the 
government must know best or because they did not want to confront the 
government (CARC 2017, 36–39). Initially, the Department did not provide a 
helpline number or explain the income averaging process (Commonwealth 
Ombudsman 2017, 2). 
These experiences triggered a range of media reports that brought Robo-debt 
into public consciousness, substantially eroding the reputation of the 
Department and automated benefits processing. The Commonwealth 
Ombudsman (2017) and the Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee 
(CARC 2017) made adverse findings about the way the initiative had been 
implemented. 
Nevertheless, the Department regarded the project a great success because of 
the revenue recovered. The Department’s Acting Deputy Secretary, Integrity 
and Information told the Senate Finance and Public Administration References 
Committee, “We’ve made it quite clear that we think the project has gone 
quite well. We’ve delivered lots of savings” (FPARC 2018b, 38). The head of 
the Department at the time was subsequently reported admitting that they had 
got things wrong in communicating to customers (Easton 2018), but nobody in 
government resiled from the move to put the onus on customers to prove 
compliance against an automated process (Carney 2018b, 4).  
But, by November 2019, and in the face of an impending court decision 
(Amato v The Commonwealth of Australia  2019), the Department had to 
acknowledge the illegality of the program and that it should not have relied 
solely on tax office data to estimate debts and that it should not have imposed 
the burden of proof on customers to demonstrate they did not have a debt 
(Sadler 2019). In June 2020, the Australian Government announced that it 
would repay $721 million for 470,000 debts alleged by the Department 
(Hendry 2020). It was also facing a potential estimated payout, reportedly 
“more than $1 billion”, in damages through a class action by over 30,000 
aggrieved citizen-customers (Galloway & Harris 2020). 
This negative feature of digital governance is not new; it has been identified 
since the early days of automated processing of regulatory transactions. 
Bovens and Zouridis, writing in 2002, describe two transitions that occurred in 
the 1990s, in which discretionary decision making was progressively removed 
from front-line staff and ultimately replaced by algorithm-based decisions 
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defined by a system builder, or system-level bureaucrat (Bovens & Zouridis 
2002, 177–180). One of the examples was a student grant and loan scheme, 
the other a speeding fine regime based on speed cameras. The latter scenario 
has been replicated in many jurisdictions in the last 20 years. It is a handy 
model by which to understand the more complex regulatory procedures. 
Before speed cameras, potential offenders first encountered police officers 
who would consider any extenuating circumstances before commencing the 
process of issuing an infringement notice. With speed cameras, this step is 
removed, the infringement notice issued automatically and the alleged 
offender can only challenge the decision later in the process, sometimes 
having to go all the way to court for the first opportunity to challenge the 
penalty. 
Bovens and Zouridis describe this new form of administration “system-level 
bureaucracy”, which has the following characteristics: 
Contacts with citizens no longer take place in the streets, in meeting rooms, or 
from behind windows, but through cameras, modems, and Web sites. ICT has 
come to play a decisive role in the organizations’ operations. It is not only used 
to register and store data, as in the early days of automation, but also to execute 
and control the whole production process (2002, 180). 
This mode contrasts with “street level bureaucrats” who deal with the public in 
person, interpret and apply policy and use computers only for accessing and 
making records of the transactions they have conducted off-line. The 
technocratic urge to be digital from end-to-end has several consequences. The 
common theme with all these examples is that it removes discretion from the 
early stages of the process to the end. It also moves the burden of proof from 
the government to the citizen.  
With regard to the pitfalls of data matching between programs with different 
purposes, the Department had, in a less public forum, acknowledged potential 
problems with third party integration: “there are challenges in ensuring the 
effective exchange of data between systems and organisations due to the lack 
of a defined welfare information taxonomy or common welfare data 
interchange standards” (DHS 2016a, s. 15.6, emphasis added). Income is one 
of these difficult concepts. The Department even admitted to having multiple 
definitions for income that varied between its own programs (DHS 2016a, s. 
15.4). 
The Department hopes that the underlying problems of Robo-debt will go 
away in the future because it will receive fortnightly pay details that are 
automatically sent to the tax office in real time by employers whenever an 
employee is paid. This assumes that this process, called “single touch payroll”, 
will be universally implemented by all employers and self-employed people 
(DHS 2016a, s. 20.5) and that the logic of the programs and their data 
structures will match.  
As I will argue later, to build technological infrastructure that is capable of 
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surveillance and control does not necessarily mean that it must inevitably be 
used to compromise citizens’ privacy and autonomy. That is, the technology 
does not deterministically result in excessive surveillance and control. 
However, the implementation and sustained defence of Robo-debt provides a 
clear picture of the justifications and readiness to prioritise enforcement over 
customer service. In justifying recourse to external data to validate welfare 
payments, the Department turned to the ideology of mutual obligation to 
make the case: 
In the future, the department will also utilise data from trusted Third Parties to 
process Circumstance changes such as changes in income, for example, through 
the ATO via implementation of the single touch payroll system. This information 
will also enable targeted management of mutual obligations in line with 
Government legislation and policy. (DHS 2016a, s. 20.5). 
Apart from the lure of automation, these tendencies also reflect a general trend 
in the ambition of executive government. Barbara Cruikshank, in citing similar 
neo-liberal-inspired events in the US since the 1980s, documents how 
functions, such as fraud prevention, previously conducted in the political and 
judicial domains have been transferred to the administrative domain, but also 
that “Rather than being a ‘depoliticising’ move, the expansion of administrative 
domains has served to expand the reach of power, a particularly productive 
kind of power” (Cruikshank 1999, 113). This tendency has been accelerated by 
the emergence of what Tamara Tulich and others have termed “the 
preventative state” (Tulich et al. 2017). While that analysis has focussed on the 
post-9/11 anti-terrorism efforts of intelligence agencies and legislators, there 
are clear parallels within administrations to profile and target high risk groups 
in order to prevent or pre-empt undesirable behaviour. Zuboff also documents 
the drive in surveillance capitalism to predict and ultimately control behaviour 
(Zuboff 2019, 199–204). 
9.5  From surveillance to control 
Recent initiatives in social services have revealed the extent to which 
governments have been willing and able to exploit surveillance technologies 
to extend their interventions into direct behaviour control. As Zuboff points 
out, the best way to predict behaviour is to control it (Zuboff 2019, 202). The 
general increase in networked computing power, as well as the capacity for 
data linkage and sharing has accelerated the neo-liberal drive to frame welfare 
recipients as individuals responsible for their own fate (Henman 2010a, 216–
17). These include reducing or cutting-off welfare payments for people who 
default on fines or are subject to warrants, compulsory drug testing for welfare 
recipients and controlling their expenditure through debit cards that only work 
in certain stores or even for specified products. 
In its budget for 2018–19, the Australian government announced that it would 
deduct welfare payments for people who were subject to legal penalties 
imposed by other jurisdictions, namely state and territory governments. The 
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budget papers outlined the purpose and its justification in the following way: 
Encouraging Lawful Behaviour of Income Support Recipients 
The Government will establish a scheme to encourage lawful behaviour from 
income support recipients. 
Under the scheme, the Commonwealth will be able to make compulsory 
deductions from the welfare payments of serial fine defaulters who have 
outstanding State and Territory court-imposed fines. The Commonwealth will also 
be able to suspend or cancel the welfare payments of individuals who have 
outstanding State and Territory arrest warrants for indictable criminal offences. 
The scheme will strengthen the principle of mutual obligation underpinning the 
Australian welfare system by requiring recipients to meet their obligations under 
State and Territory laws. It will also enhance the integrity of the welfare system, 
ensuring those avoiding justice are not being supported by taxpayer funds. 
Financial implications for this measure are not for publication (nfp) as the scheme 
is subject to negotiation with the States and Territories. (Morrison & Cormann 
2018, 172) 
Apart from revealing a rather predatory approach to pursuing people who 
have fallen foul of the law, this initiative reveals the means and the 
justification for linking data about individuals across jurisdictions and 
functions. The first justification is an explicit appeal to “encouraging” lawful 
behaviour, by using a financial lever to force compliance with court orders. 
The reciprocity entailed in the prevailing individualistic welfare ideology of 
mutual obligation (Henman 2004, 185) is extended to apply that obligation to 
the broader state in all areas of life. Here it is easy to see the way that digital 
government initiatives such as data sharing could create an enveloping web of 
control for people with multiple connections to multiple government 
programs. Inevitably, this will entangle vulnerable groups and leave the more 
privileged unscathed. One wonders if the original proponents of joined-up 
government had something like this in mind. 
Another area of technology-assisted direct intervention into the lives of 
individuals is income management, in which an ever-expanding range of 
groups are subject to restrictions on how they spend government benefits. 
Income management’s primary aim is to ensure that a proportion of income 
support and family assistance payments are available to be spent on priority 
needs and cannot be spent on excluded items, including alcohol, tobacco, 
pornography or gambling goods and services. This means that money is available 
to be spent on necessities, including food, housing, utilities, clothing and medical 
care (DSS 2020a). 
Elsewhere, the encouragement of “socially responsible behaviour” (DSS 2020b) 
and the removal of cash from targeted communities (DSS 2018) are also cited 
as objectives of income management. Through the use of debit cards issued 
on behalf of the government, welfare recipients’ expenditure is limited to 




In another initiative, the Australian Government has, at the time of writing, 
introduced legislation for a trial program of compulsory drug testing for certain 
welfare recipients. Those testing positive would be subject to compulsory drug 
treatment and income management. The legislation is strongly opposed by a 
broad spectrum of medical and community organisations (CALC 2019b, 21) for 
being punitive rather than supportive and, based on similar experience 
elsewhere, is also likely to be ineffective.  
These initiatives extend both a gaze and a means of control over targeted 
classes of people. In addition to the normal interactions of welfare recipients, 
involvement in any of these three schemes generates yet more data that can 
be added to a person’s record. Furthermore, this most likely takes place 
without their knowledge. The privacy notices provided to people involved in 
these schemes are opaque to the point of meaninglessness. Participants in the 
cashless debit card program are offered a hollow assurance that the program 
complies with privacy law and are informed that “Privacy issues are addressed 
in the legislation for the Cashless Debit Card” (DSS 2019), presenting a 
challenge for anybody not familiar with the labyrinth of social security 
legislation. The relevant sections of the Social Security (Administration) Act 
1999, ss. 124PN and 124PO, only expand the already-comprehensive powers 
of government officials to gather and share information about program 
participants. These powers, which trump all privacy laws, are spelt out in a 
completely different part of the Act (Part5). This is also an illustration of a 
government instance of what Zuboff calls a shadow text—a text that is 
generated from original transactions but then applied to other purposes 
beyond the knowledge of the subject (Zuboff 2019, 186). The informated 
processes that trace the activities of people subject to these controls then add 
to the body of data that the Department has of welfare claimants and 
recipients, further enabling the targeting of individuals and groups that may 
present a risk to the integrity of the payments system. Henman argues this 
capability has 
helped to stimulate, reinforce and extend new forms of conditional public policy, 
whereby receipt of a government service or benefit in one policy domain was 
made conditional on activity and data in a separate policy domain. In this respect, 
e-government has helped to advance the reconfiguration of citizenship into one 
which is increasingly conditional (Henman 2010a, 225). 
The most disadvantaged groups will most likely be caught in the net created 
by adding fines, court orders, warrants, drug tests and expenditure controls to 
the data about the Department’s customers. This will thereby further deepen 
the extent to which the most disadvantaged are required to trade-off greater 
surveillance and control in exchange for greater welfare benefits (Alston 2019; 
Bridges 2017; Cruikshank 1999; Henman 2004, 187). The symbiosis of 
increasing surveillance capability with neo-liberal policy trends such as 
prevention, prediction and conditionality runs the risk of creating a state that 
“seeks to purposefully exclude those who cannot, or who will not, play by the 
new rule of reciprocity” (Dwyer 2008). As Henman explains, 
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the scrutiny and surveillance of new conditionality policies, as well as the 
financial disincentives and barring from access to services, falls predominately on 
certain groups of people, while large proportions of society are unaffected 
(2010a, 165). 
Thus, the neo-liberal depiction of a minority as “failed citizens” who need to 
lift their game is sold to a majority that has not experienced that form of 
governance. This proposition received support from a strange source in the 
form of the Australian Government’s response to the unemployment caused by 
measures to control the Coronavirus outbreak in 2020. When a large 
proportion of the workforce lost their jobs and went on the dole, the 
government doubled the unemployment benefit and dropped the mutual 
obligation requirements (Henriques-Gomes 2020). 
Overall, these trends raise questions about the subjectivity of the citizen-
customer who is confronted on many sides and required to behave in certain 
ways to benefit from a range of programs that construct interlocking renditions 
of each subject; and whose cooperation is one of the main conditions on 
which the success of such a regime is grounded. 
9.6  What of e-democracy? Post-political citizen 
engagement  
After service delivery, public participation in the activities of government was 
originally presented in the digital government policies as a main selling point. 
Overall, the policy documents promoted increased opportunities for public 
involvement in government decision making through the affordances provided 
by online media. One may recall the Western Australian Government 2004 
commitment to 
establishing new ways for citizens to participate in the decision and policy-
making processes of government … [and] new avenues for government to 
increase its accountability to the citizenry through greater openness and 
transparency of its operations (OeG 2004, 15 & 18). 
Sixteen years later, we are seeing how these new modes of participation are 
playing out. A key feature of the way that participation was discussed in the 
corpus was that the engagement would be between individuals and the 
bureaucracy, rather than, say, between civil society organisations and elected 
officials. There were occasional references to community organisations who 
represent specific public interests, but overwhelmingly the assumption was 
that consultation will take place directly with individuals, because of the 
opportunity afforded by online technologies for people to engage with 
“government” directly. Here we see a clear manifestation of Pierre Bourdieu’s 
depiction of neo-liberalism as “a programme of the methodical destruction of 
collectives” (Bourdieu 1998). 
Two recent practices reveal bureaucratic approaches to public participation 
that tend to adopt the carefully-managed techniques of marketing in the post-
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political world described by Žižek (Kaethler, De Blust & Devos 2017, 177). 
One example is the Victorian Government’s Engage Victoria “online 
consultation platform104” which is provided by the Department of Premier and 
Cabinet and developed by a commercial partner, Harvest Digital Planning. 
This company describes itself as 
a civic participation company that enables people to actively shape their cities 
and communities through technology. We help our customers [i.e., government 
agencies] navigate the digital landscape, build intelligence, and unlock 
meaningful insights. 
Our team of urbanists and technologists deliver effective digital solutions and 
transformations by blending skills in urban planning, public participation, data 
analysis, digital mapping, web design and software development (Harvest Digital 
Planning 2020). 
The Department of Premier and Cabinet describes public engagement as “a 
planned process with the specific purpose of working with individuals and 
groups to encourage active involvement in decisions that affect them or are of 
interest to them” (DPC (Victoria) 2019). For each initiative, the website 
provides information about the proposal and associated consultation events, 
usually followed by a questionnaire with multiple-choice questions and 
structured comment boxes. While providing an additional avenue for citizens 
to identify and comment on proposed policies, initiatives and projects, this 
“channel” provides citizens neither the capacity to engage with each other, nor 
with the commercial or government interests that are also “stakeholders” in the 
issue at hand. In panoptical terms, the inmates are encouraged to 
communicate fully with the control tower, but not with each other to create or 
enhance any alternate centres of power. In contrast, corporate and 
government interests can maintain their more intimate channels of engagement 
with political and bureaucratic members of executive government. For them 
there is no particular value in using this medium, as it effectively levels them 
to the status of a citizen-customer. The contributions of citizen-customers are 
funnelled into the bureaucracy, never to emerge into daylight. There is no 
apparent feedback to the public on the results of the surveys, the broader 
consultations or the ultimate decisions. This contrasts with inquiries by 
legislatures, which generally publish submissions, transcripts of hearings and 
reports. 
Another important arena for engaging the citizen-customer identified in the 
digital government discourse is in the planning of services. A relatively recent 
approach to citizen participation is co-design, which is proudly favoured by 
Services Australia. Such techniques of participatory design “emerged out of 
user involvement in workplace and software systems design” in the 1980s and 
are still used in the IT field (Blomkamp 2018, 731). The other source of 





practice, in particular industrial design, and has been applied to the public 
sector in the last decade or so (loc. cit.). 
In 2009–2010, the then Department of Human Services first implemented a co-
design approach, developed for them by a consulting firm (DHS 2010, 220). 
As the Department described it at the time, 
a co-design approach that builds on traditional stakeholder engagement to engage 
with the people who actually use government service delivery and actively seek 
their views on how services could be better delivered. 
Co-design is more than asking for feedback or undertaking consultation or 
satisfaction surveys. It means engaging with individuals and groups from the 
beginning to the end of a process. 
Our co-design approach will ensure: 
• genuine partnerships are built with the community 
• the community has a real and ongoing voice at the table 
• change delivers a balance of what the Australian Government, the Human 
Services portfolio and the community want to achieve 
• the end user is involved in the planning, development and implementation of 
solutions 
• outputs are user-friendly and meet the end user’s needs 
• change and new products integrate smoothly with existing systems (DHS 
2010, 25–26, emphasis added). 
As detailed in the previous part of this thesis, the WPIT system design is 
subject to several major constraints, such as the problems of shaking-off the 
old system, the rules embedded in the pre-fabricated commercial software 
modules, the influence of systems integrators and their established 
methodologies, the participation of government and non-government policy 
and service delivery “partners”, the hundreds of pages of pre-defined system 
design requirements, and the massive weight of existing legislation, regulation 
and policy. This restricts the participants in even the most engaging co-design 
process to little more than putting a polish on a pre-defined service. This is 
reflected in the account of co-design in the description of the WPIT program, 
in which customers had disappeared from the list of “stakeholders” to be 
engaged with in designing (online) services: 
To achieve the WPIT Programme Outcomes the department recognises the need 
to truly transform its business and change the way it interacts, collaborates and 
co-designs an end-to-end welfare Ecosystem across a broad stakeholder group. 
This includes whole-of-Government, business and Delivery Partners, digital 
providers and state jurisdictions and non-Government organisations (DHS 2016a, 
s. 17).  
In 2018 this absence was acknowledged as a cause of problems associated 
with the Department’s Robo-debt initiative. In 2018, while the program was 
still running and being vigorously defended by the Department and the 
government, the Secretary of the Department of Human Services at the time 
Robo-debt commenced, Ms Kathryn Campbell, was reported as admitting “it’s 
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fair to say, when DHS rolled out the online compliance initiative which went 
on to be known as ‘robodebt’...we didn’t do quite as much co-design as we 
should have” (Easton 2018). However, in advocating co-design to her 
colleagues, Ms Campbell inadvertently shed some light on two of the 
shortcomings of citizen co-design when she claimed “if you engage with the 
citizen, they will give you feedback on how best to deliver the policy, 
regardless of whether they like it [the policy] or not” (loc. cit.). The first of 
these shortcomings is the extent to which citizen feedback is confined to the 
issues defined by those running the consultation. The second is the separation 
of policy from service delivery, as manifest in a specialist service delivery 
organisation such as the Department. When the service delivery organisation is 
structurally separated from its “policy partners”, policy and its broader social 
outcomes are somebody else’s concern. 
Inevitably, because of the one-to-many structure of such consultations, they 
are initiated by bureaucrats and carried out on the bureaucracy’s terms and 
timetables. Internal discourse around co-design is deeply couched in the 
language of formal methodologies. This is how a senior official of the 
Department described a consultation with staff when questioned by senators 
about whether staff had been consulted about a major change to call centres: 
there is a co-design workshop that we do with our staff, and we also have a 
business adviser onboard to assist. I can advise that is KPMG. They have had a 
longterm relationship with the ATO, so they are very experienced in this work. 
Obviously we want to have industry best practice. That consultation, that design, 
will look at exactly the types of calls, how they can best be handled and what the 
major benefits that can come out of those are. So, absolutely, it will be co-
designed (CALC 2017, 109–10). 
Once again, in addition to a heavy dose of managerial language, we see a 
close, mediating involvement of a consulting firm when designing and running 
consultations with the type of internal and external “stakeholders” who one 
might think would have a more direct relationship with a department.  
The common features of these sites of engagement with the citizen-customer 
is the one-way flow of information into the bureaucracy and the latter’s 
maximisation of its own discretion in structuring services and programs, all 
while comforting itself and others that the public has been engaged and is 
therefore partly responsible for the design of services. Whilst we may assume 
good faith and sincerity in bureaucrats’ attempts to incorporate public views 
into program planning, it is rarely, if ever, at the cost of their own ability to 
manoeuvre or control events (Lea 2008, 10–12). Compared with the more 
conventional processes of representative government, the horizontal 
networked techniques of consultation constitute “a proliferating maze of 
opaque networks, fuzzy institutional arrangements, ill-defined responsibilities 
and ambiguous political objectives and priorities” (Swyngedouw 2005, 1999). 
Only a tiny minority of people will ever get to stand in for what the 
department called “the end-user” or “the community” in relation to design 
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workshops. The majority will be at arm’s length from “government”, separated 
by layers of apparatus and organisational specialisation, self-servicing and 
responsibilised as the fulfilment of the neo-liberal subject. 
9.7  The subjectivity of the citizen-customer 
The mode of power suggested by the examples of control mentioned above is 
also built on a corresponding subjectivity that is co-constructed with those 
modes (Cruikshank 1999, 38–39; Rose & Miller 2010 [1992], 272). While most 
of these initiatives are being developed beyond the public gaze, someone 
subject to the workings of a surveillance state will soon-enough realise the 
extent to which they have become rendered in a government-held text. Finely 
detailed personalisation may ease their interaction with government programs, 
but attempts to correct or nuance that persona may not be so easy. The 
experience of Robo-debt created many cases of surrender and helplessness in 
the face of a rendition backed by multiple departments working to 
unfathomable rules (Australian Council of Social Service 2019). There are 
already comprehensive data held about citizen-customers from early 
childhood, primary, secondary and tertiary study, (un)employment, 
parenthood and old age. Now another proposed Australian Government 
project will share data about a person from birth. The justification for piloting 
this project is “to improve parents’ engagement with government during the 
life event of having a baby”, but could effectively establish the foundations for 
a single national identity (ADDC 2019; DTA 2018, 25). This, and other projects 
oriented around “life events” will lead to a citizen-customer rendered in fine 
detail, their behaviour made predictable through the targeting and profiling 
based on the interpretation of the data aggregated through linkage programs 
such as MADIP and a variety of compliance-based data sharing arrangements 
such as Robo-debt. However, regardless of how much detail is collected about 
a person, it will be limited to their role as a citizen—a person defined only in 
relation to government, and as a customer—a person defined only in relation 
to a service. All that cannot be rendered in data or algorithms is invisible. But 
for some, the volume of data will convey an impression of completeness. 
These renditions are the basis for a technology of government supporting a 
neo-liberal political rationality of conditionality with respect to accessing 
government services. 
… e-government has helped to advance the reconfiguration of citizenship into 
one which is increasingly conditional. The emergence and extension of the new 
conditionality in public and social policy, which networked e-government both 
facilitates and makes realisable, not only formally redefines the meaning and 
purpose of government services and reconstitutes the relationship between 
service recipients and the state … (Henman 2010a, 225).  
Through this process, Peter Dwyer argues that there emerges “a new type of 
social citizenship in which individual responsibility and duty take precedence 
over rights to welfare” (Dwyer 2008, 209, emphasis added). But conditionality 
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that combines two policy domains, such as tax and welfare or health and 
education, the citizen-customer “must understand, engage with, and 
cognitively and practically link together two separate government agencies” 
(Henman 2010a, 165), each with its own logic. 
Beyond the complexities of individual programs is the ineffability of the 
totality of connections made about a person by the state. Will the citizen-
customers ever have a chance to see how they are seen by the state? Freedom 
of information laws only let them see a partial view, program by program, or 
agency by agency. Even then, the subject must often formally apply to see 
how they are rendered by a program or agency—and often have to pay for it. 
The broader problem will be the near impossibility of seeing their avatar(s) in 
a single view. Given the nature and contingencies of databases, applications 
and data sharing arrangements, as each encounter with the state unfolds, 
individuals will be only partially rendered on the fly according to the 
immediate context of the transaction. While their data are linked, the views of 
that person will always be fragmented according to the organisational and 
programmatic structures of government. Their treatment by the state will 
inevitably be based on information that the subject can never see in its 
entirety; nor can the subject be seen in their entirety.  
Reinforcing that situation is the preconditioning of the public by surveillance 
capitalism to accept the trade-off between convenience against surveillance 
and loss of autonomy, despite the occasional controversy around data 
collection initiatives such as Cambridge Analytica’s use of Facebook data 
(Wong & Lewis 2018). The large players of surveillance capitalism—such as 
Facebook and Google—which dominate the online experience, serve as the 
exemplars touted by digital government advocates as what citizen-consumers 
should expect from their interaction with government (DTA 2018, 4). When 
the digital interfaces with government begin to resemble those of surveillance 
capitalism—web sites, mobile apps, chatbots—the digital subject will respond 
accordingly.  
Similarly, as we saw in an earlier chapter, the advocates of digital government 
present an untainted vision of convenience and liberation to their consumers. 
But, at the same time, social media users are more or less conscious of their 
inability to influence the logic of apps and the terms of service. The 
experience of citizen-customers as “end-users” of a system can be quite 
constraining when that interface is a mobile phone, the emblematic apparatus 
of user convenience and 24x7 accessibility. Lyndal Sleep and Kieran Tranter in 
their analysis of the Department’s mobile app, Express Plus Centrelink, with its 
social media-inspired, icon-driven interface, witnessed a subject “construed as 
a cyborg; a hybrid entity of human and smart device that is permanently up-
linked to the Department’s servers, continually responding to data requests, 
while potentially being monitored in real time” (Sleep & Tranter 2017, 510). 
One of the crucial effects of this form of interaction is “a dematerialisation of 
an institution and its disciplinary apparatus” (op. cit., 506). Given that this is 
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achieved just at the surface layer, if one considers all the other layers of 
abstraction I have discussed elsewhere, it is possible to imagine the degree to 
which the department, as a peopled organisation, is withdrawing from the 
citizen-customer. 
9.8  Conclusion 
As I discussed earlier in this chapter, the parliamentary committee investigating 
proposed legislation for the national facial recognition program reported 
several instances where the Department of Home Affairs’ minister and 
bureaucrats had given themselves broad discretionary powers that would have 
enabled mass surveillance, providing access to additional agencies and using 
the automated system as the sole evidence of someone’s identity. In their 
testimony to the committee and in supporting documentation, they claimed 
that, in each case, it was their intention to only use those powers in a narrow 
way (JCIS 2019, 52, 84, 87 &89). It seems that if the legislation had gone 
through in its proposed form, the only protection against the wider use of 
those broad powers would be the good intentions of the minister, the 
bureaucrats and all their successors. 
This chapter has argued that once such powers are available, their lawfulness 
is sufficient justification for their subsequent use. The licence given to 
enforcement functions and the flexible justification afforded by exceptional 
circumstances provide the discretionary platform for public officials to reach 
for the certainty teased by the ideal of complete information. The supporting 
system for a national facial recognition program had been largely constructed 
before parliamentary approval was sought, and it is conceivable that it was 
designed to enable the broader functionality sought by the bureaucrats. At the 
very least, it would not have been constructed to prevent such activity. 
This attempt to expand the powers of the bureaucracy was headed-off at the 
pass by a legislature that was alerted to it by its haste and ambition. 
Incidentally, it also offended the political sensitivities of both conservative and 
progressive parliamentarians. The other building blocks of a new mode of 
governance instanced in this chapter, such as MADIP, have gone ahead, partly 
because they were working within the existing discretionary powers delegated 
by the parliament to the executive and partly because they are more 
incremental and slow-moving.  
Collectively, these projects demonstrate the scale of the shadow text that is 
being generated by digitally enabled projects and the new capabilities they 
make possible. Each one of these episodes can be seen as an experiment from 
which system-level bureaucrats can learn what is technically possible, how 
innovations can be effectively advocated and legitimated, how they can be 
enabled through existing laws and how new laws can be crafted to provide 
maximum discretion to government actors. 
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The combination of systems and data involved in these multi-organisational 
arrangements is just one mode of the reorganisation of governance. It is 
complemented by the restructuring and reassignment of functions through 
various forms of modularisation. This movement has been inspired by private 
sector ideals and pushed by global corporations wanting to engage in those 
aggregated functions through partnership or outsourcing. At the intersection of 
these two modes is a burning bureaucratic desire for, and belief in, the ability 
to rationalise the world and the commercial drive of corporations to feed that 
hope. One of the key ingredients of that hope is the accumulation and 
standardisation of information about all aspects of its environment. 
The result is an assemblage that aspires to refine its own capabilities, but more 
importantly to make its environment in its own image in order to remove all 
confounding factors. The declared intentions to have policy constructed in a 
machine-readable form and the expanding methods of social control are clear 
indicators that the system can fulfil its design better when its environment 
corresponds to its interior. 
In the final chapter I will consider where the discourse and the practice 
documented so far may be leading. The new horizontal structures and cross 
jurisdictional operations lie somewhat beyond the reach of the 19th Century 




CHAPTER 10  CONCLUSION—DANGEROUS FUTURES 
10.1  Introduction 
In 2018, 14 years after publication of the Western Australian Strategy, the 
Digital Transformation Agency published the Australian Government’s Digital 
transformation strategy. This time, a “strategy” was addressed directly to the 
public. It promised to greatly improve ease of use in accessing government 
services, anticipate customer needs, and to notify them of new benefits as 
they progressed through each stage of life. Despite all the complications of 
infrastructure and a string of failed projects, the story was still one of 
unmitigated enthusiasm. The ideology of digital government was unchanged, 
despite 20 years of slower than anticipated uptake and the failures and 
overreach of the type I have documented in the preceding chapters. 
Compared to the Western Australian e-government Strategy, the Digital 
transformation strategy reiterated the ideology of digital government in an 
even less restrained marketing style, directly addressing the public using the 
second-person voice. What the digital transformation strategy repeated was an 
emphasis on the public interface, where citizen-consumers could have the 
same experience they have with online retail services. As Robo-debt and My 
Health Record controversies bubbled away in the media, the Digital 
transformation strategy encapsulated all that was promoted and obscured in 
the policies of the previous 20 years. Even though the Digital Transformation 
Agency was directly involved in its construction, what we do not see in its 
strategy are the massive control infrastructure and the substantial shifts in 
power involved in developing the systems that deliver online retail 
government. The digital government ideology promised transformed 
governance. The mode of governance is indeed being transformed under the 
guise of digital government, but not in the way that is described in the digital 
government narrative. In this conclusion I summarise the transformed 
governance that is emerging. 
10.2  The covering ideology 
Digital government may have started as a motivating myth to “lift politicians, 
bureaucrats and policy makers out of the banality of everyday administrative 
practice and into the possibilities of institutional innovation” (Bekkers & 
Homburg 2007, 374), but it is now just as effective as a covering narrative that 
diverts attention from the infrastructure of control and its makers. Having been 
publicly grilled on the subject by parliamentary committees for years, the 
authors of the Digital transformation strategy are only too aware of the 
problems and controversies that digitisation programs have attracted, but they 
do not address them. 
The Digital transformation strategy is neither a plan of action nor an account 
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of what is being done, but an offering of satisfying experiences to be had 
during life’s key stages, such as the birth of a child or the death of a loved 
one. This narrative reframes government as a service, locking into place its 
equivalence to the commercial retail sector, thus raising public expectations as 
much as reflecting them. Given the scale and range of behind-the-scenes 
activities I have described in the preceding three chapters, the customer 
service frame clearly serves a legitimating function above and beyond its status 
as a putative policy goal. While the less public documentation of the WPIT 
program is also laced with the language of customer convenience, other goals 
now predominate the construction of a system that aims to deliver it.  
The “digital” label invokes this class of products as the distinguishing principle 
of contemporary government, with entailments of inevitability and socio-
political neutrality. The inevitability is deliberately appealed to in the Digital 
government strategy (DTA 2018, 5) by citing Australia’s prominent position on 
the United Nations league table of “leading countries in e-government 
development” (UN 2018, 89). The technology frame is one of several ways in 
which the political is sanitised from the narrative. Conflicting interests and the 
range of advocates, developers, systems and other actors are all glossed over 
by the technological fetish at work behind the digital government label. 
The obscuring function of the digital government ideology is at least as 
important as its framing function. First, it deflects attention from the diversity 
and complexity of government engagement with the public (such as schools, 
hospitals, prisons, defence and intelligence roles). Second, it assumes a 
confluence of interests between the public, political leaders, bureaucracy and 
private sector participants. From the interviews for this thesis and my 
knowledge of the people involved, this obscuring narrative is probably not 
entirely cynical marketing, but a more feel-good story that doesn’t complicate 
or offend the audiences or the “stakeholders”. In many cases, especially in the 
first generation digital government policies, their authors probably had no idea 
of the implications of what they were advocating. Third, it keeps the 
infrastructure in the background, both in terms of the capability required to 
fulfil the digital government promise, as well as the capability that satisfies the 
appetites of bureaucrats and other system builders. Fourth, it fails to 
acknowledge all the external sources of regulation that are bought into 
government with the adoption of large computer systems. Fifth, and perhaps 
most importantly, it obscures the surveillance and control capability being 
developed in the name of digital government. 
What the alternative discourses, such as Attachment H, make clear is that the 
digital government ideology reflects what bureaucrats believe they are doing, 
even as they enhance their own power. 
The overall effect of the digital government ideology is to create a quiet and 
protected space within which the system-level bureaucrats and their partners 
can operate—building on the secrecy of the public service so carefully 
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nurtured within Westminster governments since the mid 19th century (de 
Maria 2001, 94 & n. 1, 105). As described in Chapter 6, the bureaucracy and 
their partners use the shelter of commercial confidence and cabinet 
confidentiality to establish a centre of power, draining discretion, flexibility 
and freedom of action away from the political layer of the executive, 
parliament and the public. 
10.3  The new public interface 
Beyond the obfuscating story, the actual construction of government digital 
systems is more revealing of an emerging governmentality at work. The 
enthusiasm for self-service, if realised, will not result in the warm personal 
attention suggested in the language of the policies. The customer-centric 
approach is instead heading closer to the hole-in-the-wall experience of the 
automatic teller machine (ATM). Here, citizen-customers confront a new multi-
layered mediation, at the heart of which is a locally configured globally-
developed commercial system. Except for residual circumstances, the 
Department as a peopled organisation is withdrawing from the public. 
Because the department itself has become an interface agent for its “policy 
partner” departments, the citizen customer is many times removed from “the 
government”. 
Thus, we see the bringing forth of the self-servicing, self-optimising, 
responsibilised neo-liberal subject. However, this entity has little freedom of 
movement, being managed at a distance through the technologies of targeting, 
prediction, prevention, elaborate conditionality and behaviour control. 
10.4  The infrastructure of surveillance and control 
This growing anticipatory capability is the product of the largest part of the 
work in digitising government: the infrastructure of surveillance and control. 
Missing from the discourse, this infrastructure can barely be glimpsed or 
imputed from the other side of the friendly customer interface. No audit or 
parliamentary inquiry has been able to investigate the aggregated governance 
capabilities that have been developed by the Department and similar “machine 
bureaucracies”. One of the successes of the service paradigm is to obscure the 
interconnected backend that enables the single view of the customer and the 
data sharing required for all that helpful form-filling assistance. Instead, we 
have a shopfront metaphor that implies a service-specific relationship with 
government. Similarly, there is little exposure of the vast shadow text (Zuboff 
2019, 186) that is being constructed behind the veil of privacy legislation, and 
the growing capacity of governments to share that information across agencies 
and programs. 
This infrastructure potentially places considerable power at the feet of 
bureaucrats and governments. Now it is being constructed, it will be available 
to those in power for the indefinite future. We are assured by the current 
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incumbents that they have no intention of using it inappropriately. But can 
they speak for future generations of politicians and bureaucrats? For now, we 
have the behaviour of the current generation to indicate the potential for 
bureaucrats and politicians to succumb to temptation. We have seen how a 
rationale of “system integrity” and a raft of exceptional circumstances have 
justified re-using information without the permission of subjects. In this 
context, privacy laws present no impediment to a department transferring its 
databases to another agency. The politics of security, compliance, prediction 
and prevention provide the cover for departments to re-purpose large volumes 
of data freely behind-the-scenes, without the knowledge and consent of 
subjects. In addition to these perpetual licenses for agencies to re-purpose 
data are special events such as terrorist attacks and pandemics that provide 
opportunities to turn the ratchet further. 
Driving the advance of this movement is a reflexive cycle of capability and 
appetite—whereby bureaucrats perceive a new capability afforded by the 
technology, they see and pursue new opportunities to reach for certainty. 
Incited by consultants, integrators and vendors, the imaginations of 
bureaucrats are stirred. As Henman puts it, “Advanced information 
technologies are … seen as particularly important in giving rise to the capacity 
to think about and act on population segments” (Henman 2004, 173, emphasis 
added). In this respect, an active area of development such as the WPIT 
program is what Foucault referred to as a “laboratory of power” (Foucault 
1977, 204). In Attachment H, the Department declared its desire to analyse 
customer behaviour and to model new programs and customer responses to 
them (DHS 2016a, s. 18.8). The proposed system will enable the Department’s 
“policy partners” to test policy options against the detailed circumstance-based 
profiles of customer segments and behavioural data gleaned from the 
transaction histories of customers. In addition to its own observations about 
future system capability, the Department will be encouraged by its private 
sector partners to identify new opportunities and draw on, and contribute to, 
global experience in managing customers. 
Part 3 of the thesis focussed on the example of welfare payments to contrast it 
with the claims of digital government policies. I focussed on the health and 
welfare payments system because it constitutes the majority of the Australian 
Government’s transactions with the public, and because of the intimacy of its 
contact with the public across many programs. However, it can also be seen 
as emblematic of similar trends in other sectors of government. More 
immediately, the Australian Government regards this approach as the model 
for delivering services in other sectors (Morrison 2019a). Along with social 
payments, taxation and immigration are seen as prime “machine 
bureaucracies” that for decades have been ripe for continuing computerisation 
(Dunleavy 2009, 416–17). Several large sectors of government have already 
embarked on this new mode of governance. The defence sector is furthest 
along this road (Wills 2017). The practice and industrial structure of systems 
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integration began with post-World War II development of complex military 
systems for the US government (Sapolsky 2005). Since then, what President 
Eisenhower labelled in 1961 the “military-industrial complex” (Wills 2017, 15) 
has been characterised by an increasing symbiosis of public and private 
organisations. The ever-consolidating intelligence sector, supported by a raft of 
empowering legislation (Ananian-Welsh & Williams 2014; Moorhouse 2014), is 
on a similar track (Greenwald 2014), with the added twist of its tie-in with 
surveillance capitalism (Levine 2018). Through organisational consolidation 
and system building, governments are constructing large centres of power that 
are also interacting with each other through the sharing of data via systems 
designed to address security and fraud risks, law enforcement and eligibility 
compliance. 
10.5  The emerging power structure 
These relationships illustrate the emerging power structures within the 
corporate state. While observers often present government in monolithic terms 
(Mitchell 1991, 90), throughout this thesis I have emphasised the role of the 
bureaucracy over that of the political leadership. There are several grounds for 
this. First, the digital government program has been pursued in similar ways 
across many jurisdictions. There are the occasional political champions, but 
digital government is not generally a theme in partisan manifestoes (Saint-
Martin 2004, 13–14). It is a program endorsed by the majority of governing 
parties that adhere to a broad neo-liberal political rationality, rather than being 
a point of differentiation. Second, this program of rationalisation has persisted 
at least over the last 30 years. The Department in its various guises has 
pursued this program since the 1990s (Henman 2010a, 53). In this endeavour, 
it has closer and more perennial relationships with its consultants, integrators 
and technology suppliers than it has with specific political parties or 
individuals. In Chapter 7 we saw how intimate those connections with 
industry could be, and indeed had to be, given the deep intertwining of 
system and organisation. 
The core of this power structure is a broader ecosystem of system-level 
bureaucrats and corporations, in which public governance extends across 
putative public/private boundaries. Not only do organisations engage over 
time, but the people who work on the system/organisational transformations 
work across those boundaries on various projects throughout their careers. 
Within the New Spirit of Capitalism, both senior executives and specialists 
form an itinerant workforce with horizontal, rather than vertical, career 
trajectories and worldviews that span sectors and organisations—where each 
worker is a “self-entrepreneur” (Foucault & Senellart 2008, 226)—another 
example of the neo-liberal subject, this time with a bit more autonomy. 
When we look at the way that the new governance is playing out, the agents 
whose agendas are being most vigorously pursued are the system-level 
 
202 
bureaucrats, the industry participants and the guardians of the public purse. 
On the one hand, these parties are bound together by a shared 
governmentality—the neo-liberal perspective on the size and role of 
government, the responsibilities of the citizen-customer and a commitment to 
instrumental rationalism as a mode of thought and action. On the other hand, 
they must accommodate each other’s particular interests within the alliance. To 
obtain funding for large transformations, system-level bureaucrats must 
convince the guardians that substantial cost reductions will be achieved. In the 
case of the Department, the Australian Government guardians are expecting 
billions of dollars in both reduced welfare outlays and operating costs in 
exchange for a $1.5 billion investment. The corporations are seeking a stream 
of income from government interactions with the public by mediating those 
relationships at multiple levels in the technology and policy stacks. While 
individually these corporations may compete against each other for 
government business, collectively they must convince system-level bureaucrats 
and guardians that such ambitious system developments are not just feasible 
and cost-effective, but genuinely transformational—despite a disturbing track 
record for such projects, especially in government (Gauld, Goldfinch & Dale 
2006, 10–19). For their part, the system level bureaucrats are dependent on 
those providers to deliver the systems that are the foundation of their power. 
And by pursuing reform through mega-projects rather than incremental 
change, bureaucrats have greater scope to re-work governance in the guise of 
a technology project. In return, system level bureaucrats offer corporations 
strategic opportunities as well as specific projects. At a broader level, 
consultants, integrators and others work what Horrocks describes as an e-
government “power loop”, 
in which consultants occupy influential positions in government and public policy 
circles and then act as powerful agents in promoting the development of both e-
government ‘solutions’ and the technology and expertise these require to ‘deliver’ 
the promised outcomes. This creates further opportunities for shaping and 
controlling e-government policy and for more ‘experts’ to enter the e-government 
environment, thus increasing the power and influence of the ‘consultocracy’ 
(Horrocks 2009, 111–12). 
We saw this at work with the WPIT mega-project, where 11 consulting firms 
worked on its preparatory stages before it went out to the market for software 
and systems integrators. This is to say nothing of the preceding decades of 
working with a limited number of consultants and integrators on major 
technology projects (Margetts 2009, 118). 
It is crucial to look at these relationships beyond individual projects, programs 
or departments. As digitisation is extended and integrated across more 
government functions, working with consultants, integrators and software 
vendors becomes an unexceptional and expected way of governing. Multiple 
consulting and integration firms have developed a full repertoire of public 
governance functions that can be applied to government. The consulting 
services offered by large consulting firms and integrators constitute a cradle-to-
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grave range of governance functions (e.g., KPMG 2020). Multiply that by the 
number of such firms with businesses structured around government policy, 
management, integration and IT consulting and this shadow governance 
function is substantial compared to the parallel functions within the public 
sector. Collectively, one could in a sense describe this as an administrative-
industry complex that operates in the same way as the global military-
industrial complex. Indeed, system integrators are just one type of professional 
organisation or practice that emerged from the military-industrial complex, and 
which has since migrated to the governance of corporations and the public 
sector (Davies, Brady & Hobday 2007; Sapolsky 2005). The defence field, 
where this level of intense public-private entanglement is most developed, 
provides one indication of how far corporate participation in government can 
still expand in other sectors, all within existing constitutional arrangements. 
10.6  The road to certainty 
This emerging power structure is drawing power from the political, legislative, 
legal and public realms. I have described how the “system” is attempting to 
draw-in decision making discretion from the policy field, the limits of 
parliamentary scrutiny and the protective regime of administrative secrecy. 
Authors such as Bovens, Zouridis and Cruikshank have described how judicial 
decisions are being drawn into administrative processes as they are automated 
(Bovens & Zouridis 2002; Cruikshank 1999). I have also argued that, for now, 
while legacy systems and complex policies thwart attempts to fully rationalise 
governance, that the relationship between system level bureaucrats and their 
corporate partners remains symbiotic. 
What drives this partnership between system level bureaucrats and 
corporations is a will to certainty. In many ways this is continuing the long-
term desire of bureaucracy described by Max Weber: 
Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, 
unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal 
costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic 
administration (1970 [1922], 214) 
In the products and services being pushed at them by industry, an emerging 
class of technology-literate bureaucrats see an opportunity to break through 
constraints to overcome complexity, uncertainty, risk and ambiguity. A large-
scale transformation opens a space for pursuing dreams of control not 
otherwise possible through everyday processes or incremental change. The 
long-term program to perfect “the house of certainty” (Foucault 1977, 202) 
involves the removal of reverse salients—those points of resistance from 
internal administration and the environment that hold back the optimal 
performance of the system (Dean 1996, 62–63; Hughes 1983, 14). Internally, 
this involves initiatives such as removing discretion from human agents and 
reducing the participation of humans from routine (especially non-
discretionary) procedures. Externally, there are also critical sources of 
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uncertainty that need to be addressed. The external reverse salients present 
perhaps the biggest challenges to the system and the partnership. One of the 
most remarkable aspects of the description of the WPIT program in 
Attachment H was the extent to which the system-level bureaucrats were 
openly committed to tackling reverse salients in the environment beyond the 
boundaries of the department. First among these are the unreliable and 
devious citizen-customers who drive up transaction costs, thus necessitating 
human intervention by the Department. The WPIT plan is to mobilise 
information from customer dealings with other organisations in order to have 
a clear view of their circumstances before customers do—what the UN called 
“anticipatory governance” (UN 2016, 34). This view of the customer extends 
beyond immediate contact with the department into the lives of citizens and 
customers, at least in their documented dealings with other organisations 
within and beyond the state. 
The other major reverse salient is the complex policy environment. It has 
proved impossible in the past to incorporate even parts of the existing policy 
regime into a new system (Deloitte 2019; Henman 2010a, 53–61). As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, welfare payment policies are unlikely to be simplified 
in any significant way before the completion of the WPIT program. 
Nevertheless, Attachment H set out a program for standardising policy rules 
through “templates”. Presumably the Department’s ambition is to have all their 
“policy partner” departments prepare carefully structured unambiguous rules 
so that the system can be fully automated.105 Presumably, parliamentarians will 
not mess up the templates on their way through the legislative process. 
In this way, policy would be just one of the areas subject to the logic of 
modularity. The unified service delivery organisation would ideally not only 
provide a single interface between the (Australian) state106 and the public, but 
also a single interface between policy and service delivery. This enables the 
department to operate strictly on rationalist principles, isolated from policy 
deliberations, social outcomes and, through tightly structured self-service 
channels, the complicated lives of citizen-customers. It becomes a free-floating 
service assemblage neither accountable to the public for policy nor 
accountable to the government for the behaviour of its self-optimising 
customers, who are no longer citizens in terms of their role in government or 
as holders of rights in a democratic state (Bridges 2017, 7–10). In stripping-
away the political, the digital government agenda has separated governance 
from the democratic realm. Initial promises of transparency and participation 
have been replaced by mechanisms of citizen co-option such as design 
 
105 It must be said that the chances of a government embarking on a wholesale re-working of 
welfare policy to remove all ambiguity are remote. Apart from the logical limitations, it would 
open up major political conflicts involving many and varied interests, with few political 
benefits. 




workshops and project websites, where individual customers connect to the 
bureaucracy rather than the polity. The citizen-customer is another factor to be 
managed. 
This emerging socio-technical regime will have been assembled with no 
effective oversight of its totality. Existing oversight mechanisms and 
governance arrangements have exposed only some of its parts. Audits, 
budgets, reporting arrangements and parliamentary inquiries present a view 
that is fragmented across departments, programs and projects. Even in a 
specific inquiry into digital service delivery, the Australian Parliament was 
unable to see behind the surface of service delivery, the cost and failings of 
projects, and the expenditure on contract staff and consultants (FPARC 2018a). 
10.7  The need for new forms of democratic oversight 
In this thesis I have attempted to account for an emerging reconfiguration of 
power that conventional mechanisms of governance are unable to see or 
understand, and so never properly engage with key elements of the corporate 
state. It is misleading to label this mode of government as merely digital, 
rather a hybrid public/private regime that uses, talks about and deploys digital 
products in its own service. It is better seen as the outcome of the 
convergence of market strategies and the bureaucratic will to certainty. As 
such is it not a complete break from the past but an acceleration in the 
continuing evolution of the modern state. The established conventions of 
public governance reflect the vocabulary and ideals of a hierarchical path of 
authority and accountability within a unitary state, isolated and independent 
from both the public and the market. However, while the barriers to access by 
the public have been retained, those for industry have been comprehensively 
breached by the new regime. 
The invisibility of this new mode of governance derives in part from an 
obscuring ideology, the secrecy regime and also because it is unprecedented. 
Shoshana Zuboff describes our inability to grasp the significance of this kind 
of situation in terms of the unprecedented being “necessarily unrecognizable” 
(Zuboff 2019, 12, emphasis added). The unrecognisability of the situation also 
arises from our inability to comprehend the social grounding of technology. 
Langdon Winner described the disorientation this way: 
What we lack is our bearings. The contemporary experience of things 
technological has repeatedly confounded our vision, our expectations, and our 
capacity to make intelligent judgements. Categories, arguments, conclusions, and 
choices that would have been entirely obvious in earlier times are obvious no 
longer … Many of our standard conceptions of technology reveal a disorientation 
that borders on dissociation from reality (Winner 1978, 7–8). 
In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to engage these dilemmas by 
describing the new power structure, the aims of its participants, the methods 
they have deployed and the ideology that paves its way and provides cover 
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from the scrutiny of democratic safeguards against executive over-reach and 
external influence. If they are successful, emerging programs of social control, 
such as the ones I have described, will provide ever greater affordances to 
exploit the crises and exceptional circumstances identified by the 
bureaucracies of risk and security. It is my hope that the insights offered by 
this thesis will help to bring this power structure and the consequences of 
these appetites for certainty to public light. Further, may this work contribute 
to the envisaging of new democratic controls specially geared to these times. 
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